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PAMARNATH CAVE

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DEFENDING KASHMIR



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DEFENDING
KASHMIR

A LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS



By the Hon. Mr. J. H. W. ...
...
...

"HERO OF THE NAUSHERA BATTLE"



Brigadier Mohammed Usman who died in action at Jhangar on the night of July 3-4, 1948.

DEFENDING KASHMIR

RIGHTEOUSNESS of cause and selflessness in performance, a rare patriotic fervour and faith which triumphed over Nature and, above all, a high sense of chivalry—in the true sense of the term, namely, “disinterested devotion to the cause of the weak and the oppressed”—are what make the Indian Armed Forces’ campaign in Jammu and Kashmir a crusade.

India intervened in Kashmir in response to an SOS from the people and ruler of the State. The act was not tainted by any ambitions of self-aggrandisement or acquisition of territory. At the very outset, India, of her own accord, announced to the world that when law and order and peace had been restored in Jammu and Kashmir, the people’s verdict would be sought on the crucial question of accession of the State and India would abide by it.

The Indian Army and Air Force which went into action in Kashmir at 24 hours’ notice, with no previous planning whatsoever, and fought against heavy odds, had a duty to discharge by their government and country. The political future of the State was none of their business. The officers and men of the Indian Army and Air Force in Jammu and Kashmir applied themselves to the immediate task on hand.

Free India's first military campaign enhanced the Indian Armed Forces' reputation for high discipline, devotion to duty, right conduct and disinterested service—the code of "dharma" that the Lord preached to the warrior Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra.

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"India will fight till the last raider is out of Kashmir," said Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in his first speech at Srinagar after the invasion.

INTRODUCTION

AUGUST 15, 1947, found the State of Jammu and Kashmir in a unique and unenviable position among the Indian States.

Other Indian States had no choice but to accede to the Dominion with which they were contiguous. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous with both India and Pakistan.

Almost wedged between the two, with a common border with both, and torn between its political and economic affiliations with the two Dominions, the State of Jammu and Kashmir could not make up its mind and pleaded for time to think it over before casting its lot with one or the other Dominion.

While postponing the decision on accession, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir sought to maintain the *status quo* by immediately entering into a "standstill" agreement with Pakistan.

At a press conference held in New Delhi early in October, 1947, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the largest and the most influential political party in the State, appealed to India and Pakistan not to hustle his people into a decision on the fateful question of accession. He declared that his first task was to achieve responsible government in his State; when he had accomplished that objective, he promised that he would seek the people's verdict on the issue of accession and faithfully abide by it.

While Sheikh Abdullah was propagating this viewpoint in the Indian capital, his emissary, Mr. G. M. Sadiq, one of the National Conference leaders and at present a minister in Sheikh Abdullah's government, went to Lahore in order to convince Muslim League leaders of the justice of the plea of the people of Kashmir as expressed by Sheikh Abdullah.

The Government of India accepted Sheikh Abdullah's standpoint and even backed his demand for popular and responsible government in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Indeed, the Congress had always supported Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference in their struggle for reforms in the State.

Pakistan, however, appeared to be in a hurry to accomplish Kashmir's accession to that Dominion. Within a few days of partition, an economic "squeeze" was applied to the State. In violation of the "standstill" agreement, Pakistan rigorously curtailed supplies of petrol, salt, sugar, cloth and other consumer goods to Kashmir. The customs revenue at Domel, the State's frontier post, dwindled from Rs. 30,000 per day to a few hundreds.

THE PRELUDE

As the economic screw tightened on the State, its borders were harassed by raiders from Pakistan. Between September 3, when the first border incident occurred south-east of Jammu, and October 20, when the full-scale invasion of Kashmir was launched along the Domel road, the border was pierced at several points almost every day. Organised armed bands plundered and looted and murdered inhabitants of border villages in Jammu and taxed and stretched the police and military forces of the State.

By the end of September, these border incidents increased in number, tempo and magnitude and assumed the proportions of a multi-pronged invasion from across the border.

By D-Day (October 20), the defence of the State all along the border had been punctured well, with the State Forces dispersed and encircled in penny-packets all over Jammu.

The strategy and tactics displayed in these operations suggested expert military planning. The planners of the invasion appear to have satisfied themselves that India could not, would not or dare not intervene in Kashmir, with her hands so full with internal turmoil and with the Junagadh and Hyderabad problems about to boil over.

If India was so foolhardy as to take on the Kashmir trouble too, they calculated, she would first be beaten by logistics and by the formidable natural obstacles in her way. No road-link worth the mention existed between India and Kashmir. Even by air, the distance between Delhi, the Indian Army base, and Srinagar, was 500 miles. Besides, the notorious Kashmir winter was round the corner.

The invasion planners were right. The obstacles in the way

of the Indian Army were, indeed, formidable. But they were rather rash when they concluded that the Indian Army would be deterred by those obstacles.

BATTLE AGAINST ELEMENTS

Indian troops and airmen in Jammu and Kashmir fought other foes besides the raiders. Their major battle was against the elements. Fighting the raiders was the least part of the campaign. No harder training ground could have been found for free India's armed forces. Compared with the terrain and conditions of fighting in Kashmir, the Arakan and Assam campaigns during the last war were almost a picnic.

From the arctic conditions in the Zoji La and Gurais in the north to the mountain-to-mountain fighting in Uri in the west and the steamy jungles of Jhangar in the south, Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir spanned a wide range of terrain and climate.

Foremost, the Indian army in Kashmir fought against thin tenuous lines of communications, quagmired by rain, obliterated by land-slides and choked by winter snows.

The 200-mile long Jammu-Srinagar road is a geometrical nightmare; this is the life-line of troops in the Kashmir valley as well as of the civilian population. Keeping this road functioning in fair weather and foul was the battle in which Army engineers and the Pioneer Corps engaged themselves and today thousands of tons of goods are carried on this road everyday.

War in the Uri sector really meant fighting up and down and on the top of a series of mountains eight to ten thousand feet high. Clearing a road-block in this sector amounted to clearing up the enemy perched on the top of the high mountains, flanking in waves on either side of the road. He who took the offensive in this sector had first to demolish these piquets.

In winter they were snow-bound and yet throughout the winter of 1948, Indian troops—many of whom had never seen snow in their life and suffered from frost-bite—kept a vigil here, vigorously throwing back the enemy's repeated attempts to penetrate into the Kashmir valley.

Further north around the Zoji La and Gurais, the fighting conditions are nearly arctic all the year round. This is the eerie land of blizzards and avalanches. The term "Zoji La" itself means, in the Kashmiri language, "Blizzard Pass" (*soji*, "blizzard" and *la*, "pass"). Here our piquets are perched on mountains 16,000 to 17,000 feet high, perpetually covered with snow. Living at these heights was a new and strange experience for the *jawans*.

At this altitude breathing becomes hard and one is often afflicted with headache. It takes three hours to brew tea and four hours for potatoes to get half boiled and one hour for a *chappati* to be baked. Cooking rice and pulses and meat at these heights was, of course, out of the question.

Whenever the weather was good, cooked meals were sent up to the piquets from the base. Mules and porters threading their way along bridle-paths and goat-tracks were the only medium of supplies to our troops in this sector.

Leh, in distant Ladakh in the north-east, can be reached only at the end of a month's trek through difficult mountain-paths. Aircraft flying to Leh have to be equipped with de-icing and oxygen apparatus. Airlift operations had to be carried on at incredible heights and although the aircraft available to us were unsuitable for high altitude flying, the RIAF pilots maintained regular supply and successfully defied the rigours of Himalayan weather.

Nestling in the foothills of the Himalayas, Jammu Province is the watershed of many streams which go to swell the great Indus. The country is broken by ravines, streams and rivulets. It is thickly wooded and covered with scree and shrub, making concealment easy. In the rainy season vast stretches of country are reduced to quagmires.

All these natural and logistic barriers the Indian Army conquered. This was an outstanding military achievement. But the people of Jammu and Kashmir admired the Indian Army for another reason. They will remember with gratitude the Indian Army's war against disease and epidemics in their midst, while the network of modern roads touching the remotest parts of the State—which are their roads to prosperity—will be a standing monument to the Indian Army's good work in the State.

BOON TO KASHMIR

The labourers reaped the greatest material benefit from the construction of roads in the Kashmir valley as well as in Jammu. More than 100 miles of road for vehicular traffic and as many miles of pony-track over high mountains, built at a cost of Rs. 3.4 crores, have become a permanent boon to the Kashmiris.

New and better roads, modern telegraph and telephone communications and two all-weather airfields are other permanent benefits brought to the people of Jammu and Kashmir by the presence of the Indian Army in their midst.

Out of the Rs. 75 lakhs spent by the Army in building winter huttings in the valley, about Rs. 30 lakhs went into the pockets of the local labourers in the shape of wages and the balance of the amount was utilised for the purchase of local timber.

While the Indian Armed Forces fought the invaders back and assured security of normal life to the people, the industry and trade of the State slowly recovered and in some instances even prospered. The Government of the State, with the help of the Government of India, reorganised the transport system and, by means of special measures, stimulated the export trade of the State.

During 1948, silk factories in the State worked to their maximum capacity, their turnout being 20 lakh yards of silk cloth as against the annual average of four lakh yards previously. Formerly, Kashmir used to export 1,175 maunds of raw silk annually, but during the last year its mills not only consumed the whole quantity of raw silk produced in the State, but were wanting to import more from abroad to meet their requirements.

After the invasion in 1947, the forest industry of the State received a great setback and revenue accruing from export of timber shrank considerably. But during the year 1948, 9,65,000 scantlings measuring 3,69,000 cubic feet and worth Rs. 12 crores were exported through Jammu-Pathankot Road.

Fruits to the value of Rs. 65 lakhs were exported in 1948 compared with Rs. 29,81,000 worth of fruits exported in 1944-1945. There has also been an appreciable increase in the export of woollen goods, embroidery and other fancy articles, metal

manufacture and indigenous drugs. As regards imports, salt, tea and piecegoods were imported in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the local population.

Above all, the *jawan's* high sense of duty and discipline and his friendly and helpful bearing towards the civilians endeared the Indian Army to the common people.

The happy relationship between Indian troops and the civilians was strikingly demonstrated when, after the cease-fire, an Indian battalion withdrew from a certain village in the Uri sector. The parting scenes were indeed touching. The villagers came up to the Officer Commanding the battalion and with tears in their eyes begged him not to leave them. At a public send-off, their spokesman formally expressed the gratitude of the village to the OC of the battalion for the security and peace brought to their village by Indian troops.

As soon as an area was liberated from the invaders, Indian troops plunged themselves into the task of rehabilitating the people and restoring normal conditions in the villages. They even lent a hand in harvesting their crops; they protected them against disease and epidemics; they gave them work. In besieged Punch they even shared their rations with the refugees and gave away tinned milk to children.

PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

Behind the protective shield provided by the Indian Army, for the first time in the history of the State, a people's government flourished. The void created by the breakdown of the administration at the first impact of the invasion was filled by Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference, and thus came to birth a people's government in the State.

The people of the valley rallied round Sheikh Abdullah, and they organised a volunteer corps to maintain peace and order in the city and prepared to defend their hearths and homes against the invaders. The orderly life in Srinagar during that fateful week was at once a testimony to Sheikh Abdullah's influence over his people and the Kashmiris' determination to defend their country against the invaders, if need be, with their bare fists.

This *ad hoc* administration set up by Sheikh Abdullah

during the days of travail soon flowered into a full-fledged popular government enjoying the confidence of the people and striving to ameliorate their lot under the abnormal conditions created by war. The absolute ruler of the State was now reduced to a constitutional head.

At the end of 15 months of gruelling fighting, in summer heat and winter snows, the Indian Army had the satisfaction of securing the vital Kashmir valley against the invaders, ensuring the safety of the Buddhist Ladakh province in the north-east, liberating a large part of Jammu province from the hostiles, and confining the latter to the border strip consisting of the districts of Mirpur, Punch and Muzaffarabad.

In the summer of 1948 Pakistan threw off its mask and admitted to the United Nations Commission Pakistan Army's participation in the fighting in Kashmir—what India knew all the time and had been telling the United Nations Security Council, and what Pakistan had been, till then, vehemently denying. By then, more than two Pakistan divisions besides 32 "Azad" Kashmir Battalions had been put in the field by Pakistan. For obvious reasons they stopped short of using their air force, as that would have meant precipitating an open war between the two dominions.

The Hon'ble S. Baldev Singh, Defence Minister, inspecting a guard of honour provided by a battalion in Kashmir.





Gen. K. M. Cariappa, C-in-C, Indian Army, who was then GOC-in-C, Western Command.



Lt-Gen. S. M. Shrinagesh, GOC-in-C, Western Command who was then 5 Corps Commander.

THE



Left: Maj-Gen. Kalwant Singh who commanded Jammu and Kashmir forces from October 1947 to May 1948. Middle: Maj-Gen. K. S. Thimayya, GOC, 19 Division, Srinagar. Right: Maj-Gen. Atma Singh, GOC, 26 Division, Jammu.



Brig. Yadhunath Singh who commanded our forces in the Punch "link-up" operations.



Brig. L. P. Sen, who stemmed the tide of raiders at Uri in the winter of 1947-48.

E LEADERS



Brig. H. L. Atal who commanded Indian troops in the Zoji La operations.



Brig. Pritam Singh, "Hero of Punch."



Brig. Harbux Singh who commanded our forces in Tithwal.

CHAPTER I

A DRAMATIC DECISION

In the month of October 1947, large bands of raiders, inspired and backed by Pakistan, poured across the border into Jammu and Kashmir at several points.

They were a motley crowd, composed of frontier tribesmen attracted by the promise of rich loot, ex-soldiers from Punch and Pakistan, some regular soldiers from the Pakistan Army "on leave" and deserters from the Kashmir State Forces.

The raiders came in motor lorries and were armed with modern weapons, including Bren-guns, Sten-guns, grenades, heavy mortars, anti-tank rifles and land-mines and an unlimited supply of ammunition. They were led by officers fully conversant with modern strategy and warfare, some of whom belonged to the Pakistan Army.

The main column of the raiders drove down the Domel road on October 20, heading for Srinagar, their supreme objective. This column moved in 300 lorries and included 1,000 tribesmen from Hazara plus 400 Pathans, said to be Afridis, in addition to Muslim League National Guards and other Pakistan nationals.

Over a month before they launched their main invasion along the Domel road, the "softening" process had been put into operation. All along the 500-mile Pakistan border, raids, small and big, had tested, baited, decoyed and dispersed the forces guarding the security of the State.

The column's advance along the road to Srinagar was swift. The invaders reckoned that they would be in Srinagar on October 26. But they did not reckon with two factors.

Firstly, the tribesmen amongst them busied themselves with looting and pillaging while the going was good, and forgot the "holy war" and its military objective.

Secondly, Brigadier Rajendra Singh of the State Forces, gathering together a remnant of 150 men, engaged the invaders for two days at Uri. The Brigadier himself and almost all his men were slain in the gallant rearguard





action, but he had halted their advance for two precious days.

But that was also the only resistance of any consequence that the invaders had met in their drive towards Srinagar. Within four days of crossing the border, the invaders had covered more than half the distance to their coveted objective, Srinagar. They overran Uri and captured Mahura, the electric power station, 50 miles from Srinagar, and plunged the latter city in darkness. Now Baramula and Srinagar itself were threatened. It looked as though nothing could stop the invading hordes from getting to Srinagar.

When on October 25, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, sent an SOS to the Government of India, the fate of the entire State hung in the balance. The plea for immediate military aid was supported by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the popular and undisputed leader of the people of Kashmir. All his life, the Sheikh had fought the Maharaja and his regime in the cause of democratic reform in the State; now in the hour of common peril, he joined his opponent in appealing to India for help.

On October 26, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession, and the same day the Government of India took the momentous decision to send military aid to Srinagar.

On October 27, the first batch of Indian troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. Rai flew to Srinagar. They flew because that was the only medium of transport left to them, at such short notice. By land, they would have been too late. Some 300 miles of precarious fair-weather road lay between India and Srinagar.

Over a hundred civilian aircraft were immediately mobilised to fly troops, equipment and supplies to Srinagar. RIAF and civilian pilots and ground-crews rose to the occasion and worked day and night to make the air-lift a success. The ferry service to Srinagar continued unabated up to November 17, during which time 704 sorties were flown from Delhi.

Seldom in the history of warfare has an operation been put through with no previous planning and with many handicaps, not the least of which were almost non-existent lines of communication and a complete lack of intelligence of enemy strength and dispositions.



A sentry guarding the Jammu airfield.

When the first troops were flown for Srinagar, they were instructed to circle over the airfield before landing. They were not sure whether the airfield had not fallen into the hands of the enemy. As a matter of fact, the instructions to Col. Rai were not to land if there was any doubt on the point, but to fly back to Jammu. After an interval of tense suspense, at 10.30 a.m., a wireless flash from Srinagar announced the safe landing of the first wave of troops.

The dispatch of troops to Srinagar was the responsibility of the Delhi-East Punjab Command (now called Western Command), which had originally been formed as an operational command to co-ordinate the numerous internal defence duties in which the Army in Delhi and East Punjab was involved following the partition.

The headquarters staff of this Command consisted of just eight officers. The units under the Command had been fully committed on internal defence duties, distributed in penny-packets, escorting non-Muslim and Muslim refugee trains and foot columns and maintaining law and order. The training of units had therefore suffered considerably. Most units had got somewhat disorganised following the partition of the Army and the withdrawal of the British element.

Instructions to send a battalion to Srinagar were received by the Command headquarters at 1 p.m. on October 26. 1 battalion of the Sikh Regiment, under Lt-Col. Rai, which was then employed on internal defence duties at Gurgaon, was ordered to concentrate at Palam airfield.

By midnight on October 26-27, the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh managed to assemble his battalion headquarters plus one company at Palam. Clothing, rations and ammunition were issued to the troops at the airfield, and by first light on October 27, the Sikhs were airborne. The battalion head-

The first batch of Indian soldiers flown to Srinagar being rushed to the front in civilian transport.



quarters was flown in three RIAF Dakotas from Palam and one company took off in civilian Dakotas from Willingdon airport.

Later in the day, one more company employed on railway protection duties arrived at Palam. The remainder of 1 Sikh was still out on detachment duties and had to be brought to Delhi to be flown to Srinagar the following day.

Six hundred out of the 704 sorties were flown under the direct supervision of staff officers of the then skeleton Delhi-East Punjab Command headquarters. For the first fortnight, the daily routine for staff officers of this headquarters began at 4 a.m. They arranged for the flight of the first wave up to 8 a.m., and then had to work in their offices up to late hours in the evening, with two or three hours' break in between, to lay on the flight of the second wave. At night they had again to go to the airfield to arrange issue of rations, clothing and ammunition and to detail aircraft loads for the flights of the following day.

On October 27, when the first wave of Indian troops under Col. Rai landed in Srinagar, the invaders were already in Baramula. Thirty-five miles of fine tarmac road was all that lay between them and Srinagar.

Col. Rai's orders were to defend the airfield and consolidate his position. On landing, however, he found himself faced with a dilemma. He had to take a quick decision—the enemy was at Baramula, the strategic bottleneck which opens into the Srinagar valley. Once the invaders were allowed to enter and fan out into the Srinagar plain, the game was up.

Should he give immediate battle to the invaders—estimated at anything between 3,000 and 5,000—at Baramula, with his woefully inadequate force or wait till adequate reinforcements arrived? Col. Rai took the decision and crashed into the invaders' column at Baramula.

As he had no motor transport himself he acquired civilian buses through the local Government and rushed his troops to within two miles of Baramula. Holding one company in reserve, he put in an attack with another company. He found, however, that it was no ill-organised rabble that he had to contend with but an organised body of men armed with light and medium machine-guns and mortars, divided into units and

sub-units, and led by commanders who knew modern tactics and the use of ground.

Col. Rai's company was deployed on a hill along the main road. Some time after battle had been joined, Col. Rai discovered that large parties of raiders were working their way around his flanks and that machine-gun fire was coming from the flanks as well as from the front.

There was a serious threat of both his companies being encircled and annihilated. Thereupon, Col. Rai decided to withdraw to Pattan, halfway between Baramula and Srinagar. He got his reserve company away in buses and gradually began to pull out his leading company which was at that time committed. He himself remained with the forward section to make sure that all his troops moved back safely.

The last party of Indian troops had to run the gauntlet of heavy fire in order to escape the trap. Many fell dead; among them was Col. Rai himself—the victim of a sniper's bullet. But he had succeeded in his object—he had staggered the enemy, disorganised his column and halted his advance long enough for reinforcements to arrive from India. By his courage and dash vital progress in the saving of Srinagar was achieved.

The troops, however, left without a commanding officer, fell back to a point only $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Srinagar. But the same night they went forward again, reoccupied Pattan and went even further to the 26th milestone from Srinagar. There they found the raiders swarming around the countryside. They then fell back on Pattan, where they occupied a ridge and dug in.

Meanwhile, a brigade headquarters and a flight of RIAF Spitfire, Tempest, and Harvard aircraft for closer co-operation and air reconnaissance were flown from Delhi. The 161 Brigade arrived in Srinagar close on the heels of the 1 Sikh Regiment. Brigadier L. P. Sen, who won his DSO in the famous battle of Kangaw in the Arakan during the last World War, arrived in Srinagar and took over command of all Indian and State Forces in the Srinagar valley.

The situation in the first week of operations in Kashmir can best be described as "touch and go." The threat to Srinagar continued, even increased. For the Indian Army, the week



Lt.-Col. D. R. Rai, who died in action on the outskirts of Baramula on October 27, 1947.

was one of desperate struggle to gain time for adequate troops to be flown in from India. That struggle took the shape of offensive delaying actions.

Scanty intelligence reports of the raiders' movements indicated that there were at least four columns of raiders converging on Srinagar and the airfield, one column moving from the west from Baramula, another from the south-west, a third from the north-west and a fourth from the north.

On November 3, a company of the 1 Kumaon Regiment, which in the meantime had been flown in, under Major Somnath Sharma, went out on a fighting patrol to Badgam, nine miles south-west of Srinagar and hardly half a mile from the airfield.

The company ran into an enemy force, 500 to 700 strong, who attacked supported by 3" and 2" mortars. The encounter last-




Maj. Somnath Sharma, who died in action at Badgam on November 3, 1947.

ed over four hours. Maj. Sharma led his men with remarkable skill and inflicted many casualties on the enemy. Brig. Sen. realising that the Kumaonis were faced with a body of well armed raiders infinitely superior in numbers, immediately dispatched reinforcements. But before they could reach the Kumaonis, Maj. Sharma was killed when a two-inch mortar bomb exploded near him.

The loss of the commander as well as the fierceness of the enemy's attack resulted in the two forward platoons of the Kumaon company being overrun. The third platoon fought on and when the reinforcements arrived, the situation steadied up. The enemy's casualties in this action were estimated at about 200, while the Kumaonis suffered 15 killed and 32 wounded. The air support by RIAF fighter aircraft to our troops proved invaluable in this engagement, which removed an

INVASION MAP OF KASHMIR AND JAMMU



immediate threat to the airfield and gave us more breathing time.

The day after the Badgam engagement, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Deputy Prime Minister, and Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Minister, arrived in Srinagar and found that the position was still very grave. They returned to Delhi the same day and reported the position to a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. On November 5, an additional battalion of infantry was flown to Srinagar and more reinforcements were sent daily thereafter for some time.


When it was noticed that the raiders could bypass our position at Pattan, 17 miles outside Srinagar, and infiltrate into the city itself, Brig. Sen decided to pull back his troops to a point $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles due west of Srinagar city. In so doing, he strengthened the defence of the city as well as shortened the line of communication of his troops.

Since the withdrawal from Pattan almost coincided with the Badgam engagement, the raiders got away with the impression that the Indian Army was in full retreat. They thereupon concentrated their main body astride the Baramula road and faced our forces entrenched outside the city.

Thus, while the enemy was preparing for a final assault on the city, we were fast building up for an offensive ourselves.

Major-General Kalwant Singh arrived in Srinagar on November 5, and took over command of all the forces in Jammu and Kashmir. At the same time, one squadron of armoured cars adventured their way to Srinagar by the perilous 300-mile road from the East Punjab via Jammu and the 9,000 foot high Banihal Pass and over ricketty bridges fit only for light tourist traffic. In Srinagar, large crowds lined the route and loudly cheered the cavalcade as it rumbled past.

The raiders' main position had been spotted and the stage was set for the projected offensive. On the morning of November 7, our troops attacked the enemy. At the same time one troop of armoured cars and a detachment of infantry which were patrolling in the Gandharbal area were ordered to manoeuvre back so as to take on the enemy from the rear. Brig. Sen sent one force of armoured cars and troops north of the Anchar Lake to go behind the raiders' positions which were hinged on a village called Shelatang. He dispatched another





A village near Baramula set on fire by retreating raiders.

column supported by armoured cars straight down the Baramula road and a battalion of infantry to attack the raiders' right flank. RIAF fighters gave close support from the air.

The battle of Shelatang lasted 12 hours. Trapped from three sides, surprised by armoured cars and pursued from the air by the RIAF, the raiders fled westwards in disorder, leaving behind 300 dead. In the words of Brig. Sen, "the RIAF, in this crucial engagement and during the follow up, played a decisive role."

With this battle the Indian Army turned the corner. It was a decisive victory, which broke the back of the enemy drive, demoralised the invaders and enabled us to go over to the offensive. It removed the threat to Srinagar once and for all.

Indian forces took up the pursuit and arrived in Pattan the same evening. The next day, November 8, they made for Baramula, and after some skirmishes on the road, entered the town in the afternoon.

To their great disappointment, however, they found that the

slight delay in their advance, caused by shortage of petrol, had enabled the main party of raiders to escape from Baramula along the road to Uri and Domel.

Even before we reached Uri, the Indian column ran out of petrol at least twice and had to wait for replenishment from Srinagar. The civilian buses borrowed by the Army were unsuitable and too few to meet the needs.

The momentum of this victory should have taken us straight to Muzaffarabad if only we had enough petrol and military motor transport. It was later revealed that the invaders were in a headlong retreat and there were no enemy troops in reserve even in Muzaffarabad to make a stand against us. In between, most of the bridges had, of course, been blown up by the retreating forces, some of them beyond repair and others incapable of permitting even a diversion.

Baramula as our troops found it after expelling the raiders.



CHAPTER II

THE RAPE OF BARAMULA

INDIAN troops found Baramula in a shambles. The raiders had run amuck in the town, burning, pillaging, looting and murdering. Half the town had been burned to the ground; shops and houses had been sacked; women had been abducted and raped and men beaten up or butchered, irrespective of race and religion. Muslims suffered as much as non-Muslims at their hands.

The raiders sacked the Presentation Convent at Baramula and murdered the Assistant Mother Superior, Sister Teresaline, a Spaniard, and wounded the Mother Superior and desecrated the holy images in the chapel. A former British officer of the Indian Army, Lieutenant-Colonel D. O. T. Dykes, was shot dead and his wife's naked body was found in a well. The invaders then raided the hospital attached to the convent and killed a nurse and two patients. They did not even spare the cemetery where they smashed up the crosses covering the graves.

The remaining foreigners in the town, about 70 in number, living huddled in a wing of the Convent, were however saved on the intervention of some of the officers commanding the invaders. National Conference workers were singled out for torture and maltreatment. Mr. Mohammed Maqbool Sherwani, a local leader of the Conference, was tortured and shot.

The atrocities committed by the raiders in Baramula shocked the world and their self-proclaimed role of liberators of Muslims was scorned and spurned by the people.

The Indian Army's advance beyond Baramula was also slowed down by the nature of the terrain and shortage of petrol. The road beyond Baramula is overlooked on either side by thickly wooded hills ideal for ambush. Besides, the invaders had blown up the bridges behind them in their retreat.

One wooden bridge, four miles short of Rampur, was found destroyed by fire. Beyond Rampur, another bridge had been

destroyed with explosives. A diversion was made at the first bridge. The second bridge covered a deep nullah, and no diversion was possible. Thereupon, Indian infantrymen took up the pursuit leaving their vehicles behind.

The Mahura power house, which supplied electricity to Srinagar, was found only slightly damaged and electrical engineers who accompanied Brig. Sen's column got it going within ten days. The lights were on in Srinagar once again, symbolising the return of security to that fair city.

On November 14, Indian troops entered Uri, 65 miles from Srinagar, without much of a battle. In fact, the punishment that they had received at Shelatang had scared the raiders and put them into headlong flight westwards.

With the recapture of Uri, the first and the most hazardous phase of the Kashmir campaign had been completed. An immediate threat to the Srinagar valley had been removed. Gruelling as the fighting had been on the ground in the initial phase of the Kashmir campaign, the RIAF earned a great deal

A section of Indian troops on a hill feature near Baramula.





A company of mules carrying rations, kit and other supplies to the forward piquets near Baramula.

of credit for the rapid advance all the way from the gates of Srinagar to Uri.

Experts, after investigation, had reported that no Spitfires could operate from Srinagar. Two young RIAF pilots exploded this theory by successfully landing and taking off from the Srinagar airfield in the first three days of the campaign.

Arriving over Pattan on October 30, these two pilots did not find smoke signals which the infantry had been instructed to lay down. Thereupon, they boldly landed at Srinagar to be briefed. They then took off and strafed the raiders' positions beyond Pattan and returned to their base safely.

Group Captain (later Air Commodore) Mehar Singh, DSO, who was now personally conducting the air operations in Srinagar, asked for more Spitfires to be flown in. A small maintenance section and supplies were also sent.

Apart from the daring and skill shown by the pilots, the ground crews and airmen performed marvels of improvisation.

Very often the pilots flew so low over enemy positions that their aircraft were hit by small arms fire. These holes were patched up by the ground crews overnight and the aircraft were in the air again within a few hours.

The Srinagar airfield being a rough airstrip was dusty, and after its surface had been pounded by the continuous movement of aircraft, the dust became a major obstacle to safe flying. Instruments and controls became choked with dust and the pilots and crew were caked with it from head to foot.

The accuracy of RIAF pilots in spotting and strafing raiders' machine-gun and mortar positions and their superb reconnaissance work evoked well deserved tributes from the infantry.

THE GILGIT REVOLT

As the tribal invaders were triumphantly driving up the Domel road towards Srinagar, in the remote northern frontier

A group of sappers of the Indian Army clearing a landslide in the Kashmir valley.





Air Commodore Mehar Singh (standing, second from left) with the air-crew of Tempest and Dakota aircraft, before they take off on an offensive visit.

district of Gilgit, a local revolution was being hatched under inspiration from Peshawar.

In pursuance of the British Government's announcement, the Gilgit Agency had been returned to the State of Jammu and Kashmir late in July 1947. Certain British and Muslim officers of the Gilgit Scouts, a Frontier Military formation, actively conspired to sabotage the transfer and to get Gilgit merged into Pakistan.

No sooner had the newly appointed Governor of Gilgit, Brigadier Ghansara Singh, arrived than he was faced with a catalogue of demands from the officers and JCOs of the Gilgit Scouts. These officers and JCOs made it clear that they wanted to serve Pakistan. Simultaneously, the civil establishment struck work.

Thus when the Jammu and Kashmir State took over charge of Gilgit and Gilgit Agency, the entire administration had come

to a standstill. At Bunji, 34 miles from Gilgit, was stationed the State garrison consisting of the 6 Jammu and Kashmir Infantry less about two companies, composed half of Sikhs and half of Muslims and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Majid Khan. The Muslim element in the State Force showed pro-Pakistan sentiments and some of the units were heard to raise pro-Pakistan slogans as they marched.

As the tribal invaders were knocking at the gates of Srinagar, the tension increased in Gilgit, and on October 30, the Governor ordered Lieut.-Col. Abdul Majid Khan at Bunji to proceed to Gilgit immediately with as big a force as he could muster.

At midnight on October 31, the Governor of Gilgit found his residence surrounded by about 100 Gilgit Scouts, led by officers. In the morning emissaries of the Gilgit Scouts, who continued to surround the bungalow, met Brig. Ghansara Singh and demanded his surrender within 15 minutes, with the ultimatum that if he did not surrender, all non-Muslims in Gilgit would be shot dead.

Indian troops advancing under cover of a smoke-screen in the Jhangar area.





A bayonet charge in the Naushera area.

The Governor was put under arrest and a provisional government was formed by the rebels. The "hero" of the revolution was a Major Brown, the British commandant of the Gilgit Scouts. Muslim officers of the Scouts and the State garrison were his co-conspirators. With the Muslim officers, the Muslim element in the State garrison also deserted. The non-Muslim element was largely liquidated; some survived and escaped to the hills and then joined the State garrison at Skardu.

A non-Muslim detachment at Janglot was massacred. A Sikh company at Bunji, hearing of the fate of their comrades at Janglot, fled to the hills heading south. Captain Matheson, another British officer, had however already cut their line of retreat by occupying Astore with a contingent of the Scouts. The Sikhs thereupon wandered back into the jungles for a fortnight and then returned to Bunji hungry and bedraggled and surrendered themselves.

The leading figures in the provisional government were Major Brown, Captain Hussain, Captain Ishan Ali, Captain

Mohammed Khan, Captain Sayeed, Lieutenant Haider and Subedar Major Babur Khan. Major Brown ruled Gilgit, while Captain Hussain styled himself General Commanding at Bunji, the garrison headquarters.

On November 4, Major Brown ceremonially hoisted the Pakistan flag in the Scouts Lines in Gilgit. The function was attended by all civil officers of the State. In the third week of November, Sardar Mohamed Alam arrived in Gilgit from Peshawar and established himself as Pakistan's Political Agent in Gilgit. Pakistan opened an air service to Gilgit and a stream of civil and military officers poured in and the administration was gradually taken over.

With the establishment of a regular Pakistan administration in Gilgit, both Major Brown and Captain Matheson were transferred to Peshawar and Pakistan officers took over command of the Gilgit Scouts as well as rebel State troops.

From all evidence available, the Mirs and Rajas of the frontier district took no active part in the revolution.

Indian troops being transported across a river on a raft.



It is clear, from all accounts, that the revolution in Gilgit had no connection or contact whatsoever with the so-called "Azad Kashmir" Government in Western Jammu.

It is, however, evident that Peshawar was the centre and the North-West Frontier Premier, Mr. Abdul Qayum Khan, was the inspiration of the entire movement for the subversion of the established Government in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Sardar Ibrahim Khan, the leader of the so-called "Azad Kashmir" Government in Western Jammu, kept close contact with Mr. Abdul Qayum Khan and obtained large quantities of arms from the NWFP to buttress his own revolution in Western Jammu.

Our troops moving forward by improvised ropeways.



CHAPTER III

ON TO JAMMU !

WHILE attention was focussed on Srinagar, a grave situation was developing in the Jammu province, where hostiles had seized a considerable stretch of territory adjacent to the Pakistan border and were fast advancing towards the capital.

Whereas Kashmir in the north faced essentially foreign invaders, in West Jammu the raiders were reinforced by local insurgents, backed from across the border with supplies and equipment.

The State forces, which had taken up positions in key towns near the border, had been surrounded at Mirpur, Kotli, Punch, Jhangar, Naushera, Bhimber and Rajauri. Taking shelter with them were thousands of non-Muslim refugees, hapless victims of communal persecution and vendetta. Our aircraft on reconnaissance had spotted fires raging in several parts of West Jammu, particularly in the districts of Mirpur, Punch and Riasi.

Rescuing the refugees and relieving the encircled State Force garrisons became the first task of the Indian Army in Jammu.

Fighting conditions in Jammu were even more difficult than those experienced by Indian troops in their push from Srinagar to Uri. There were few roads in Jammu, and those few were no more than "fair weather" tracks. The only road available to the Indian Army was a narrow, winding, dusty road which ran from Jammu city, through Akhnur and Beri Pattan, to Naushera and beyond it to Jhangar, where it forked into two, one leading to Mirpur and thence to the Pakistan border, and the other going north to Kotli, Punch and Uri.

Cut out of the sides of hills in many places and following their contours, the road is so narrow in parts that it is only suitable for one-way traffic and is intersected by innumerable unbridged nullahs. Considerable effort had to be put in by Indian Army engineers and pioneers before this road could be made fit for military traffic.



A Dakota plane transporting refugees from Punch to Jammu on their return flight, after bringing munition to the besieged town.

The relief operations began with one column dispatched from Jammu in the direction of Naushera and Jhangar and another column moving south from Uri with Punch as its objective. Along the Naushera road, a strategically important point was the Akhnur bridge which had to be secured by Indian troops.

Setting out on November 16, the Jammu column, under Brigadier Y. S. Paranjpye, relieved the State Force garrisons at Naushera and Jhangar by November 19. *En route*, it had only a brief encounter with hostiles east of Naushera. The next day the column advanced towards Kotli, and after a difficult march, during which it encountered numerous roadblocks and heavy sniping, it reached its destination. The garrison was relieved on November 27 and 9,000 refugees were brought out without loss of life.

The State Force garrison at Mirpur could not be relieved as no Indian troops were available then but it fought its way out on November 25, bringing with it nearly 3,600 refugees.

The column for the relief of Punch set out from Uri on November 20. It had to traverse some of the most difficult country, interspersed with high mountain ranges and covered with thick jungle. The column had to go over the 8,000 foot high Haji Pir Pass.

The rear group of the column, consisting of armoured vehicles, motor vehicles and an infantry company, was ambushed within one day's march and was forced to withdraw to Uri. The head of the column found that the State Forces had blown up the bridge at Kahuta, eight miles short of Punch, mistaking them for hostiles. One battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) Pritam Singh, however, scrambled across the stream and joined the Punch garrison.

Though the attempt to relieve Punch was not totally successful, the additional battalion enabled the garrison to hold out for one full year until it was finally relieved. At the time there were 40,000 refugees taking shelter with the garrison in Punch.

Wing Commander M. M. Engineer, D.F.C., briefs the pilots before take-off at Jammu.



Determined to eject Indian troops from Jhangar, where they were sitting astride the enemy's line of communication between Mirpur and Kotli, the raiders mounted a strong attack on Jhangar on the night of December 23-24.

Approximately 6,000 men attacked our garrison consisting of a depleted battalion, while about another 3,000 intercepted the Naushera-Jhangar road, thus preventing reinforcements.

The reinforcement column dispatched from Naushera failed to penetrate this point despite repeated attempts. At the same time, inclement weather came in the way of any air support to the defending troops as our fighters remained grounded. Our position was overrun and our troops were forced to withdraw to Naushera.

Encouraged by this success, the following night, 2,500 hostiles attacked our camp at Naushera, but were easily repulsed by first light. Now improved weather conditions permitted an air strike to be carried out by the RIAF fighters. Ammunition dumps and enemy concentrations were subjected to heavy attacks, and the fast fleeing enemy provided ground targets for our aircraft.

After the loss of Jhangar, it was decided to stay put in Naushera—70 miles west of Jammu—and to postpone any offensive operations till more troops were available.

Local actions, however, continued to be fought and several attacks of the enemy were repulsed. In particular, there were frequent raids on our line of communication from Pathankot to Jammu.

In a border engagement, 18 miles south-east of Jammu, an Indian patrol came under fire from Bajra village, which was held by 200 raiders. Some of them wore uniform and others civilian clothes. The Indian patrol immediately engaged and put them to flight.

In the Samba-Kathua area, an Indian patrol engaged with mortars what appeared to be a small enemy party, in the vicinity of Ranbirsinghpura. Closer observation, however, revealed that the enemy strength was about 4,000. The Indian patrol was subjected to heavy fire from a distance. The Indians replied with rifles and automatics. With the approach of night they lost contact. On the following morning, when a strong

patrol was sent to probe the area, it counted 88 dead left behind by the raiders.

On January 20, Lieutenant-General K. M. Cariappa took over the Western Command. In the last week of that month, the General paid a visit to Naushera, the headquarters of the 50 Para Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Mohammed Usman. It was decided that the Indian Army should take possession of a feature called Kot, five miles north-east of Naushera, with a view to ensuring the safety of Naushera.

Kot is the highest point of a range of hills overlooking the Naushera-Tawi valley. The enemy had a piquet on Kot and his strength was estimated at 500, armed with two or three 3-inch mortars, one or two medium machine-guns and four light machine-guns. His defences were well sited and mutually supporting.

Brigadier Usman launched the attack on Kot by first light, on February 1, on a two-battalion front. An offensive visit of RIAF fighters over the target to soften enemy positions preceded the D-Day. Though completely surprised, the enemy fought back ferociously. By 10 o'clock, however, Kot as well as another feature was captured. The enemy had fled, suffering 150 killed and 200 wounded. One medium machine-gun, three rifles and other items of equipment were captured. Our own casualties were 11 killed and 15 wounded.

Stung by this failure, the enemy massed his strength for a major assault on Naushera itself. The attack was launched on February 6, and the biggest battle of the Kashmir campaign was fought.

Under cover of darkness just before dawn, over 4,000 hostiles stormed the Indian positions south-east of Naushera, while another 3,000 attacked from the north-east. Simultaneously, some 5,000 hostiles attacked two of our piquets north-north-east of Naushera, on Taindhar hill and Kot. The enemy flung on to our positions in waves. They used medium machine-guns and mortars in batteries as also a large number of light machine-guns and quantities of grenades. All the attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

After two hours' fierce and desperate fighting, the hostiles broke battle and ran helter-skelter. The artillery, mortars and machine-guns fired continuously for four hours at groups of

hostiles trying to escape. The RIAF fighters provided effective support during the battle of Naushera. They attacked enemy positions, created road blocks and disrupted supply and escape routes.

It is estimated that 15,000 hostiles attacked Naushera in three waves. About 2,000 of them were killed—942 bodies were actually counted—and a countless number wounded. The booty captured was equally impressive and included a large number of Bren and Sten guns, rifles and swords. Our own casualties were 29 other ranks killed and 90 other ranks wounded.

The attack on Taindhar was particularly fierce and our troops engaged the enemy in bitter hand-to-hand fighting before the enemy was chased out.

One of the attacks had got to within 50 yards of the Indian positions and at one particular point, the hostiles had even managed to enter our positions. Heavy hand-to-hand fighting between sword-bearing Pathans and Indian troops ensued. Brig. Usman had, just before the attack, deployed a part of his newly arrived reinforcements in this area. The reinforcements had reached only a few minutes before the position was pierced by the enemy. The attack was beaten back and heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy.

Every officer and NCO of Brig. Usman's 50 Para Brigade fought in the engagement. Officers and men of the Supply and Engineer Units fought side by side with the regular infantry battalions. One of the Indian Army machine-gun posts in the forward area fired over 9,000 rounds at point-blank range into mass formations of the enemy. Among the hordes of hostiles were Sudhans, Pathans, men from Swat and Dir and other tribesmen as well as Pakistanis.

The whole of that night Indian troops were laying ambushes in all directions to catch groups of hostiles who, they knew, would return to take back their dead. The chase of the hostiles continued the whole of the next day. Indian artillery and the RIAF opened up on the enemy wherever they saw him. South-west of Naushera, especially, this vigil yielded a big harvest.

Indian armoured fighting vehicles lent valuable support to the ground forces throughout the battle. On the morning of February 7, patrolling up the road to Jhangar, the armoured

fighting vehicles sighted a formation of over 2,000 raiders, some of them fleeing in motor vehicles. The Air Force was called in and together they engaged this group effectively and dispersed it.

South-west of Naushera, near the Pakistan border, our forces intercepted a loot caravan led by some 300 raiders. Coming through the hills, completely surprising them, our troops killed 60 of them and recovered the looted treasure.


To exploit the success gained in the battle of Naushera, it was decided to recapture Jhangar. Maj.-Gen. Kalwant Singh, General Officer Commanding the Jammu and Kashmir Force, was personally in command of the operations. The advance began on March 15.

The Indians fought in thickly wooded hills on their way to Jhangar. The main opposition was met in the Gaikot forest, where the raiders were in position with light and medium machine-guns. Indian troops crawled through bushes and pounced on the enemy, who hurriedly fled. From there, the Indians advanced and captured Darhal fort.

The decisive battle for the recapture of Jhangar was fought at Pirthal, a steep hill overlooking Jhangar. The hostiles, who were entrenched on this hill, initially put up a stiff fight, but their resistance collapsed when Indian troops pressed home their attack. The hostiles were forced to abandon their positions so hurriedly that they left behind vehicles with their engines running, stores, equipment and cooked meals. Indian troops also seized Mark V mines, and large quantities of ammunition and grenades.

The RIAF played a valuable part in the recapture of Jhangar. Days before the Indian column commenced moving from Naushera, RIAF Tempests flew reconnaissance sorties over high and thickly wooded hills, through winding valleys and awkward gorges, spotting out cunningly concealed enemy positions and then hammering them systematically with rockets, bombs and bullets.

The RIAF Dakota squadron, under the command of Wing Commander K. L. Bhatia, conveyed tons of army requirements from barbed wire to rations and ammunition, right up to the ground troops' forward bases, thereby saving much valuable time.





Indian troops patrolling in the Sonamarg area.

With the recapture of Jhangar on March 18, the main land route leading into the Naushera valley was secured and the enemy's supply line was disrupted.

Meanwhile, Punch held out gamely in the face of repeated assaults by the besieging enemy. Brig. Pritam Singh, who now took command of the garrison, set himself to the task of reorganising life in the beleaguered town.

To facilitate a regular flow of supplies by air, it was decided to construct an airstrip. Hundreds of refugees worked day and night to complete the job within a week's time. On December 13, the RIAF landed one section of a mountain battery. An additional infantry battalion was flown into Punch early in January. Brig. Pritam Singh organised local volunteers from among the refugees into militia battalions to fight side by side with Indian and State Force troops.

At one time, there were 40,000 refugees to look after in Punch. Their welfare, morale and feeding was the concern of the garrison. When the supply position became tight—and that happened quite often—the troops shared their rations with

the refugees and gave away their tinned milk quota to children and women and the ailing.

To augment their foodstocks, harvesting operations in neighbouring enemy-held territory were undertaken. Indian troops escorted batches of refugees who went out and harvested standing crops through a hail of bullets. In one such operation, the Indians suffered nine killed and 22 wounded.

A simultaneous attack on four of our piquets was the direct result of the ferocity of hostiles' assault on Punch. After a thirty-minute engagement, the attack was repulsed. On January 1, another strong attack was launched on three of our piquets. This too was thrown back.

On March 17, at 5.30 p.m., after the last Dakota had taken off, the enemy for the first time opened up with 3.7 howitzers, with the airstrip as the main target. That night the enemy pumped in 200 shells, while our own battery counter-shelled. The shelling continued the following day, doing considerable damage to the airstrip. The RIAF Tempest and Harvard aircraft,

A landslide, blocking the road, traps a jeep in the Sonamarg area.



however, carried on air activity over hostile territory and spotted enemy positions by visual and photo reconnaissance.

Brig. Pritam Singh, the Punch Brigade Commander, had asked for two 25-pounders with ammunition and gunners to man them. The existing mountain guns at Punch were ineffective against the enemy's long-range guns which were shelling Punch for several days.

Then the RIAF pilots excelled themselves. On March 21, three Dakotas took off just before noon with the required cargo. Air Commodore Mehar Singh with Gen. Kalwant Singh took off to Punch in a Harvard aircraft. As the first Dakota landed and taxied to the other end of the airstrip the enemy guns opened up. The Dakota was damaged by a shell bursting a few yards from its port wheel.

Mehar Singh, who was watching this landing from the air and was in constant contact with the Brigade Commander on R.T., decided to postpone the operation.

At dusk, the same day, in hazy moonlight, a flight of Dakotas took off again. The pilot of one of the aircraft was Air Commodore Mehar Singh himself. The first aircraft stole through darkness and landed on the airstrip. Having delivered the goods it took off. The second, the third and the fourth followed suit. While one aircraft was unloading on the airstrip, others hovered over the area to deceive the enemy.

The 25-pounders outranged hostile mountain guns and enabled operations to be carried out to dislodge the enemy west of Punch and compel him to withdraw his guns. On April 30, after exactly a month of inactivity, the airstrip was put back into commission.

RIAF No. 12 Squadron had a large share in the successful defence of Punch. This squadron carried out 73 sorties in six days, carrying 4,21,000 lbs of supplies to Punch—'Punching,' as they called the operation.

The landing strip in Punch is bounded on all sides by high hills, and to operate from it required great skill and daring. Besides flying in supplies, the RIAF evacuated 35,000 refugees.

In appreciation of its great services, the Raja of Punch presented to the squadron a stuffed panther as a trophy.

CHAPTER IV

JOUST WITH "GENERAL WINTER"

DURING the winter months, the Indian Army in Kashmir fought two enemies. Holding the raiders at bay was easy. Throughout the period, the raiders could not gain an inch of territory, and every attempt to break through or bypass Uri was beaten back resolutely. But the Indian Army's joust with "General Winter" was indeed a grim and heroic struggle.

A majority of our troops had never seen snow before. Nor were they armed with special snow-fighting equipment. With the blocking of the only land route to Srinagar by snow and the stoppage of the air service, the supply situation became acute.

In many countries, troops are given special training for snow-fighting and issued special equipment. In the peculiar circumstances in which Indian armed forces were flung into battle in Kashmir, there was hardly any time to train or suitably equip them for fighting in almost arctic conditions.

When it became difficult to maintain the number of troops already in Kashmir, to send reinforcements, even if it had been possible to do so, was out of the question.

The Indian Army's victory over the elements constituted a fresh chapter in its glorious history, already replete with feats of endurance and bravery. Far from yielding ground to either enemy, our troops actually improved and consolidated their positions on the snow-bound Uri front.

During these difficult months, the Indian Army in Kashmir largely remained on the defensive, confining itself to long-range reconnaissance and offensive patrolling. Its battle against the elements was fought by lone piquets perched on snow-clad mountains and by patrols venturing out into uncharted country, breasting the blizzards and hailstorms.

In the middle of January, a party of 1,500 raiders, moving along the north bank of the Jhelum, concentrated on the other side of the Mahura power-house, intent on seizing or disrupting it.



Removing snow from a road in the Zoji La area.

Our troops threw a steel cable across the 100-yard width of the Jhelum, and with the aid of ropes and pulleys, got across the river under cover of darkness. Their heavy equipment and ammunition were ferried. The column then fell on the raiders at dead of night. Asleep and taken by surprise, the raiders fled in disorder. Among the killed was their commanding officer.

An Indian patrol, composed of young men of 18 and 19, who had just passed out of Boys' Companies, launched a surprise attack on a raider-held feature north of Uri and expelled the hostiles after a bayonet charge. The raiders counter-attacked, using 1,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition and fifty 3-inch mortar bombs, but were repulsed by the youths with the aid of artillery.

After the engagement, 92 enemy dead were counted. Twenty of them wore regimental badges of the Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistan Army. The number of wounded was also heavy. The boys had been sent out with instructions only

to reconnoitre the enemy position on the feature, but they were so enthusiastic that they went further and finished up with a bayonet charge which gave us possession of the feature.

The raiders made repeated attempts to storm our piquets one after the other. Every time they were beaten back. Failing either to break through or bypass Uri, the raiders advanced over the track linking Muzaffarabad with Tithwal and made for Handowar, in the northern approaches to the Srinagar valley. An Indian column met them there and dispersed them, recapturing some of the villages that had fallen into their hands.

In March, as winter began to wane, the activity of our troops was gradually stepped up. The raiders were in occupation of a series of high commanding features around Uri and north of Mahura, and constituted a threat to our positions. Two columns set out from our bases on this "feature-hopping" expedition.

The Garhwalis and the Kumaonis moved out from different points. The Garhwalis marched 12 miles northwards, crossed the Jhelum, and then wrested from the enemy a 7,706 foot high

A bull-dozer clearing the snow on the Banihal Pass at a height of over 9,000 ft.



feature, killing and wounding 40 of the enemy. Our only casualty in the action was one killed. They were constantly on the move till April, taking other features, including a 9,000 foot high hill beyond Uri. This last feature was captured in conjunction with the Kumaonis and with artillery support.

Covering 30 arduous miles from their starting points, the two columns played havoc with the raiders' lines of communication to their hill piquets, isolating them from their bases.

The Kumaonis' gains in this expedition included a 7,760 foot high feature three miles north of Mahura and the 8,000 foot high Kopra Hill. In the first engagement, 50 of the enemy were killed and one light machine-gun, a few rifles and 6,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition were captured. The second engagement lasted nine hours, at the end of which the enemy fled, leaving behind a large quantity of equipment. These operations finally removed the threat to the road to Uri.

All this time, the battle against "General Winter" was being fought with grim tenacity. Though by March, the Indian Army was fairly on top and had nearly won this battle, earlier our troops went through tribulations. At one stage in February, the Indian Army's supply depot at Srinagar had just ten gallons of aviation spirit in stock. Other supplies for the troops were also dangerously short. The civil population—whose morale was a most important factor in these operations—suffered acutely from a shortage of salt, which sold at Rs. 10 a seer in Srinagar.

The brunt of the battle against winter was, however, borne by Indian Army drivers and sappers. In the past, for four winter months of the year, the Banihal Pass, choked with snow, used to remain closed to traffic. The Madras Sappers and Miners valiantly strove to keep this pass, the bottleneck of the Jammu-Srinagar road, clear of the snows. The drivers worked overtime and without rest in order to bring supplies to the snow-besieged city.

Fourteen miles on either side of the 150-yard Banihal tunnel was a veritable death trap. The tunnel was repeatedly sealed off at either end by 30 feet of snow. A handful of sappers and miners, armed with bull-dozers, picks and shovels, hardy drivers and ill-clad local labourers were the heroes of this battle.

On occasions, the sappers worked from seven in the morning till two next morning without rest, pulling out vehicles buried

in the snows. They suffered from sore feet, frostbite and chilblain.

Thanks to their efforts, from December 22 to the end of March, three convoys, consisting of a total of 300 vehicles, got through to Srinagar. Each time, however, a few vehicles at the tail end of the convoy got stuck and remained buried in the snow. The snow fell so thick and fast that not even a 15 foot long pole pierced into the snow mounds could touch the top of the buried vehicles.

The snowing started on December 22, and by December 25, the road on the Banihal stretch was impassable. A convoy of 25 three-tonner lorries, carrying 200 refugees and supplies, was caught in the snow, some inside the tunnel, others outside. After enduring much hardship and with some loss of life, the refugees were rescued and marched beyond the danger zone a few days later. A similar fate overtook another convoy of 13 vehicles in February.

The Banihal Pass was opened once again in the middle of January and one convoy passed through each way. For one month thereafter the pass was again blocked. It was opened for the second time on February 20 and was sealed off again on February 22. It reopened on March 5 to close immediately after. The pass was finally cleared on March 28.

Though the winter battle had been won, the melting snows brought forth a new problem for the Indian Army engineers and lorry drivers to contend with. While the Banihal Pass was cleared of snow, the 200 mile tenuous road, hewn in the side of the Himalayan ranges, was now plagued with landslides. Large chunks of mountain, with trees, boulders and all, slipped on to the road and completely obliterated it.

The sappers and the pioneers were kept busy sweeping these chunks of mountain out of the way, as supply convoys remained held up.

While it froze and covered the Kashmir valley with a white mantle, winter appeared in a different guise in Jammu. Here it was all slush and quagmire created by the winter rains which impeded mobility and made life miserable for our troops. Abnormal rains even swept away bridges along the life-line from Pathankot and constricted supply to the troops.

Thus, while the Kashmir front hibernated, the activity in



A pack-train leaving a convoy on the Banihal Pass.

Jammu intensified, thanks to the advantages enjoyed by the enemy on this front, in the shape of shorter, better and more numerous lines of communication.

As against the single 75-mile road that we possessed from Jammu to Naushera, which was repeatedly rendered unusable by the winter rains, the raiders relied on shorter lines of communication consisting of the first class all-weather Jhelum-Mirpur road and Sialkot-Jammu road, besides numerous other tracks; to supply their troops.

Stung by their initial reverses against the Indian Army and enjoying as they did many material advantages, the hostiles in Jammu occupied themselves during the winter months in spirited counter-attacks. One or two temporary successes were gained by them, as in the case of the recapture of Jhangar. In their own

territory they were well entrenched, while our troops remained on the defensive, owing to the limitations imposed by winter.

Winter also gave our commanders, for the first time, some respite to think and plan and regroup. Kept on their toes from the moment the troops landed in Srinagar on October 27, they were kept hurrying about, plugging in leaks in the hastily prepared defences, relieving encircled State Force garrisons and rescuing thousands of non-Muslim refugees.

Maj. Gen. Kalwant Singh, GOC, Jammu and Kashmir Force, had valiantly struggled to build up a fighting machine from scratch, even while he fought a well prepared and resolute enemy. Now he gradually geared that machine for planned offensive operations.

Srinagar had been rendered safe. The menace to the Pathankot-Jammu line of communication had been effectively removed. By a forward policy and the institution of a chain of piquets, the Pakistan-Jammu border had been largely sealed off against nuisance raids from across. Our forward positions had been consolidated. The situation in the territory already held by

Indian troops on patrol in the snow-bound north.



the Indian Army had been stabilised and normal life restored.

The task of looking after and administering relief to thousands of rescued refugees also largely fell to the lot of the Indian Army. While Srinagar was blest with communal harmony, the situation in Jammu was complicated by communal tension, which made the task of Gen. Kalwant Singh and his troops all the more difficult.

It was a backwash of the terrible happenings in the adjacent Punjab. As non-Muslim refugees poured into Jammu from across the border, with their harrowing tales of suffering and misery, they produced repercussions in the State resulting, in some cases, in retaliatory disorders.

As winter gave way to spring, the back had been broken of all these problems, and Gen. Kalwant Singh now planned to move forward.

As already related in the preceding chapter, the mighty defeat sustained by the hostiles at Naushera was immediately followed up by our troops recapturing Jhangar on March 18.

The Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir was now poised for an offensive.

A convoy creeping up on the Banihal Pass.



CHAPTER V

THE LEAP FORWARD

The first objective of the spring offensive in Jammu was Rajauri, 30 miles north-west of Naushera. The operation was distinguished by careful and elaborate ground and air planning. The advance began on April 8. The 30-mile stretch of country which the Indian troops had to traverse was thickly wooded and well defended with enemy machine-guns and mortars.

Barwali ridge, seven miles north of Naushera, was the first hurdle. The ridge was held by uniformed, steel-helmeted hostiles, armed with 3-inch mortars, two medium machine-guns and eight light machine-guns.

Indian armoured vehicles and a Dogra battalion had been ordered to present themselves at 9 a.m. at Nadpur Sarai, a point facing Barwali ridge, and the attack was scheduled for 12.30 p.m. The enemy, however, fired the first mortar bomb at 11 a.m. Our guns and machine-guns immediately silenced the mortar.

The approaches to Barwali ridge were difficult and a frontal attack was necessary. The Dogras had to wade through waist-deep water and came under fire from both flanks of the ridge. Moving under cover of heavy fire and effectively supported by tanks they charged the enemy's positions and occupied their objective by 4 p.m. Later in the day, the hostiles launched a counter-attack, which was repulsed.

Chingas, half-way to Rajauri, was the next objective. Lying on the old Moghul route linking Naushera and Rajauri, Chingas was the base from which the hostiles had launched their abortive assaults on Naushera. Reports had also been received of oppression of the local population and brutality of the raiders in the area.

From Barwali ridge the Indian column split up and fanned out, with different strategic features around Chingas and Rajauri as their respective objectives. Kumaonis and Jats overcame stiff opposition on a feature parallel to Barwali ridge



Brig. Harbux Singh with two other officers locating enemy positions and pin-pointing them on the map.

and reached Katari village overlooking Chingas. Chingas itself was entered by armoured cars. The armoured cars found the town in flames. The raiders had resorted to arson and murder before departing. It was a "scorched earth" policy with a vengeance.

On the right flank, Rajputana Rifles operating from Kot maintained their advance and reached Mal village. On the morning of April 12, the Jats came down into the Chingas valley and after crossing the Tawi, captured a hill overlooking Rajauri. An armoured column followed by Kumaonis entered Rajauri late that evening. This operation saved the lives of 1,200 to 1,500 refugees, mostly women. Of these 300 to 500 had been lined up to be shot when our column arrived.

In this operation, Indian troops had not only to contend with well prepared and well sited enemy positions but also numerous

landslides and roadblocks. It cost the hostiles approximately 500 killed and the Indian Army suffered 11 killed and 48 wounded.

The atrocities committed by the hostiles in Rajauri put Baramula in the shade. Our troops expected a warm welcome from 5,000 refugees as well as local inhabitants. When they entered the town, they were appalled by an eerie silence. Rajauri was a city of the dead and dying.

Before the hostiles departed, they had carried out a general massacre of the non-Muslim population. Heaps of rubble, mass graves and decomposing corpses told the tale. So did the sword and hatchet wounds and burns on the person of the survivors, who slowly trickled back to their destroyed homes.

Three gaping pits, each 50 square yards in area and 15 feet deep, were full of corpses. The hostiles had not had the time to bury them all, and more were being discovered by our patrols every day. In one spot were found broken, multicoloured bangles and women's sandals and marks of blood. Children's hands were sticking out of the graves in mute appeal to heaven.

A convoy of mules led by Indian troops carrying ration and ammunition to forward piquets in the Naushera sector.



Of the 600 houses in the town, half had been destroyed, some by fire and others by picks and shovels. In the bazar, all that was left were a few pots and pans and some cooked chappaties left behind by the raiders in their haste to get out. This was the second massacre that Rajauri had witnessed. The first was staged when the raiders entered the town in the flush of victory.

The headmistress of the local school, one of the survivors, bore seventeen wounds on her body. She had lost her husband and other relatives at the hands of the raiders. A handful of old women described how the young girls in the town were carried away by the raiders.

Miraculously, an eighteen month old baby was discovered alive in a house in which a number of persons had been burnt alive. The soldiers' attention was attracted by the cries of the child. It was found badly burnt, but recovered after medical treatment by Army doctors and careful nourishment.

Among the first tasks of the Indian troops in this area was the rescue of "hostages" held by the raiders. Within a week, patrolling columns brought back 1,040 of them, including 300 Muslims.

The enemy reacted to their loss of Rajauri by mounting another determined attack on Jhangar. On April 16, 6,000 raiders stormed that outpost, were beaten back, and suffered 200 casualties.

Representing a fist thrust into the enemy's jaw, Jhangar became the object of repeated and energetic assaults by the raiders, who could never reconcile themselves to the position and badly needed that vital road junction between Mirpur and Kotli.

As the operational front in Jammu and Kashmir expanded and the number of troops increased, the need began to be felt for a reorganisation and a split of the JAK Force into two, with one divisional headquarters in Jammu and another in Srinagar.

On May 4, this project was carried out. The conduct of the operations from now on came directly under Western Command. For this purpose a Command Tactical Headquarters was established in Jammu. Major-General K. S. Thimayya was placed in command of the Srinagar Division, which was afterwards designated 19 Division, while Major-General Atma Singh took over the Jammu Division, afterwards called 26 Division. At the same time, a Line of Communications

Sub-Area was added to the Jammu and Kashmir set-up. Maj.-Gen. Kalwant Singh went to the Army Headquarters as the Chief of the General Staff.

Later, in October, a Corps Headquarters was set up in command of the two divisions and the L of C Sub-Area to relieve Western Command of the direct responsibility. Lieutenant General S. M. Shrinagesh was appointed the Corps Commander, and Air Commodore A. M. Engineer took over the command of No. 1 Operational group of the RIAF which planned and executed all air operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

The spring in Kashmir was devoted by both sides to building up for the impending burst of operational activity on that front. While the Indian Army was ambitiously planning a drive from Uri in the direction of Domel and Muzaffarabad, the enemy was busy bolstering up his defences to meet this threat and, at the same time, was pushing north-eastward via Gilgit with the intention of opening another front and knocking at the back-door of the Srinagar valley.

Gen. Thimayya's projected offensive was directed towards Muzaffarabad on the western border. Brig. Sen was to advance from Uri along the Domel road, while Brigadier Harbux Singh was to make a wide sweeping right hook via Handawar to Tithwal—a point hardly 18 miles on the northern flank of Muzaffarabad.

Starting on the night of May 17-18 from Handawar, 40 miles north-north-east of Uri, Brig. Harbux Singh's column made good progress, and on May 23, entered Tithwal, covering 40 miles in six days through difficult roadless country.

The raiders were taken completely by surprise. Thirtyfive prisoners, including Lieutenant-Colonel Sikandar Khan and four other ranks of the Pakistan Army, and one 3-inch mortar were captured at Tithwal. The enemy casualties in this advance were 67 counted killed, and our own 17 killed and 31 wounded.

In the course of the advance, Indian troops came up against strongly entrenched enemy positions on commanding hills. They were reduced only after fierce, tenacious fighting. Numerous snipers along the line of advance were effectively dealt with by Indian artillery.



A machine-gun post. An N.C.O. is seen locating the enemy-position with the help of binoculars just before action in the Uri sector.

The reports received from air-crew and other sources had indicated that the enemy had considerably increased his anti-aircraft defences especially in the Tithwal area and all along the western strip. Both mobile and stationary ack-ack had been installed. The intensity and accuracy of the enemy fire proved beyond doubt that these guns were manipulated and operated by highly trained and skilled gun-crew. Occasionally, these guns scored hits on our planes but our pilots managed to land at the base safely.

On one occasion, a Tempest flown by Flying Officer A. M. Palamkote had a large piece of its rudder shot off when fired at by 20 mm. ack-ack guns in the Tithwal area. In the same area, another Tempest was caught in a hail of accurate cross-fire just off the Kishenganga river and was so badly shot up that the pilot, Flying Officer U. G. Wright, was compelled to bail out. He landed safely in our lines but only after enduring a few tense moments. The raiders, in flagrant contravention of the international code of warfare, opened fire with LMGs and rifles on the helpless pilot as he floated down to the earth

and safety. The parachute canopy was entangled in the branches of a tree and the pilot was dangling in mid-air by the rigging lines. Determined to finish him off, the enemy directed a murderous fire with 3.7 howitzer and mortars at the tree which was later found completely obliterated. During the firing the parachute lines were shot away and the pilot fell to the ground and made good his miraculous escape.

The capture of Tithwal signified a major blow to the raiders, as it was dangerously close to Muzaffarabad, their main base, and it disrupted their main line of communication with their forward bases in the north and north-east.

Supporting the direct attack on Tithwal, another column simultaneously advanced towards Tragham, 20 miles north-west of Handawor. Notwithstanding tough opposition, they pushed on and then striking towards Tithwal, finally ended up by capturing Nustachar.

Brig. Sen set out from Uri on May 20, with one battalion north of the Jhelum, two battalions south of the road and one

Indian Army engineers levelling the ground to build a bridge across a river.



battalion and one armoured column along the road. There were no illusions about the task assigned to Brig. Sen. Pitted against him was the largest and strongest concentration of the raiders, well equipped and armed with artillery.

The operation involved fighting up and down 7,000 to 10,000 foot high, thickly wooded mountains flanking the road on either side and clearing piquets at their tops. The road could be cleared only when the piquets at the tops of the mountains overlooking the road on either side were cleaned up.

There was heavy fighting for features on either side of the road. Some changed hands thrice in one day. Pandu, an important hill feature $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles north-west of Uri, was captured on May 23. Here a complete enemy ration and ammunition dump fell into our hands. Two prisoners belonging to the Frontier Force Rifles and the Frontier Force Regiment of the Pakistan Army were also captured. On May 27, the column advanced up to Urusa, overlooking Chakoti, the raiders' entrenched position along the road.

The threat to Muzaffarabad, represented by this drive and its initial successes at Tithwal and around Uri, spread panic and alarm in Pakistan and "Azad Kashmir." If the Indian Army were allowed to reach Domel and Muzaffarabad, all would be lost for the cause of the raiders. Pakistan, which till then had helped the invaders covertly, now came out into the open and flung in more regular Pakistan Army battalions to stem the tide of the Indian Army's drive westward. They also brought up 4.2-inch mortars and medium guns.

Beyond Urusa, the Indian Army met the hard core of enemy resistance in the shape of regular Pakistan battalions. The fighting was fierce and desperate. Our advance was held up. Between May 20 and 27, the enemy losses were 126 counted killed, six prisoners captured and a large number wounded. Our own casualties were 51 killed, 80 wounded and four missing—very heavy, compared with the Indian Army's previous record in the Kashmir campaign.

As the advance of the main column came to a halt, a subsidiary column was sent out north of the Jhelum. At the same time, Brigadier Harbux Singh was ordered to strike towards Muzaffarabad from Tithwal. The former column concentrated at Pandu on May 29 and captured a 6,875 foot high feature.

The enemy was dislodged only after three bayonet charges. His casualties were 20 killed and 35 wounded. His losses in equipment were 16 light machine-guns captured. In the meantime, the column from Tithwal cleared the area north of the Kishenganga of the enemy.

Then the weather took a hand. It rained ceaselessly for two days, converting dry nullahs into raging streams and grounding our aircraft. Both the columns were being maintained by air. The operation had to be postponed. The column from Uri returned to its base.

Yet another manoeuvre was attempted—this time a left hook. A Gurkha battalion was sent down south along the Urusa nullah, while another battalion advanced to Ledi Gali. Amidst a hail of grenades and bullets, the Gurkhas captured the 10,924 foot high Pir Kanti ridge on June 28, with a *kukri* charge. The enemy casualties were 54 counted killed; our own 7 killed and 51 wounded.

A column sent from Punch towards Bagh, an enemy strong point ten miles south of Chakoti, with the object of drawing the enemy from the Uri front, encountered stiff resistance and only partially succeeded in its object.

On July 10, the U. N. Commission on Kashmir arrived in India. The Commission appealed to both sides to refrain from offensive activity while they carried out their investigations. The Government of India immediately responded to the appeal and the Indian Army in Kashmir and Jammu was directed not to undertake fresh offensive action.

Pakistan, however, paid little heed to the appeal and launched a counter-attack at Pandu and recaptured it and also attacked our positions north of Kishenganga in the Tithwal area.

Pakistan, which had till now strenuously denied direct participation in the Kashmir fighting, confessed to the U. N. Commission that since May the Pakistan Army battalions had been fighting in Kashmir and that the Pakistan Army headquarters were in overall command of the operations in Jammu and Kashmir on their side of the line. The reason advanced was that the Indian Army's summer drive constituted a threat to Pakistan's interests in Kashmir as well as across the border.

Since the push began on May 17, General Thimayya's troops had cleared a 11-mile stretch of road between Urusa and Uri, and

captured Handowar, Kupwara, Keran and Tithwal, and established a forward position within 18 miles of Muzaffarabad and cut the enemy's line of communication to the north. In terms of territory, they had liberated 3,500 square miles.

About this time, in Jammu, the activity was still confined to sparring at the enemy, preliminary to bigger things to come. Offensive patrolling around Jhangar, Naushera and Rajauri was intensified.

Another attempt was made to relieve Punch, this time from Rajauri. Simultaneously a column from Rajauri and a column from Punch set out on June 15 and met at Potha on June 17.

During this link-up operation one of our Dakota pilots, Flying Officer D. O. Barty, on his flight back from Punch, received a radio message to airlift some of our own badly wounded jawans to whom proper medical attention or escort could not be given, and without their immediate evacuation they would have been lost or else the advance would have been held up. Ignoring all rules of the book and taking a grave personal risk, Barty landed his Dakota on an Auster strip, emplaned the casualties and took off.

In a message to the Officer Commanding RIAF Wing in Jammu and Kashmir the GOC-in-C, Western Command, remarked:

"I have just heard of the magnificent bit of work done by F/O Barty of Transport Squadron when he landed in a Dakota on a very hazardous strip in Potha on June 19, to evacuate our casualties from there. This is yet another act of gallantry of our brave young RIAF officers in these operations in Jammu and Kashmir. Will you please convey my very best congratulations and thanks to this young officer."

After the link-up, a column was sent to Mendhar, an important enemy training centre, and 100 refugees were recovered. The total of enemy casualties in this link-up operation were 122 counted killed and 280 estimated killed or wounded. Our own casualties were one officer and 10 other ranks killed and one officer and 17 other ranks wounded. To accomplish the link-up our troops had to march non-stop for 56 hours through thick jungle and high hills besides fighting a desperate enemy in entrenched positions.

The link-up with Punch, however, proved temporary, as we lacked the requisite number of troops to maintain it.

All the time Jhangar continued to be the favourite target of the enemy's artillery practice. On the night of July 3-4, the shelling of Jhangar was more intense than usual. Some 600 shells were pumped into our positions in Jhangar that night. One of them took the life of Brigadier Mohammad Usman, the hero of the battle of Naushera—an officer who distinguished himself as an outstanding soldier, a fearless leader and a popular man who was loved by his *jawans* and trusted by the local civilian population.

He was the first brigadier to be killed in the Kashmir campaign. At his death there were rejoicings in "Azad Kashmir" territory as well as in Pakistan, as he had become a terror to the enemy. In India he was hailed as a national hero. His body was flown to Delhi, where he was given a State funeral, with full military honours. The Governor General, the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers attended the funeral.

Indian troops on the march in the Naushera sector.



CHAPTER VI

THE "ARCTIC" FRONT

THE raiders' plans for the summer lay in a different direction—the north-easterly direction. Losing all hopes of piercing the Indian Army's steel ring in the west at Uri and in the south-west in Jammu, they sought new adventures in the remote, semi-arctic, barren districts of Baltistan and Ladakh.

Between those districts and the Kashmir valley stood the gaunt, forbidding Himalayan ranges, with a few difficult, fair-weather, snow-covered mountain tracks serving as the only link. Their very inaccessibility made those districts safe for the activities of the raiders, putting them beyond easy range of the Indian Army's attentions.

The raiders' projected summer campaign had three objectives aimed at dispersal of our forces—opening two more fronts, one in the north via Gurais and the other in the north-east via Zoji La, and "bagging" as much territory as possible in Baltistan and Ladakh. Gurais and Zoji La are the northern and north-eastern gateways respectively to the Kashmir valley.

All winter the raiders built up Gilgit, their possession in the northern frontier area, as the base for their summer campaign. Columns of raiders moved down from Gilgit and infiltrated southwards and south-eastwards.

By January, the pressure on the small State Force garrison in Skardu increased. The garrison, commanded by Colonel Shar Jung Thapa and consisting of two companies, held out pluckily against waves of attacks from the raiders. Accompanied by a large number of refugees, the garrison shut themselves up in the Skardu fort. The raiders encircled the fort and bypassed it on their eastward movement towards Kargil and Ladakh.

Repeated attempts from Srinagar to send relief to the besieged Skardu garrison were foiled by the difficult nature of the country, particularly in winter. The relief columns had to trek along snow-covered mountain tracks. On the way the Muslim porters sometimes deserted, and the columns were harassed by the enemy.

The first relief column of two companies set out from Srinagar on January 15 and moved in small parties of platoons. Three parties reached their destination after a month's trek in snow and blizzards. The second relief column consisting of one company left Srinagar on February 17. This column and the remnants of the first column held up *en route* were engaged at Gol by 100 raiders armed with 3-inch mortars.

Three hundred raiders ambushed the rear of this column eight miles north of Parkutta. The raiders hurled stones and rocks from hill tops. The commander of the relief column, Brigadier Faqir Singh, was wounded and the column scuttled. Our casualties in this attempt were 26 killed, seven missing, believed killed, and 18 wounded. Ammunition and baggage were looted. The remainder of the column withdrew to Kargil, 70 miles south of Skardu.

A third column was dispatched for Skardu on April 8. The head of the column reached Parkutta on May 8. Tolti was reached by the rest on May 11. But further advance was impossible owing to heavy opposition. The column was cut off

A forward piquet in the Uri sector. Indian soldiers coming out of a bunker at the top of a hill and going out on patrol.



by the enemy. Some 150 men returned cross-country to Srinagar. Thereupon, RIAF Tempest pilots dropped supplies in containers to the besieged garrison in Skardu. But bad weather constantly came in the way of the air-drops.

Though neither reinforcements nor supplies in any appreciable quantity could reach Skardu, the garrison, ordered to fight "to the last man and last round," held on grimly.

In the meantime, bypassing Skardu, the raiders overpowered another small State Force garrison at Kargil and then captured Dras, and thus cleared the way to Ladakh and Leh, its capital, the coveted objective of the eastward drive.

When the raiders infiltrated into the Ladakh district and skirmished with State Forces, the threat to Leh became imminent. The remnants of the State Forces dotted all over the Ladakh valley fell back on Leh to strengthen the defence of the town. From Srinagar were sent two officers and 15 other ranks to prepare the defences of the town. A party of Buddhist soldiers of the Indian Army had also been sent to Leh in February.

On May 24, Air Commodore Mehar Singh undertook the most daring operation yet in his colourful career—a flight to Leh along an uncharted route, at 23,000 feet and over the world's highest mountain ranges. He flew without even oxygen. Accompanying him on the flight was Gen. Thimayya. Mehar Singh landed on a rough improvised strip in Leh, constructed by a Ladakhi engineer, 11,554 feet above sea level.

Studying the situation on the spot, Gen. Thimayya decided to fly in reinforcements immediately. Two companies of Gurkhas were flown to Leh by the RIAF in May and June.

These measures were taken in the nick of time. On July 11, 1,000 raiders, armed with a 3-7 howitzer, launched an attack on the outposts of Leh. The attack was repulsed. As the pressure on Leh increased, the demand for supplies and reinforcements became insistent and urgent. Once again, the difficulties of terrain and the winter conditions were the major obstacles.

There were two land routes to Leh. The one from Srinagar passed through the snow-covered 11,578 foot high Zoji Pass and through Kargil. Only 40 out of the 230 miles of the route was motorable. The rest of the journey had to be performed on horse or on foot. The route wends its way between and up

and down bleak snow-mantled mountains. With Kargil in enemy hands, this route was out of the question. The second route to Leh was from Manali in East Punjab which was equally difficult and circuitous, running over 200 miles through thick jungles and Himalayan ranges.

Speedy help was the need of the moment. RIAF transport planes became once again the only resort. Dakotas, fitted up with improvised oxygen apparatus, opened a ferry service between Srinagar and Leh. Landing on a strip, 11,500 feet high, was no picnic. The aircraft kept their engines running while unloading and reloading for if the engines were switched off, they might not restart at that altitude.

The Leh garrison energetically built up its defences with the help of the supplies flown in by RIAF. Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhist volunteers were organised and trained into a local militia to fight side by side with the Indian and State forces.

Almost simultaneously with their eastward drive, the raiders moved down south from Gilgit into the Gurais valley, and passing over the Razdhanangan Pass (11,586 feet) got to Traqbal, overlooking Bandipura, in the Wular Lake region, 35 miles north of Srinagar.

The first air strike towards the north of Wular Lake came on April 28, 1948, in the shape of a concentrated attack by Tempests on the enemy position in Traqbal which lies six miles north of the Lake and 14 miles south-west of Gurais. A large cluster of houses which formed the centre of enemy activity in that area were bombed and destroyed. The discovery of this target was entirely due to the vigilance and "eagle-eye" of a Tempest pilot who spotted fresh track marks on snow leading to these innocent looking houses. Under difficult flying conditions, sustained and effective offensive air raids were carried out until the capture of Gurais, exactly two months later.

Gen. Thimayya, in the meantime, got ready to meet this threat from the north. Soon after the devastating air strike which had driven the enemy out of Traqbal, Army engineers "got cracking" on a jeep track to Traqbal, 10,000 feet above sea level.

The first jeep motored to Traqbal on May 21. Mules and porters carried ammunition and supplies another eight miles to



A mobile 3-inch mortar positioned for action in the Zoji La area.

Razdhanangan, where was established the base for our operations. Two infantry battalions and a mountain battery were concentrated for the job. Facing our troops and entrenched in the Gurais valley were five companies of the Frontier Constabulary, 250 Chitral Scouts and 300 Gilgit Scouts, well armed and equipped and led by regular Army officers, including State Force deserters, with intimate knowledge of the country.

Gurais is a valley through which flows the Kishenganga, dominated on either side by a series of ranges of the Himalayas, running parallel to each other and nowhere below 11,000 feet, with most of them snow-covered all the year round. D-Day was June 25. The operation largely consisted of climbing up and wresting from the enemy a series of steep snow-mantled features. The process began with the capture of Menon Hill (12,857 feet) and Shete Hill (11,978 feet) and culminated in the conquest of the forbidding 14,218 foot high peak, Kesar. This peak was assaulted by our troops in a blizzard in the middle of the night.

Wet and shivering, the Indian Army troops kept up the momentum of their advance under a hail of machine-gun and

mortar fire and were in Gurais by June 28. Behind the capture of Gurais lies the story of phenomenal endurance and perseverance by the Indian Army troops and their engineers. It was a mountaineers' war fought in arctic conditions. Our troops were poorly clad for that kind of winter. Fortyfive mules died in the cold and the mountain guns had to be man-handled in blizzard and snow.

The fleeing raiders left behind a trail of their dead. The raiders also lost heavily in equipment and supplies. The most precious booty captured by our troops was the Frontier Constabulary blankets. Almost following on the heels of our advancing troops, Indian Army engineers unrolled a jeep track, from Bandipur to Gurais, a distance of 42 miles, within four weeks.

In the north-east, the raiders penetrated the Zoji La and infiltrated into the Sonamarg valley. The Patialas guarding this gateway to Srinagar reacted energetically. They immediately engaged them and chased them beyond the Zoji La. The Patialas mounted guard at the Zoji Pass by establishing

Mules carrying rations in the Uri sector. They are the only dependable transport in the snow-covered hills of Kashmir.



piquets at 16,000 foot high peaks, while a jeep track crept towards them from Sonamarg.

On August 14, the Skardu garrison was at last overwhelmed and surrendered to sheer weight of numbers. The State Force troops resisted till the last, with no hope of either relief or victory. The OC of the victorious Pakistani troops reported back to his headquarters: "All Sikhs shot, all women raped."

With the fall of Skardu, as apprehended, the raiders doubled their pressure on Leh. In August another company of Gurkhas was flown into Leh. In the same month two more companies of Gurkhas plus 800 rifles were also sent to Leh along the 203-mile mountain track via Manali in East Punjab. Yet another column followed them along the same route on September 12, with 400 mules and 1,000 porters. Thus the defences of Leh were reinforced betimes to meet the danger.

A lonely piquet in a forward area.



CHAPTER VII

ON THE ROAD TO LEH

As the precious summer months were fading out, the Indian Army had the satisfaction of securing the safety of the Kashmir valley against invasion from the north and the north-east, thus completing the steel ring around the valley.

But two important jobs still remained outstanding. Both the tasks had to be accomplished before winter, if a calamity were to be averted. These were (a) reopening the road from Srinagar to Leh and removing the menace to the Buddhist district of Ladakh, and (b) the relief of the Punch garrison, which had gallantly held out for a year against repeated assaults and whose position was getting precarious under intensified pressure from the besieging forces. Both were purely relief operations, in no way contrary to the agreement with the UN Commission that no action would be taken that would aggravate the situation.

The Zoji Pass, 64 miles north-east of Srinagar, which links the Kashmir valley with Ladakh, is dominated by high peaks on either side and is about two miles long, debouching into the Gumri basin.


Indian troops effectively controlled the western approaches to the Zoji La, but the raiders held three ridges around the pass. These three ridges, named by the Indian troops, "Chabutra," "Machine-gun" and "Mukund," had to be cleared of the enemy before the Indian Army could advance towards Kargil, an important junction of the raiders' line of communication from the north to Ladakh.

With plenty of time to choose his defensive positions, the raiders had sited their weapons to cover the defile along which our troops would have to advance, while on a sheer cliff known as "North Ridge," far down the centre, he had mounted a mountain-gun to command the whole pass.

The first attempt to break through the Zoji Pass was made early in September. While Patialas were ordered to hold to their positions flanking the Zoji La, one battalion of Gurkhas

WAR MAP OF KASHMIR & JAMMU AS ON THE 27TH OCT. 48

MILES 0 20 40 60 80 100 MILES



- INDIAN ARMY'S FORWARD LINE
- TERRITORY ADMINISTERED BY J & K GOVERNMENT
- HOSTILE HELD TERRITORY
- ROUTES OF ENEMY PENETRATION
- FORWARDMOST POINT OF ENEMY'S PENETRATION
- BATTLEFIELDS
- ROADS - ALL WEATHER
- TRACTS

C. PARRADY

4150/2874 - A. 1/48

was to carry out a diversion along a left hook to Dras via Botkulamganj, and a company of another Gurkha battalion, setting out from Pahalgam, was to demonstrate towards Suru. Mahrattas and Jats were to carry out a frontal assault.

The Gurkha battalion advancing to Botkulamganj came up against glaciers and found the tracks shown on the map non-existent. It had therefore to be withdrawn. The Gurkha company demonstrating towards Suru encountered heavy opposition. The main column captured a feature on the other side of the pass on September 6. It was, however, recaptured by the enemy. The Indian column then advanced on a two-battalion front.

On the night of September 13-14, Mahrattas and Jats attacked two features. They reached within 30 yards of their objective, but were pinned down by heavy enemy fire. The Indian column suffered very heavy casualties—one entire company was involved, and on the following day fighting patrols were sent out to bring them out.

The operation was called off when it was realised that enemy caves positioned on the side of cliffs could not be reached by the trajectory of our artillery, nor could air support be effective in the circumstances. There was also no room for manoeuvre. The enemy was holding precipitous heights. His positions on the edges of cliffs were difficult to climb.

It was then decided that movement from our side was possible only by night or under cover of fire from tanks. The first alternative was ruled out as the hours of the night would prove insufficient for completion of the operation.

The second alternative was workable, if only the tanks could be brought up to this height and all the distance from Jammu. The tanks could sit in the pass with impunity, ignoring the enemy small-arms fire, and blanket his bunkers with shells, while our infantry advanced. But if tanks were to be brought, a road had to be constructed.

The bold decision was taken. In less than two months, the Thangaraju road—named after Major Thangaraju who planned the project—from Baltal to Zoji La, was laid down. At places the road had to be hewn out of sheer rock.

From Jammu to Baltal, seven Stewart ("Honeys") tanks travelled a distance of 260 miles *incognito* and under strict



Mules crossing a mountain stream in the Naushera sector.

secrecy. They were covered with shrouds to conceal their identity. On the way, the tanks negotiated the frail Ramban bridge.

From Baltal to Zoji La, the tanks negotiated their way around slippery hairpin bends and up a gradient of 3,000 feet in four miles.

D-Day was October 20. Rain and snow on October 20 compelled postponement of the operation, and at one time it looked as though it could not be launched until the following spring. November 1 was fixed as the last possible date for launching the operation, because any delay beyond that date would have made stocking across the Zoji La impossible, as the pass became blocked with snow in December.

Fortunately the weather cleared up in time, and under the natural cover of cloud, the tanks moved out at 10 a.m. on November 1. It was snowing as the tanks mounted the Zoji La track. From the jeephead, the road constructed by our sappers meandered forward for two miles. Whether any track existed beyond that point nobody knew.

The tanks moved forward, crossed Zoji La and gingerly stepped on to the "no man's land" in the Gumri basin. Solely relying for guidance on air reconnaissance reports, the tanks forged ahead through snowdrifts, glaciers, mountain streams and over boulders to reach the foot of Chabutra Hill.

The enemy opened up a barrage of fire, which ricocheted harmlessly off the tank armour. Then the tank guns barked and systematically destroyed about 25 enemy bunkers and seized full control of Gumri by midday. Behind the tanks, the infantry moved in without much opposition.

The credit for taking the first tank through the snow-covered pass goes to Acting Lance Duffadar Bachhan Singh of Rampur Mandar village, Mansal Tehsil, Patiala State.

Driving his tank through snow-covered and boggy tracks over rock-like glaciers and through streams of melted snow, Bachhan Singh advanced through a hailstorm of enemy fire from the ridges around, while the guns of the remaining tanks gave protection to the infantry marching into Gumri.

Bachhan Singh described the action thus: "When we

The first R. I. A. F. Dakota to land at Leh.



received our marching orders at 10 a.m. on November 1, and started off to break through the enemy defences at Zoji La, it was snowing heavily and the enemy could not spot us. He did not even imagine that tanks could be taken through the pass.

"A track had been made by our sappers working through the night, 500 yards beyond the pass, but we had no idea what lay ahead. We did not know whether the glaciers over which we had to take our tanks would be able to stand their weight or would bury us all under many feet of snow. We took a chance, and driving over the glacier, we soon descended into the Gumri basin.

"The enemy then spotted us and immediately opened up a barrage of machine-gun, anti-tank rifle and Bren-gun fire. He also opened fire with a 3.7 howitzer, but without effect. A few small arms bullets which hit my tank glanced off and my tank remained undamaged. The gunner of the tank thereupon opened fire on the enemy bunkers and silenced them completely. Our infantry then safely crossed over and occupied the lower slopes of Gumri, cutting off the enemy from behind. We reached Gumri at the end of two hours."

The enemy was surprised and demoralised by the sight of the tanks in Gumri, which he had never expected. At 9 p.m. on November 1, Patialas under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Sukhdeo Singh, set out from the Gumri basin. Walking surreptitiously throughout the night, a company of Patialas reached Machhoi and covered the enemy from behind.

On finding themselves encircled on all sides, the hostiles were completely demoralised. Those who tried to flee were good targets for our riflemen, others surrendered and saved their lives. On the "North Ridge" our troops found a dismantled 3.7 howitzer. The enemy was obviously trying to carry it in parts while running away to safety.

The Patialas rested at Machhoi on November 2 as they were on dry rations for more than 40 hours and the Rajputs under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Girdhari Singh pushed towards Matayan, six miles to the north-east of Machhoi. Matayan eventually fell into our hands on November 4 at 3 p.m.

Our patrols here discovered strong enemy concentrations at Batkundi ridge, which rises from Pindras to the west, where the

enemy had dug-outs, stone caves and bunkers constructed on the Japanese pattern. Another ridge behind, named "Anant Ridge" after Lieutenant-Colonel Anant Singh Pathania, Commander of a Gurkha battalion, who captured the ridge later, was also infested with enemy gun positions. This ridge along with the "Brown feature" controlled the entrance to Dras.

Our troops could not take the risk against such strong enemy positions. They had to wait for eight days for the tanks to arrive from Gumri. There was no road and it was not possible to build one during the winter. The Commander took a chance and drove the tanks through Gumri nullah in knee-deep water and over huge boulders and ultimately reached Matayan without a break-down.

Knowing that a day attack would be futile, a night operation was undertaken to dislodge the enemy from his well entrenched positions. Our troops launched an attack on the night of November 13-14, but it proved unsuccessful.

At 10 a.m. on November 14, our troops, supported by armour, attacked and secured the lower slopes of Anant ridge. At 7 p.m. the same day a two-pronged attack was mounted, one on the Anant ridge and the other on the track at the foot of the Brown feature, which leads to Dras, through Gumri nullah and Dras river. Yet another diversionary drive was simultaneously made on the Batkundi ridge to enable the two main prongs to bypass the ridge and reach their objectives.

After the initial surprise, the enemy brought down heavy automatic fire. Indian mountain-gunners opened up and kept the enemy's heads down and provided cover for the two formations to converge on Anant feature.

When one of the formations was within 200 yards of its objective, it came under direct enemy fire, but a diversionary move by our troops crawling on their stomachs again surprised the enemy in his bunkers. The first formation swung right and fell suddenly upon the enemy in his caves. The feature was in our hands by 5 a.m.

When the attack on Anant feature was in progress, another Indian formation dashed forward through the Gumri nullah and the Dras river, bypassing the enemy entrenched on Batkundi ridge, just near the entrance to Pindras. At nightfall,



Two Stewart ("Honeys") tanks negotiating their way from Zoji La to Dras.

the troops crossed the river at six different points under very trying conditions, marching over snow-covered mountains and wading through fords. Every time the troops came out of freezing water, they felt as if their feet had been chopped off. The water in their trousers froze and pebbles remained stuck to trousers and boots.

Crossing the first stream at the foot of Pindras, about four miles from Matayan, these troops came under ceaseless enemy fire in bright moonlight. They took cover behind huge boulders for five hours, until the enemy exhausted his ammunition. In the meantime, a small formation of our troops had taken up positions on Brown feature.

Early next morning, when Indian troops moved up the ridge, the enemy ran helter-skelter and were picked on by our formation on Brown feature as well as by RIAF fighters overhead.

Covering over ten miles of rugged terrain infested with enemy snipers, the Patialas reached the Dras plain at 4.20 p.m. on November 15. Our Force Commander, Brigadier H. L.

Atal, Commander of 77 Para Brigade, was met by a delegation of two villagers from Dras. Ghauhal Ghulam Zaffar, Zaildar (Headman) and Ghulam Rasool, Lambardar of Dras, welcomed the Indian troops and announced that the hostiles had cleared out of Dras at 2 p.m.

On reaching Dras our troops recovered rifles, Bren-guns, 50 cases of 3-inch and 2-inch mortar bombs, blankets, ground-sheets, warm jackets, medical stores and 3,000 maunds of firewood.

The next day, November 16, the Patialas celebrated Guru Nanak's birthday in Dras, which was attended by Maj-Gen. K. S. Thimayya, GOC, 19 Division. The Patialas collected the children of the villages and distributed sweets to them.

During the entire operation RIAF aircraft gave close support to our marching columns and strafed enemy dug-in gun and mortar positions on the mountain slopes on either side of the defile in Zoji La as troops pushed forward. RIAF aircraft also dropped thousands of leaflets on Dras and surrounding areas advising the local population not to abandon their homes.

Indian troops advancing up the steep hills beyond Zoji La.





Gurkha soldiers examining an enemy mortar captured in the Zoji La area.

Continuing the mopping up of hostile pockets beyond Dras, Indian troops, on the morning of November 23, established positions at Kargil, the important trade and communication centre situated on the track leading to Skardu in the north, Dras and Srinagar in the west and Leh in the east.

Meanwhile, from the other side, consolidating their positions in the Nubra valley, Indian troops cleared hostiles from Khalatse, 50 miles west of Leh. Khalatse, situated at the track junction from Gilgit and Skardu in the north-west and from Srinagar, Dras and Kargil in the south-west, is the gateway to Leh.

Now, only 45 miles of tortuous snow-covered mountain track lay between our troops in Kargil and those in Khalatse. Moving along this track, an Indian Army patrol from Khalatse established contact with our forward troops at Kargil on November 24. The Indian troops then busied themselves with combing out the region for hostiles.

Thus the land-link between Srinagar and Leh was established after nearly six months. In the entire operation, the enemy suffered a total of 318 killed and 206 wounded. One enemy 3.7 howitzer, one 4.2-inch mortar, one 3-inch mortar and two 2-inch mortars and 14 rifles were captured. Our casualties were 40 killed, 86 wounded and 37 listed as missing. Casualties from frost-bite were 350.

In the meantime, in the western front of the Kashmir valley, the raiders made a herculean effort to pierce our defences at Tithwal. Preceded by heavy shell fire, hostiles over 2,000 strong launched a two-pronged attack on our forward positions south and south-west of Tithwal on the morning of October 13. Indian troops went into action immediately and in the battle which lasted four hours, they threw the enemy back inflicting on him heavy casualties.

Later in the day, after reinforcing themselves the raiders, under cover of a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire, mounted two more attacks, accompanied by a diversionary

An R. I. A. F. Dakota flying at a height of 25,000 ft. on its way to Leh.



attack from another point. Our defences stood firm, and the raiders went back, losing more men. Late that evening, the raiders came for the third time. This time they attacked our positions in the area south-south-west of Tithwal, and were again repulsed.

Having failed in their attempts to dislodge the Indians from their forward positions around Tithwal, the enemy kept up a barrage of 25-pounders and 3.7 howitzers. Up to 5 a.m. on October 13, the enemy had fired 3,000 shells and an equal number of mortar bombs. This was one of the heaviest shelling that our troops had encountered in Jammu and Kashmir.

The next day, the enemy, assuming that our troops had abandoned their positions, again approached our forward piquets at 7.30 p.m. He was dispersed summarily.

RIAF aircraft gave close support to our troops during and after the attack and accurately engaged hostiles' known gun positions and concentrations. This demoralised the enemy so much that in the words of one of our Army officers who was in the thick of the fighting, "the enemy would have undoubtedly overrun our positions but for the Tempest."

On October 29, in the Uri-Chakothi sector, hostile medium guns fired 42 shells on our forward positions in the Urusa area. Our own aircraft effectively engaged hostile gun positions on the same day. In the first week of November, 300 raiders, supported by medium guns, 25-pounders and 3.7 howitzers, attacked an Indian position five miles north-east of Chakothi. Our troops repulsed the attack and forced the enemy to withdraw.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELIEF OF PUNCH

IN Jammu, Gen. Atma Singh launched his elaborately planned offensive for the relief of Punch. By September, the hostile ring around Punch had tightened and it threatened to strangle the garrison. The enemy brought up 25-pounders and put the airstrip—the only link with the outside world—out of commission. Intelligence and air reconnaissance reports indicated a heavy build-up in Bagh, an enemy base north-west of Punch, with the obvious intention of extracting the thorn on their side, which was the Punch garrison.

The first phase in the operation for the relief of Punch comprised the capture of Thana Mandi, 12 miles north of Rajauri. 19 Brigade concentrated a column at Rajauri, consisting of two troops of light tanks, a troop of a field battery, a battalion of Kumaon Rifles and a battalion of Rajputana Rifles.

On the night of September 19-20, the column advanced towards Thana Mandi. After two days' push, Thana Mandi was secured. Its fate was sealed when Kumaonis captured Point 7,710. This feature had been strongly held by two enemy companies armed with two 3-inch mortars and four machine-guns.

A hailstorm and thick mist helped our troops to occupy it on September 22, without suffering any casualties, while the weather also helped the hostiles to retreat easily. The enemy's losses were three killed and 12 wounded.

With Thana Mandi in our possession, hostile pockets in the Riasi district, east of the Thana Mandi-Rajauri track, were already in the bag, being cut off and isolated from their bases.

Now preparations for the second phase of the operation were under way. Two brigades concentrated at Rajauri under the command of Brigadier Yadhunath Singh. In addition, a Rajauri column of three battalions was also placed under his command. The operation was to be carried out in three phases; the capture of Pir Badesar and Pir Kalewa, the capture



Armed with spades, besides automatic weapons, Indian troops have to cut footholds in the snow on their way to Dras.

of Sangiot and its conversion into a firm base, and the final break-through and link-up with Punch.

The enemy strength facing them was reported to be two battalions east of Rajauri-Thana Mandi, one brigade west of Rajauri, one brigade in Mendhar, on the way to Punch, and one brigade south of Punch.

Pir Badesar, 5,432 feet high, was a stronghold of the hostiles, overlooking the entire Naushera and Seri valleys north-east of Jhangar. The operation was launched under the command of Brigadier Harbhajan Singh on the night of October 14-15. In moonlight, a column of our troops, mostly Gurkhas, marched through difficult, mountainous, trackless country on to the enemy-held Giran village. A half-asleep sentry challenged our leading section and asked for the password. A burst of bullets was the answer he received. A moment later, there was a fierce exchange of fire. Before long, the last of the enemy fled, leaving behind his dead, dying and wounded.

In the meantime, another column consisting of Punjabis and

Kumaonis had bypassed the scene of this battle and taken up positions near Paran.

As dawn broke, a Tempest twin of the RIAF zoomed overhead and rocketted the hostile positions on Pir Badesar. Soon columns of smoke billowed high from the feature. Three quarters of an hour later, a second Tempest twin appeared from behind the surging mass of pine, headed straight for the target and dropped their "eggs" and disappeared.

The air strike, at precise intervals, lasted the whole day, synchronising with a barrage from our field and mountain guns. By midday, one column of our troops, Punjabis, had captured Paran and other smaller features in its vicinity. In the meantime, Kumaonis were making for the main objective, Pir Badesar, ready for the final assault.

After a series of skirmishes, which added to the demoralisation of the enemy, our advance column of Kumaonis was fast scaling Pir Badesar, and an hour before sunset, they were on top. The enemy's losses in this operation were 102 killed and 9 prisoners and 27 rifles captured.

The Pir Badesar operation was a deception. As intended,

A mountain gun being carried on mules beyond Dras.





A convoy returning from Zoji La to Sonamarg.

the move put the enemy on the wrong scent, giving the impression that our objective was Kotli instead of Punch.

Pir Kalewa, a commanding feature astride the Rajauri-Thana Mandi road, was captured by another brigade on the afternoon of October 26. This was comparatively an easier job, the enemy's losses being only four killed and many more believed killed and wounded.

The remaining phases of the Punch link-up operations, however, had to be postponed for a while following a new menace to our lines of communication from hostiles from across the Pakistan border.

Towards the end of October, hostile pressure suddenly increased all along the Jammu-Pakistan border, from Pathankot to Chhamb. Three additional infantry battalions had to be sent for from India, to be stationed at Samba, Chhamb and Naushera.

In the last week of October 15, hostiles were killed in the Chhamb area when our troops ambushed a party of raiders. Later, under cover of machine-gun fire, the hostiles rushed in reinforcements, but Indian artillery and mortars foiled the

hostiles' attempt to concentrate for a further attack on our positions.

On the night of October 29, approximately 300 hostiles, armed with light machine-guns, attacked our positions south of Chhamb. The hostile action was supported by artillery fire from Pakistan territory. After severe fighting, our troops,

A wounded soldier being evacuated by air from Punch to Jammu.



supported by 3-inch mortar fire, repulsed the attack. A few days later, the enemy fired 300 25-pounder and 5.5-inch medium-gun shells in the Chhamb area.

In the Samba-Kathua border region, two engagements took place on November 4 and 5, the former eight and a half miles south-east of Samba and the latter at Nekowal village, 13 miles south-west of Miransahib. Our border patrols went into action and put the hostiles to flight. Six hostiles were killed and five wounded.

After consolidating their successes at Pir Badesar and Pir Kalewa and dispatching more men to defend the Pathankot-Chhamb stretch of the Jammu-Pakistan border, the Indian Army resumed the offensive for the link-up with Punch.

The next phase of the operation, i.e. the capture of Sangiot, was altered, as the sappers preferred to build a road to Punch via Mendhar. The enemy had one strong brigade located in Mendhar, and another brigade at Ramgarh.

On the night of November 7-8, 5 Brigade moved forward to secure the right flank of Mendhar, while 19 Brigade took up the task of securing the left flank. The Rajauri column was detailed to capture Ramgarh fort and features in the vicinity, to protect the left flank of 19 Brigade. Meanwhile, the battalion at Pir Badesar was demonstrating towards Kotli, and the battalion at Point 7,710 was demonstrating towards Thana Mandi. Bhimber Gali and Ramgarh were to be taken in the first bound and Bhimber Gali was then to be made into a firm base for further advance.

Indian troops left Rajauri on the night of November 6-7 and assembled six miles to the north at Kain Basan the same night. At 6 p.m. the next day, they moved down the Haiyat-pura spur and entered Sukhtao Nala valley at 9 p.m. After crossing the Nala they started advancing along the Dheri Dara spur.

Two hours later, on the lower spur of Point 6,307, the leading column ran into opposition for the first time. The enemy was, however, pushed back after he had suffered a few casualties, and the advance continued in pitch darkness.

There were no incidents until they approached Mangalnar village. The enemy had strongly defended positions in

this area and all the approaches to Mangalnar had been covered by 100 men armed with Browning and Italian-made Breda machine-guns, mortars, light automatics and rifles.

Our forces could obtain no artillery support as it was night and decided to charge this enemy strongpoint under cover of their own mortar fire. The enemy defended his ground tenaciously and was thrown back only after hand-to-hand fighting in which he used a large number of hand-grenades. After losing at least 25 killed and many more wounded, the enemy, by 2-30 a.m., began retreating.

The Indian column was then reorganised and proceeded further. Between Mangalnar and Point 6,307, the enemy put up resistance at three different points, but the Indian troops reached their objective by 6 o'clock on November 8. By now this column had covered a distance of 12 miles in the hours of darkness over difficult mountain tracks and had fought five successful actions.

Meanwhile, another Indian column was following behind. After reducing pockets of resistance *en route* this column got ready to take the next feature. Man-handling mortars and machine-guns—the track was too narrow even for mules—at noon the column made for Point 6,274 and a feature immediately to the north. Under cover of artillery-fire, by 1 p.m., the column captured its objective. The enemy fell back to the next feature leaving behind 10 dead and four taken prisoner.

The last phase of this attack was the taking of Point 6,944 on the west flank of Bhimber Gali. No field-guns could be used for this purpose on account of the rugged mountainous terrain. Indian engineers, working at hectic speed, got a 12-mile track ready in nine hours and mountain-guns were brought up this track to a place from where further advance could be supported.

A third column joined the fray, and the attack on the feature was mounted at 5 p.m., with mountain-artillery and RIAF support. For over 2,000 yards, our troops had to move over ground swept by enemy bullets. The hostiles held on to the height stubbornly until the Indians fixed bayonets for the final charge. When they saw the glittering steel, the enemy



Tempest pilots being briefed before take-off.

fled in disorder. The hostiles lost 50 killed and many more wounded in the action.

As the sun was dipping behind the hills, Bhimber Gali itself was in our hands. Our positions were consolidated during the night and the next day, November 9, Point 6,207 was taken. The capture of Point 6,207 gave us a clear view of an enemy concentration in Turti, about six miles south of Mendhar. One thousand hostiles with animal transport concentrated in the area presented an ideal target for our guns and mortars. The enemy fled in utter confusion, leaving behind at least 60 dead.

The total of enemy casualties in the course of the 18-mile Indian advance from Rajauri to Bhimber Gali was 175 killed, many more wounded and 20 taken prisoner. Large quantities of stores and equipment, including standard and paratroop

rifles, 3-inch mortar bombs, small-arms ammunition, signal cable and foodstocks fell into our hands. The enemy also left behind loads of anti-Indian hate-propaganda posters and leaflets.

The Rajauri column encountered heavy opposition at Ramgarh fort, five miles north-west of Rajauri, and the surrounding heights. The fort area, on top of a steep, pine-clad projection, was defended by three hostile battalions under "Brigadier" Rahmatullah (Captain Rahmatullah, a State Force deserter). The resistance was broken and the fort itself captured by midday on November 9.

Two hundred hostiles were believed to have been killed in the fight for Ramgarh. The booty included 5,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 38 3-inch mortar bombs, five to six miles of cable, one loudspeaker and chairs and tables and a Pakistan flag. Every raider had been sworn on the Koran to defend Ramgarh "to the last man and last round," and the fort itself was in our hands only after bitter fighting for Niganar, Harj Lali, Lambi Bari and Point 6480. India's flag was hoisted over the century-old fort after due ceremony.

Maj.-Gen. Atma Singh congratulating Brig. Yadhunath Singh on the successful conclusion of the Punch "link-up" operations.



As our troops in the Rajauri sector began their advance, Indian troops at Jhangar launched a sharp attack on enemy-held positions to the north-west of Jhangar. The operation was more or less of a diversionary character.

The attack started at dead of night. Our troops, marching through thick jungle in darkness, thrust deep into enemy positions before dawn. Surprised in his lair, the enemy fired at random in all directions, with little effect. Our troops continued to move forward.

At daybreak, RIAF fighters joined in the attack, while our artillery shelled enemy hill positions. Down in the Seri valley, our tanks deployed in support of our right flank, sped past the cornfields and inflicted heavy punishment on the hostiles.

By about 8 o'clock, the enemy's 25-pounders and 3-inch mortars opened up. Considering the quantity of high explosives expended by the enemy, the damage caused to our positions was insignificant. Altogether, the hostiles lost some 60 to 70 killed in this diversionary action, about half of them being accounted for by our tanks. Indian Army casualties were three killed and a dozen wounded.

With Ramgarh in our hands, Indian troops from Chingas and the Pir Badesar area linked up with Ramgarh, thus removing the large enemy bulge towards Rajauri.

At Bhimber Gali, the Indian forces resumed their advance along both the flanks. 19 Brigade was held up by heavy opposition from Point 5732, south-east of Mendhar, but 5 Brigade secured its objectives without much opposition.

With the enemy well entrenched and the approach to it most difficult, Point 5732 held out. A frontal attack appeared to be the only alternative, with the inevitable accompanying loss of lives. The enemy was also holding features south of Mendhar in greater strength. The plan was accordingly changed and 19 Brigade was ordered to perform a right hook. 19 Brigade left behind one battalion and concentrated in the 5 Brigade area.

The night of November 19-20 was selected as the D-Day for final link-up operations. 168 Brigade from Punch advanced and captured features south of Punch. 5 Brigade captured Point 5982 and effected the link-up with the Punch column at 2 p.m. on November 20. 19 Brigade captured Topa ridge.

Mendhar itself was secured on November 23 and the features south of Mendhar were also taken. And Brigadier Pritam Singh, the defender of Punch, and Brig. Yadhunath Singh, commanding the leading relief column, shook hands. At Topa ridge the Indians captured one medium machine-gun, two 3-inch mortars, 20,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 200 mortar bombs, 60 grenades, 200 blankets and 20 mules.

The final phase was exciting for the Punch garrison. On the night of November 19-20, only Pir Marghot Ghazi, a 6,000 foot high hill feature, stood between the besieged Punch garrison and the relief column from Rajauri. A column from Punch made for the feature stealthily. A cold wind cut through their battle-dress as the Indians reached the foothills. They knew that the feature was held strongly by five companies of hostiles, armed with medium machine-guns and Bren-guns, and as they advanced they wondered why the enemy was quiet.

Suddenly the Indians were challenged by a sentry. The cool-headed company commander kept his presence of mind and whispered, "Apne admi hain." The sentry was satisfied, without bothering to ask for the password. A bayonet disposed of the sentry. The shuffle of their feet, however, alarmed the hostiles, who hastily opened with everything they had and lobbed grenades at our troops. All that failed to deter the advancing Indians, who captured their objective by midday, after four bayonet charges. An hour later, they were on top of Danni Na Pir and had consolidated their gains.

The booty at Pir Marghot Ghazi included one wireless battery-charging engine, two 12-volt batteries, 12,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, a wireless set, two telephones, 30 3-inch mortar bombs, 400 rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition and four rifles.

Though the Commander of the Punch garrison had shaken hands with the Commander of the relief column, a lot of work yet remained to be done to insure the link-up and the safety of Punch. The hostiles still had the town within range of their shells. To remove this threat, on November 25, an attack was launched on Salotri ridge. The ridge was taken after overcoming stiff resistance. Along with it came more booty— one Bren-gun and two V. B. magazines, two spare barrels, two

rifles, 2,300 rounds of small arms ammunition, cable, a microphone and a wireless set.

The capture of Salotri ridge exposed the enemy gun positions, and he had to pull them out. After the link-up, the Panch garrison freed Suran and Mandi valleys astride the tracks to the north to Kashmir.

*Commanders of the Kashmir operations.
From left to right: Maj.-Gen. K. S. Thimayya, Lt.-Gen. S. M. Shrinagesh and Gen. K. M. Cariappa.*



CHAPTER IX

THE BALANCE SHEET

The last two major objectives set down for accomplishment before the onset of winter had been achieved by the Indian Army on schedule. The threatening menace of raiders to the Ladakh valley and Leh had been dissipated, and Punch had been, at last, relieved after 12 months of heroic resistance.

These two operations, forced on us by the refusal of Pakistan to raise the siege of our beleaguered garrisons, were as large as any in the campaign. Their resounding success enabled us to link up with our gallant isolated garrisons in spite of the enemy's stubborn efforts to prevent it.

When the raiders were sent down the Domel road in October 1947, Srinagar was their supreme objective. Now, 15 months later, after all the expenditure of blood and treasure, they were as far away from attaining that objective as ever.

The Indian Army's steel ring around the Kashmir valley was now complete and secure. The raiders were also being chased out of their newly acquired territory in the north-eastern district of Ladakh. In Jammu, they were being pushed back very fast until they found themselves desperately clinging to a strip of border territory in the west.

The political repercussions of these reverses were far-reaching in the fast shrinking "Azad" territory as well as in Pakistan. With the dream of possessing Kashmir fast melting away, the sum-total of human suffering inflicted by the rash adventure stood out in bold relief, with thousands of uprooted refugees penned up in open camps and starving, hoarsely demanding fulfilment of the rosy promises made to them by the rebel and Pakistan leaders.

The discontent became sharper with the receipt of reports about the fair treatment meted out to those Muslims who had chosen to stay behind in the territory lost to the Indian Army.

Here they had already gone back to their farms under the security provided by our troops. Government controlled shops provided them with their daily necessities of life at reasonable



prices. State and Indian Army medical aid was freely available to their sick and ailing. They found large-scale employment at good wages with the Indian Army. They found a market for their agricultural produce. Trade had already begun to revive.

Hungry and emaciated refugees were now trickling back across the line and surrendering to our troops for being permitted to return to their homes.

When the voluntary, informal "cease-fire" came one minute before midnight on New Year's Day, the Indian troops in Kashmir were still fighting the cruel northern winter beyond Kargil, struggling on their way to Marol, another road-junction from Gilgit and Skardu to the Ladakh valley in the south-east.

In Jammu, the link-up with Punch had been made firm and permanent. Thus, after 12 months of siege, the gallant garrison had been relieved.

The story of the defence of Punch is a saga of courage, endurance and grim tenacity of purpose—of sheer will to survive in the face of overwhelming odds. In this brilliant achievement, the RIAF shared the honours with Brig. Pritam Singh's gallant men and the thousands of refugees living with them.

For over a year, wave after wave of well armed fanatics—at one time, as many as three rebel brigades and five to ten thousand Pathans—supported by 25-pounders, 3.7 howitzers and 4.2-inch mortars, lashed against the Punch garrison holding a tiny bit of ten square miles, ringed by pine-clad hills. The enemy paid for their temerity by losing 2,628 killed and 3,876 wounded.

The relief of Punch was accomplished on November 21, 1948—exactly one year after the entry of the first Indian troops into Punch. Punch was being garrisoned by Jammu and Kashmir State Forces when on November 21, 1947, Lt.-Col. (later Brig.) Pritam Singh led 1 Para Kumaonis to Punch from Uri. With them were 40,000 refugees. The morale of neither the State Forces nor the refugees was high in the circumstances. Completely cut off by the hostiles, the only hope was an air-link with the outside world. For that an airstrip was needed. Six thousand refugee volunteers, men, women and children, worked day and night to complete a rough airstrip in a week's time.



Brig. Pritam Singh showing some captured enemy equipment to Maj.-Gen. Atma Singh (standing, left) in the Punch area.

On December 8, Air Vice-Marshal Mukherjee and Air Commodore Mehar Singh landed the first aircraft—a Beechcraft—at Punch. On December 12, the first Dakota landed on the strip. The RIAF had now started “Punching”—a phrase coined by the boys of the air, signifying rushing in urgently needed supplies and flying out refugees. Among the most welcome gifts they brought was a battery of mountain-guns.

Punch’s battle for survival took a turn for the worse when in March, the enemy, for the first time, brought up 3.7 howitzers. That put the airstrip directly under fire and Punch’s “window” to the world was sealed off.

It was then decided to put 25-pounder guns into Punch to neutralise the enemy’s mountain-guns. On March 21, while enemy shells whizzed and whistled around them, RIAF landed 25-pounders in moonlight. One of the shells hit a Dakota. Brig. Pritam Singh himself, who had gone to the airstrip to meet the gallant pilots, was wounded in the leg, but he carried on.

With the aid of the 25-pounders, the Punch garrison managed to push the enemy's mountain-guns out of range of the airstrip and went over to the offensive. By the third week of April, the garrison had gone forward and captured the village of Kheri Dharamshal, and with the extension of our perimeter, Dakotas were able to resume the "Punching" operations in May.

Thousands of refugees were evacuated by air. Still there was not enough food to go round and raids were made into enemy-held territory with the sole object of procuring grain for the starving population.

The food stocks of the garrison were dangerously low. The troops had to live on a 16-ounce ration of *chappaties* and *dal*. There was no meat or vegetable. Whatever milk ration was left with the troops was given by them voluntarily to the 6,000 refugee children who badly needed it. Tinned milk and rations for refugees were also sent by Western Command and by the Government of India, while Army

An Indian Army officer interrogating the inhabitants of Rajauri after its liberation.



doctors in Punch worked day and night combating disease and ill-health among the civilians and the cattle.

In August, the hostiles launched their most determined attack yet on the Punch garrison. They brought up field, mountain and anti-tank guns, and during the month twice attacked Tetrinot ridge in battalion strength each time. Although held by only one company of our troops, the attack was beaten off and a counter-attack stabilised the situation.

Thereafter, the hostiles refrained from any large-scale direct frontal attacks, and resigned themselves to the less ambitious alternative of tightening the siege and starving the garrison to surrender. They put their field guns in commanding positions and contented themselves by shelling the airstrip. On September 2, the airstrip was once again put out of action except for a few landings by Harvards. But RIAF Dakotas managed to drop supplies to the Punch garrison.

It was cloudy and misty when on October 10, a formation of three Tempests piloted by Flight-Lieutenant C. G. Devashar, Flying-Officer G. B. Cabral and Flying-Officer D. J. Cannel took off to escort a Harvard aircraft to Punch. While Flying-Officer A. E. Newby was preparing to land his Harvard aircraft, one of the protecting Tempest pilots noticed some flashes in the distant mist below. Soon it became obvious that the enemy guns in the locality which had shelled Punch airstrip continuously for many days had opened up. The Tempests who were waiting for this spot of luck went all-out to plaster these gun positions. Two suspected gun positions about nine miles south-west of Punch were attacked and silenced. A 25-pounder gun position located by the flash of the firing was similarly treated. The area soon after was covered with a cloud of dust.

One of the aircraft paid its exclusive attention to another gun position in the close proximity of the target attacked by another pilot, thus silencing three out of the four spotted guns. An hour later, two more fighters visited the area and attacked the surviving gun position. For days, following this feat of superb observation and airmanship, not a shell dropped on Punch.

It was ultimately decided to establish a permanent land-link with Punch, whatever the cost. The link-up was accomplished

in the third week of November, with a comparatively small cost. On the day of the link-up, there were still 10,000 refugees in Punch. But with the liberation of 3,000 square miles of territory, it was hoped that they would soon be able to resettle on land and look after themselves.

As a result of the link-up operation, one entire division of the hostiles had been scattered to the winds. Confirmed casualties of the enemy alone totalled 363 killed and 633 wounded compared with 13 killed and 62 wounded on the Indian side. Fourteen hostiles were taken prisoner, including one Subedar-Major and one Jemadar. The haul of arms was equally impressive.

After the accomplishment of the Punch link-up, there still remained one job on hand for the Indian Army in Jammu. Far behind our line, in the Riasi district there existed several isolated pockets of hostiles. These had to be mopped up.

The State Forces were directed to take on this task. On November 26, a State Force column moved into Riasi and captured Budil, a hostile centre, without much opposition and then the district was systematically combed out and the hostiles' resistance was stamped out.

In the first week of November, the Indian Army was called upon to deal with one more threat from the raiders, this time from an unexpected direction. A lashkar of raiders was reported to have infiltrated through the Himalayan ranges east of the Banihal Pass and reached Zaskar.

A column consisting of Indian troops and a detachment of Jammu and Kashmir militia was sent out from Kishtwar to meet the raiders. After swift initial progress, the column was held up for three days in the Umasi Pass (17,400 feet) by a snow-storm. Refusing to be halted by the elements, the column struggled forward and surprised the raiders in their bivouac, who broke up and fled without giving battle, abandoning 22 mules loaded with supplies.

Worsted all along the line, the hostiles now gave vent to their discomfiture by resorting to sporadic and intense shelling of our positions. At the same time, they feverishly built up for a counter-offensive. As many as 400 vehicles were observed in one sector on a single day. The hostiles also stepped up border raids. Their new tactics were to strengthen their positions for



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*Wing Comdr. H. Moolgavkar,
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Sept. '48 to Dec. '49.*

miles along the frontier and to swoop into the State territory and run back across the border after doing the maximum damage.

Having accomplished their appointed tasks in Jammu and Kashmir the Indian Army was now again on the defensive. While every enemy attack on our positions was resolutely repulsed, Indian troops, under strict orders from the Army headquarters, refrained from embarking on any fresh offensive operations. But RIAF kept a strict vigil over enemy territory. Enemy concentrations were strafed around Kotli and Bagh with the object of dissolving their build-up for offensive activity in western Jammu.

On December 14—while the cease-fire was still under negotiation between India and Pakistan—the hostiles laid down the biggest artillery bombardment of the campaign on our position around Naushera. They used 5.5 medium guns, a complete regiment of 25-pounders, 3.7 heavy ack-ack guns and 75 mms from medium tanks. Between 11.15 a.m. and 8 p.m. that day, the hostiles fired 2,500 shells into an area seven miles radius of Naushera. At the farthest point, they picked on targets at Beri Pattan ten miles south-east of Naushera.

The shelling continued through the night with varying intensity and was resumed next morning. Altogether, the hostiles fired well over 5,000 shells in this bombardment. Naushera itself received 3.7 heavy ack-ack shells. Their targets included Beri Pattan, Seri, Naushera, Notidhar, Kaman Gosha, Gurund Gala, Kalal and the much-shelled Chhawa ridge.

The bridge at Beri Pattan was hit and our life-line from Jammu to Naushera remained cut for two days. Otherwise, the damage done was surprisingly small in terms of human lives and military targets.

Simultaneously, Pakistan's Sherman tanks fired at our positions from an area two miles south-west of Sadabad. They were engaged and dispersed by Indian gunners. RIAF aircraft on reconnaissance also encountered heavy ack-ack fire from 40 mm anti-aircraft guns.

The cease-fire came into force a minute before midnight on the first day of the year 1949, which brought to a close a 15-month gruelling campaign for the Indian Army. Launched

upon within a month and a half of the country's freedom, under every imaginable handicap and without any planning whatsoever, the Kashmir campaign was a fiery test for free India's Armed Forces. Out of the test they emerged with flying colours.

To their former skill and traditional efficiency was now added a new patriotic fervour. The combination enabled the Indian officer and soldier to work veritable miracles. Mere efficiency was not enough; a high sense of patriotism alone could have conquered the formidable obstacles that the Indian troops met in Kashmir and Jammu.

They exploded many a copy-book theory of logistics and contributed new and valuable chapters to their war experience. On airstrips which had been pronounced by experts as unfit for fighter aircraft to operate from, RIAF pilots landed Spitfires and Tempests and took off. Over roads and ground declared impassable for heavy military vehicles, tanks moved and went into action.

At Zoji La, when the raiders reported back to their

An RIAF Dakota at the airstrip in Punch emplaning refugees.



headquarters that they were being attacked by tanks, the Commander—according to an enemy wireless signal—declared it impossible and disbelieved his troops. Indian Army roads snaked their way close on the heels of our troops, up hill and down dale. When the Indian Army returns home, those roads will remain behind, providing an excellent network of communications for the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Two Tempests on a reconnaissance flight over the Kashmir valley.



CHAPTER X

THE "EYES AND EARS"

THE RIAF which had earned the sobriquet "Eyes and Ears of the 14 Army" during the Burma war, lived up to its reputation in the Kashmir campaign. In addition, in this difficult mountainous terrain, with almost non-existent road communications, the RIAF's services proved invaluable as a speedy medium of transport.

It transported vital supplies and equipment to the besieged garrisons in Punch and evacuated thousands of desperate, stranded refugees. It transported reinforcements and supplies to hard pressed Leh, flying over incredible heights and performing rare feats of aviation. It served as "air ambulance" by evacuating the wounded from the battle-fronts and saved many lives.

Its reconnaissance reports of enemy positions and movements proved invaluable to the ground troops in their operations. Last, but not the least, the prompt, constant and accurate air support that the RIAF provided to the ground troops was an important factor in the success attained by the Army in Jammu and Kashmir.

The magnificent part played by the Transport Command of the RIAF and the marvels performed by their pilots in rushing supplies and equipment to the needy under incredible conditions have been described in detail in the preceding chapters of this book. Here we will largely confine ourselves to the achievements of the Fighter Command.

The bombing of the Kishenganga bridge, of the air bases at Gilgit and Chilas, of ammunition and store dumps at Skardu, of enemy advance headquarters at Palandhri and his clandestine build-ups at Dhuli and Palak, the silencing of numerous enemy guns including three 25-pounders which shelled the besieged town of Punch for months, the destruction of countless number of enemy mules which are often more valuable than men in a mountainous terrain, and the laying of road-blocks which denied to the enemy his supply and escape routes, are some



A Tempest being loaded with rockets and machine-gun ammunition.

of the major achievements of the RIAF in Jammu and Kashmir.

Early in the summer of 1948, when the Indian Army was planning its new offensive, it was decided that the enemy should be deprived of the use of the vital Domel and Kishenganga bridges which linked his forward positions with his main supply bases to the west. The RIAF was called upon to undertake this hazardous and delicate task. The two bridges were well concealed by nature's barriers and strongly defended by heavy ack-ack guns.

At dawn on April 23, a flight of three Tempests went over the target and opened a tentative raid. A direct hit was registered on one abutment of the Kishenganga bridge. The enemy ack-ack went into action and the leader of the flight soon realised that the targets could be effectively handled only by new tactics.

The next morning a second attack was carried out on the same target. As was expected, no sooner our Tempests

approached the bridge than they were subjected to intense and extremely accurate fire from 40 mm Bofor guns situated about half a mile east of the target.

As planned before, the pilots immediately went for the two gun positions, and a grim duel of ack-ack versus Tempests ensued. The Bofors maintained a steady barrage as the aircraft closed for attack. The surrounding hills echoed and shook to the accompaniment of the deep-throated coughing of the Bofors and the angry roar of the diving Tempests.

Alert behind the gun-sight in the cockpit of the leading Tempest sat Wing Commander (now Group Captain) Ranjan Dutt followed by Flight-Lieutenant (now Sqd. Ldr.) W. David, as they hurtled down on the target tearing the space at 400 miles per hour, with all their guns blazing amidst the smoke and puffs of the anti-aircraft fire. With grim determination they pressed home the attack and released their bombs at the precise moment. One of the gun-pits received a direct hit and was completely knocked out. The bodies

A Havard aircraft preparing to take off on a reconnaissance mission.



of its occupants and the wreckage littering the scene were clearly visible.

Later in the day, another attack was made by three Tempests. While Fl/Lt. David carried out a high level bombing attack securing a direct hit, Flying-Officer P. B. Pawar concentrated on the second gun position which he ultimately silenced by direct hits with rockets.

W/C. Dutt, in the third Tempest, and leader of the flight, carried out a dangerously low level attack on the bridge barely ten feet above the river and released two heavy bombs securing a direct hit on one of the abutments, while the other bomb struck the bridge and exploded in the water. While climbing away from the target, he was caught in a hail of ack-ack fire and his aircraft sustained severe damage, receiving more than 12 holes, each 6×3 inches, with petrol pouring from one of the tanks. Through superb airmanship, Dutt completed the mission and brought the aircraft and the flight safely back to base.

After these operations, the GOC-in-C, Western Command, sent the following message to No. 1 Operational Group:

"The bombing expedition on the Kishenganga bridge carried out on April 24 is yet another example of the excellent work being done by India's Armed Forces for the liberation of Kashmir. I write to congratulate W/C. Dutt, F/Lt. David and F/O. Pawar for their superb airmanship and high sense of duty in pressing home the attack in the face of determined opposition. I shall be grateful if you will convey my high appreciation to all three officers."

As the front in Kashmir extended northwards to remote inaccessible areas, the RIAF's share of the fighting proportionately increased. The summer months were notable for intense RIAF activity in the northern regions.

Early in September, a column of reinforcements on its way from Manali via the tortuous route to Leh lost all contact with its base. Two RIAF Tempests piloted by Flight-Lieutenant M. Blake and Squadron-Leader K. M. David took off from Palam on contact reconnaissance sorties to locate and protect the missing body of men. The aircraft flying through foul weather and over some of the world's most mountainous

regions, spotted our troops, dropped messages and scouted the route ahead for any lurking enemy who might have attempted to ambush them. About this time, Gilgit, the main base of the raiders in their eastward drive to Leh, was the object of constant attention from RIAF. Bombing and strafing sorties were sent out over Gilgit and other subsidiary bases as well as the routes of advance of the enemy.

These bombing expeditions to the arctic north involved hazardous flying over lofty Himalayan ranges, skirting the mighty 26,000 foot high Nanga Parbat itself. The raids began in the middle of July, and by the end of August, reports indicated that the enemy's wireless stations and huts adjoining the Gilgit airfield had been completely destroyed, while the military barracks had suffered heavy damage.

On October 24, RIAF Tempests also bombed and strafed hostile concentrations in Skardu. The main target was the old fort. It was attacked with bombs and only its walls were left standing. All the buildings inside the fort were completely destroyed, including an ammunition dump from which columns of black smoke shot up to a height of 2,000 feet. The new fort in Skardu also received a fair share of bombs and rockets.

The airfield at Gilgit, which hummed with activity and was attacked in the previous month, was visited again by our Tempests. Direct hits with rockets were obtained on barracks lying to the east of the airstrip. Bomb craters from the previous raids were now still visible.

On November 4, RIAF Fighter pilots on reconnaissance over enemy-held territory in Kashmir, observed a well maintained airstrip and a hangar at Chilas, 40 miles south of Gilgit as well as movement of enemy troops concentrated in the fort at Chilas. On the same day, the hangar at Chilas airfield was attacked with rockets by two Tempests piloted by Squadron-Leader E. D. Masillamani and Flight-Lieutenant B. S. Dogra. On pulling up after this attack, a Royal Pakistan Air Force supply-dropping Dakota was intercepted and instructed over the radio-telephone to make for our nearest airfield. When the Dakota pilot failed to heed these signals, a few warning shots were fired across his bows. The enemy Dakota, however, escaped across the border to Pakistan.

Three days later another formation of three Tempests again visited Chilas and bombed and cratered its 1,800 yard long airstrip. Direct hits were also registered on a hangar which was levelled to the ground. After the attack, the RIAF pilots noticed that the hostiles were hastily scrubbing the word "Chilas" in white on the ground, part of the lettering still standing out boldly.

Deceptive air activity was another important aspect of air manoeuvres which contributed indirectly to the success of many a ground operation. The RIAF Photo-Reconnaissance unit rendered valuable service by supplying photographs of ground surface of our as well as enemy territory. Much valuable information of strategic and tactical importance was thus made available to our Army and Air Force commanders. By the help of aerial photographs, out-of-date maps were modified and new ones made of areas previously unsurveyed. The enemy positions, hidden bases, and supply roads, as also his future intentions, were detected by these means and later destroyed systematically.

The timely, sustained and systematic air operations over Chilas, according to military experts, had a far-reaching effect on the shape of future operations. Evidence is not lacking that Pakistan was feverishly building up this air base with the obvious intention of bringing into use their air arm against us.

Throughout the campaign, RIAF pilots scrupulously observed the International Code of warfare. On one occasion, for example, one of our Harvard pilots on a reconnaissance flight noticed a 15 cwt. truck bearing Red Cross markings on its roof near Palak moving from the direction of Kotli. Later in the day, two Tempest pilots flying over this area were attacked by small arms auto-tracer fire from this "ambulance." The RIAF pilots, however, refrained from attacking it.

Notwithstanding the skill, daring and initiative of the aircrew, the RIAF, without the efficient backing of their ancillary machinery—signals, armaments and meteorological and medical units and the flying control and, above all, the technical equipment and administrative services—could not have achieved the brilliant results they did.

No. 1 Operational Group, RIAF, which controlled all front-line fighter, communication, reconnaissance and Air OP squadrons and the aforesaid ancillary organisation, was responsible for planning and execution of all air operations in Jammu and Kashmir.

The two forward Air Force bases, in Srinagar and in Jammu,

A team of armourers "feed" Tempests before the fighter aircraft take off for operational sorties.



were controlled by No. 1 Operational Wing, at first commanded by Wing Commander Minoo Engineer, DFC, and later by Wing Commander H. Moolgavkar.

A Gurkha unit signalman carrying a wireless set on his back in the Zoji La area.



CHAPTER XI

A LOGISTICAL NIGHTMARE

LONG before operations are staged, the tactics of ancillary services to the combat forces—supply and ordnance corps and their administration at the base—is carefully planned to the minutest detail. Supplies and equipment are pooled; lines of communication are opened; methods of transportation of goods are devised and an administrative base is established to co-ordinate and direct these manifold activities.

In Kashmir, the operations were put on the ground at 16 hours' notice and by air. This meant that initially the troops had to leave their motor transport behind and fall back on civilian buses loaned by the State Government.

Events moved fast. The troops multiplied and the operations enlarged from the original objective of defending the Srinagar airfield and city against the invaders to fighting the enemy on a far-flung thousand-mile front stretching from western Jammu in the south to Chakoti in the west, to Gurais in the north and Leh in the north-east. The administrative tail could never catch up.

A Himalayan terrain, an unfamiliar climate and a complete lack of modern communications made the operations a logistical nightmare. The Jammu-Srinagar road and the Jammu-Jhangar road were the only lines of communication available to the Indian Army. The former road zigzagging its way through the Himalayan ranges had a limited capacity and was subjected to serious interruptions during the winter months. The road to Jhangar was no more than a rough fair-weather jeep track.

The Indian rail-head and "Admin" base for the operations was the obscure third-rate railway station at Pathankot, woefully inadequate for the gigantic task it was suddenly called upon to undertake. Then again the road between Pathankot and Jammu was no more than a fair-weather track cut up by numerous unbridged rivers and streams.

Commanders on the spot shouted for more troops. But more



A troop carrier being towed by a "Recovery" van of the IEME.

troops meant more supplies and equipment and "Admin" *bandobust*. The single tenuous 300-mile line of communication from Pathankot to Srinagar had been taxed to its capacity to feed and supply the troops already in Kashmir as well as to meet the essential needs of the civilian population of the valley. In the winter months even this road broke down, choked with snow.

While the "Admin" staff pitted ingenuity against mechanical handicaps and produced marvels of improvisation and RIASC drivers worked over-time to deliver the much-needed goods at the front-line, sacrificing sleep, rest and comfort, the engineers got cracking on the stupendous task of building up the lines of communication from the rail-head to the scattered fronts in Jammu and Kashmir. The small sleepy town of Pathankot leapt to life overnight and spread out like a mushroom.

From a modest beginning of a small detachment of a Construction Company, which was flown into Srinagar to assist the initial assaulting force, Indian Engineer troops expanded to a

force of considerable size. The work done by this Engineer Force was almost entirely concentrated on communications, the main items being airfields, bridges and improvements to existing roads. A number of Dakota-cum-Fighter airstrips were constructed including three all-weather airfields. In addition, several Auster strips were laid down in different sectors of the front. A total of eleven major bridges and innumerable minor ones were constructed.

A first priority task was to maintain the fair-weather motor track from Kathua to Jammu—the only land-link with India. There was a motor ferry over the Ravi which plied during the dry months, October to June, but there were no bridges over the three major obstacles between Pathankot and Jammu, namely, the rivers Ravi, Ujh and Basantar. The Ujh and the Basantar could be forded by motor transport during nine months of the year, but the Ravi, along this stretch, was fordable to motor transport only during two or three months in the year when the flow was at its minimum.

The first step therefore was to provide a crossing over the

A supply column crossing a kutcha wooden bridge in the Jammu sector.





Ferrying trucks over a Bailey bridge at Beri Pattan.

Ravi. The engineers built a temporary ferry-crossing over the river and later erected a 180-foot span triple double Bailey bridge alongside. This enabled motor transport to move from Pathankot to Jammu.

The Jammu-Srinagar road was primarily constructed for light tourist traffic and it claimed constant attention from the Indian Army engineers. The numerous bridges across the road were too weak to sustain heavy military traffic and needed strengthening or replacement.

The Ramban bridge, for example, caused considerable anxiety. The abutments, cables and anchorages were strong, but the superstructure of the transoms was in such an advanced stage of rust and decay that one could scratch a hole in it with a walking stick. It was decided that an alternative crossing at Ramban was essential as an insurance against failure of the suspension bridge. A low level single-span 160-foot long triple double Bailey bridge was, accordingly, constructed.

It was the kind of bridge that would have to be dismantled as the volume of water in the Chenab increased following the

thawing of the snow in April. The bridge was completed in November 1947 and all military traffic was diverted from the suspension bridge to the new Bailey bridge.

A tough task awaited the engineers and the Pioneer Corps in the Jammu province, in keeping open the fair-weather road from Jammu to Nanshera. This road traversing hilly country had no metal surface, no side drains and no catchwater drains. Nearly all the bridges along the road had been flimsily constructed and had collapsed. The months from January to March were a struggle against the weather. Rain turned the road into a quagmire. It needed a superhuman effort to keep the road serviceable.

Meanwhile, the Pathankot-Jammu road, the life-line of our troops in Jammu and Kashmir, began to show signs of breaking up and was greatly taxing the engineers in their effort to keep it motorable. At the Ravi crossing, the bridge could not cope with the increased volume of water in the river. Winter

Mules loaded with ammunition crossing a nallah in the Rajauri sector.



freshets in February and the still larger volume due to the thawing of snow in March and the subsequent months had swelled the torrent of water and the bridge had to be dismantled and replaced by a two-span Bailey bridge, each span being a 180-foot triple double construction.

The abutments and the central pier of this bridge were constructed by the Central PWD under the advice of the Punjab PWD Irrigation Branch. The bridge was designed to take a discharge of 30,000 cusecs which in normal years would have been adequate before the start of the monsoon.

The ford over the Ujh was another trouble spot. During fair weather the winter flow in the Ujh is small and the river can be forded by all types of military vehicles. This ford, however, was always a difficult one and there were cases every day of vehicles getting stuck in midstream.

During the wet weather the flow in the Ujh also swells enormously and it becomes unfordable as the process of subsidence is slow. In February a one-span 180-foot long triple double Bailey bridge was put across the main channel and thereafter traffic crossed this obstacle without delay and misadventure.

The third trouble spot was a low-lying stretch of country between the Ujh and Samba, approximately ten miles long. The road was embanked to keep the traffic moving. A series of diversions had to be built to get the traffic round soft spots. This process of diverting reached grotesque limits and by the end of February traffic had to make a 20-mile detour in order to avoid the ten miles of bad going.

Shingling of the entire length of the road was then undertaken. It presented a tricky problem. If the road was shingled during the dry weather, the traffic pushed it off the road because of the hard surface. If the shingling was done immediately before or after the rains, the shingle disappeared into the ground as the traffic passed over it. It was necessary to choose a time when the ground was neither too hard nor too soft. The expedient adopted was to stack the shingle in piles on the side of the road and then to spread it at the right moment of surface hardness.

In March 1948 there was heavy rain in Kashmir and the East Punjab. In the Srinagar valley there was continuous rain and snow for eight days, while in Jammu and East Punjab it rained

for six days. This widespread rain and snow resulted in floods and avalanches, causing much damage to communications. The two-span Bailey bridge over the river Ravi was washed away by flood and the Bailey bridge over the Ujh was damaged owing to the undermining of one of the abutments.

The road from Jammu to Srinagar was breached at many points by landslides, the most serious landslide being at Khud. The tunnel at the Khuni Nullah, between Ramban and Banihal, was hit by a dislodged boulder and a segment of the arch ring sheared away and slipped a foot downwards, leaving the tunnel standing in a precarious condition. The Banihal Pass was snow-bound and in places where avalanches had descended on to the road the depth of snow was as much as thirty feet.

All this damage by floods and snow needed extraordinary engineering efforts to repair. Both the State PWD and the RIE responded magnificently to the task and the roads were opened to traffic within a fortnight of the cessation of rain.

A new temporary bridge was put across the Ravi, later to be replaced by a Bailey pontoon bridge. The bridge over the Ujh was repaired. It was decided to build a Bailey bridge in order to bypass the damaged tunnel at the Khuni Nullah. When this Bailey bridge was completed, the tunnel was demolished and the State PWD was requested to rebuild it. Engineer strength was augmented to work on the Bailey pontoon bridge across the Ravi and to construct a permanent bridge at Madhopur.

Keeping open the road from Jammu to Srinagar was a problem of a totally different character. Here the road itself was in a good state of repair and was either tarmac or macadam throughout. The problem was how to keep the Banihal Pass and to a lesser degree the Patni Pass clear of snow. Engineers with the aid of bull-dozers, assisted by civilian labour, kept the Banihal open after overcoming incredible difficulties. The Banihal Pass itself is 9,200 feet high but the road climbs to a height of 8,900 feet and is then taken through the mountains by a tunnel.

Although the snowfall on the Banihal Pass is light by the Himalayan standards, snow clearance is rendered difficult because of the fact that on the south side of the pass there is usually a strong wind blowing down the hill. This wind, which is bitterly cold, blows the snow back on to the road and has a paralysing effect on the ill-equipped Kashmiri labourer.



Indian sappers working on the landslide-infested Jammu-Srinagar road.

Because of this wind the labour strength had to be dispersed along the road so that it could deal with any drifts as they piled up. At times these drifts formed with such lightning rapidity that while one vehicle got through a drift, the next one got bogged in the snow.

The fate of a Srinagar-Jammu convoy of 100 vehicles moving over the Banihal Pass, on January 15, illustrates the peculiar difficulties at Banihal. During the descent on the south side of the pass one of the leading vehicles got stuck at a point where the snow had avalanched on to the road and a passage-way in the form of a defile had been dug through the avalanche.

The wind kept blowing snow into this defile and it was in the

drift so caused that the vehicle got stuck. The driver of the vehicle behind decided that he should attempt to push the vehicle, but in the attempt, his own vehicle got bogged and he could move neither forward nor backward. The driver of the next vehicle then drove up from behind and tried to tow the second vehicle backwards. His vehicle also got stuck. Thus there were three vehicles bogged in the same drift of snow. They blocked the way for the entire convoy behind. Meanwhile, more snow was blown into the defile and soon all the three vehicles were half buried.

All efforts to dig out the vehicles with civilian labour proved unavailing because the labourers would not work in the sharp wind for more than 15 minutes at a time and when they had dug down to a certain level, the snow was blown in as fast as they could shovel it away. The next expedient tried to clear the vehicles was the use of two bull-dozers. These had to be brought down from work near the tunnel. It took one day and one night before a passageway could be dug for these bull-dozers round the vehicles of the convoy halted on the road.

The combined efforts of the two bull-dozers succeeded in

Indian troops fording a stream in the Naushera sector.



pulling out only one of the three vehicles out of the defile. It was then thought that one or more bull-dozers pulling on the downhill side might be effective and a signal was sent to Ramban ordering forward two more bull-dozers. All this time drivers and passengers in the vehicles of the convoy were suffering acutely from the intensity of cold.

Some of the lorries were filled with refugees and others contained troops of the Kashmir State Forces. Neither category of passengers could be induced to leave their vehicles and walk down to the comparative warmth of Banihal village. There were about twenty cases of frost-bite.

The two bull-dozers chugged their way up to the site of the obstruction at the end of 24 hours. Finally, with two bull-dozers pulling on the downhill side and one pushing from uphill the obstruction was cleared. The convoy had been stranded on the pass for five days. This is merely the story of one convoy. The passage of every convoy was attended with adventure, and sometimes catastrophe.

With determined efforts on the part alike of civilian labour, the bull-dozer detachment and the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, a trickle of traffic was maintained over the pass during the winter. The loss in lives, money and motor transport was considerable. Four vehicles were overwhelmed by avalanches and the number of cracked cylinder blocks in vehicles totalled above 100.

On the Jammu-Naushera road, there was a good high level bridge over the Chenab river at Akhnur, with a single unsupported span of more than 400 feet long. The next big water obstacle after the Chenab was the Munawarwali Tawi at Beri Pattan. Here a high level three-pin steel arch bridge had been erected in 1942 by the State Government but this bridge collapsed within a month on account of earth pressure behind the abutment on the right bank.

Keeping open the Jammu-Naushera road proved difficult, firstly, because of the disturbed state of the country little or no civil labour was available, and secondly, stone was scarce along the road on the Chauki-Beri Pattan stretch. It was impossible to embark upon a systematic programme of improvement on this road. All that the engineers could do was to keep the dusty road passable to traffic.

The crossing of this road over the Munawarwali Tawi at Beri Pattan is at a point where the Tawi flows through a deep pool caused by a natural dam of vertical rock stratum. The width of this pool during normal flow is approximately 300 feet. At first a ferry with two rafts was provided as a crossing. This was later replaced by a pontoon bridge.

During wet weather this bridge had to be cut and the component rafts moored to one side. It was decided that the bridge should be replaced by a high level bridge before the coming of the monsoon, but it was not possible to execute this intention because of lack of engineer troops. A high level Bailey suspension bridge was eventually built at Beri Pattan.

The construction of the Pathankot-Jammu road was meanwhile going apace. The Central PWD had undertaken the project of building the permanent road from Pathankot to Jammu. The work was started in January 1948. In this task the Army's part was to loan plant units for the making of the formation of the road and for the clearance of river channels.

Apart from the work to be done by plant, all other work was entrusted to the Central PWD. This included the building of the three major bridges over the Ravi, Ujh and Basantar. It was in the building of these bridges that the need for speed was greatest. The army-built Bailey bridge over the Ravi was good only up to the monsoon; after that it would have to be dismantled. The Ujh and Basantar were not fordable during the monsoon.

Therefore, if the land-link from India to Kashmir was to be maintained throughout the year, it was essential that the three bridges should be completed by the end of June; in fact this work was vital for the maintenance of the troops in Kashmir.

Design, layout, collection of stores and the placing on the ground of the organisation to carry out the work took time. Actual work on the bridges was not started till the middle of February and it was apparent then that the race against the monsoon would be a close one.

Towards the end of February there were a couple of raids from across the Pakistan border on the labour camps of the CPWD on the Pathankot-Jammu road. Panic seized the labourers and there was a large-scale exodus from the site of the



Indian Army engineers blasting a rock to widen the Jammu-Srinagar road.

work. This was a serious setback and was immediately followed by the disastrous floods in March. Virtually all the work done in digging the foundation of piers for the bridge was washed out.

It now became obvious that the CPWD would not be able to complete the task of establishing a firm road-link from Pathankot to Jammu unless immediate outside help was given to them. It was decided that the Army's engineers should support the CPWD in the completion of the work.

From the beginning of April there were furious and concerted efforts on the part of the Army's engineers and the CPWD to complete this vital road-link before the onset of the monsoon. Work continued day and night and no red-tape or rules of procedure were allowed to stand in the way of speedy

completion of the job. On July 7, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was able to declare the road open.

That was not the end of troubles for the road-makers. The volume of flow in the Ravi remained abnormally large during April, May and June and on account of this freakish behaviour on the part of nature, the CPWD were unable to build one of the piers adjoining the left abutment of the Ravi bridge. Its absence meant that there was a gap of 280 feet from the left abutment to pier No. 2 that had to be spanned. This was a span greater than what a simply supported Bailey or Hamilton could have bridged. The only way out was to span the gap by a Bailey suspension, which was immediately available. Within a month, a 320 foot Bailey suspension span was put up.

The bridge over the Ravi as it stands today is a composite one consisting of one 320 foot span Bailey suspension bridge followed by 17 Hamilton spans each 140 feet long.

The engineers fully utilised their experience in this trying period to build jeep tracks in the wake of the advancing army

"The fate of two vehicles which got stuck in snow . . ." One of the three bull-dozers struggling to extricate them.



through the 11,586 foot high Razdhanangan Pass to Gurais, the 10,264 foot Nastachur Pass to Tithwal and through the 11,578 foot Zoji Pass in Kashmir—these are perhaps the world's highest jeep tracks—and to Punch and to several hill-top piquets in Jammu.

Problems no less difficult had to be surmounted in constructing all-weather airstrips at Pathankot, Jammu and Srinagar and fair-weather landing grounds and Auster strips in the liberated areas of Jammu and Kashmir.

The roads and airstrips constructed by the Indian Army will prove a great asset to the State in its commercial and economic development. In terms of money, the Indian tax-payer spent Rs. 3 crores on the 64 miles of *pucca* road from Pathankot to Jammu, including the three two-way bridges over the Ravi, Ujh and Basantar.

Since this road was opened, thousands of tons of food grains were moved to State territory, thus relieving the prevalent acute shortage and, at the same time, enabling Kashmiris to send fine specimens of their products outside the State for sale. The construction of the Pathankot-Jammu road involved the movement of a considerable quantity of stores approximating 50,000 maunds from various parts of India.

The Jammu-Srinagar road was maintained at a cost of approximately Rs. 20 lakhs to stand the unexpectedly large volume of traffic, including a considerable number of heavy vehicles. Out of this, Rs. 10 lakhs was spent towards wages of State labour.

The bridges on this road were originally constructed for small tourist traffic and were strengthened by Army engineers to stand up to heavy traffic. These bridges will now be able to cope with any type of civilian traffic that the State may anticipate in the future.

The road from Jammu to Naushera and Jhangar, involving a total length of 91 miles, was developed to a two-way fair-weather road except at a few places where work is still in progress. Rs. 10 lakhs was spent on this road and about two-thirds of the amount were paid out in wages to people in the State. The same applies to the 30-mile Naushera-Rajauri road and the 45-mile Rajauri-Punch road.

Approximately 250 miles of mule tracks were developed into

jeep tracks at a total cost of Rs. 35 lakhs, to Gurais, Pindras, Keran, Tithwal and a number of other places.

The development of roads in Jammu and Kashmir involved a number of bridges other than the aforementioned four major bridges. Approximately 50 army bridges were constructed at one time or the other, some of them temporary. At present 20 of these bridges exist for the benefit of the army and the civilians alike.

The bridges in Jammu and Kashmir involved the movement of about 3,00,000 maunds of bridging material and it cost the Indian tax-payer over Rs. 25 lakhs.

Before the hostilities began, only two fair-weather airstrips of inadequate dimensions existed at Jammu and Srinagar respectively. In the initial stages, these were rapidly developed to take Dakotas, Spitfires and Tempests. The Army's engineers completed the construction of all-weather airstrips at Srinagar and Jammu in June 1948 at a cost of approximately Rs. 30 lakhs and these have since been used regularly by civil and military aircraft.

Indian Army engineers constructing a bridge in the Jammu sector.



About 900 huts covering an area of approximately 3,00,000 square feet were built at various places such as Srinagar, Kazigund, Banihal, Gurais, Tithwal, Uri, Kanzalwan, etc. They cost Rs. 75 lakhs. The construction of these was generally entrusted to State engineers and assistance was given by Army engineers wherever called for.

Signalmen laying telephone lines near Naushera.



CHAPTER XII

THE ARMY'S "SINEWS"

EVERY man bearing a rifle requires, on an average, seven men to feed and clothe him. Napoleon's famous saying, "the army marches on its stomach," is no less true in modern warfare than it was 200 or 2,000 years ago.

The RIASC, on which fell the responsibility of feeding Indian troops fighting in the mountainous regions of Jammu and Kashmir, worked ceaselessly to procure the necessities of life and to make supplies available where they were needed most. Owing to the limited resources and the lack of planning, it was often hard to keep pace with our fast moving forces.

Our supply line in the State was like a powerful octopus. Its rough-surfaced undulating tentacles spread all over Kashmir. After the havoc caused by the floods in Kashmir last year, this octopus stretched a long quivering tentacle to Delhi, the firm supply base in India.

The treacherous floods had disrupted rail communication, and our troops in Kashmir were in dire need of all sorts of supplies. The RIAF was short of bombs and our forward troops clamoured for supplies and additional battalions.

How the demands of our armed forces were met during that crisis is a tale of heroism. Transports from Delhi crept up at a snail's pace on the damaged roads to Pathankot. No rapid movement was possible because the roads were blocked with bullock cart convoys carrying thousands of refugees fleeing in all directions. Many incoming motor lorries did not unload at Pathankot or Jammu but had to go straight to Srinagar where stocks were running low.

Inadequate transport in Kashmir was another problem. The transport convoys after discharging maintenance stores at Srinagar or Jammu were called upon immediately to rush troops, ammunition and baggage to Uri, Baramula, Akhnur and Naushera. They had little or no respite whatsoever, and despite incessant sniping by the hostiles, motor transport was kept moving day and night.



An Artillery Observation Post on the Jammu front.

With the approach of winter, snow and rain descended on the State. The Banihal Pass was blanketed with snow and the road connecting Pathankot and Jammu was cut up with bogs. Motor transport vehicles equipped with skid chains moved forward perilously, braving heavy rains on the road and severe blizzards at Banihal.

There were accidents and casualties, but the flow of supplies continued uninterrupted and ultimately, though by degrees, it was possible to replenish stocks at Srinagar. Meanwhile our forces were being reinforced continuously, thus outstripping the increase in supplies. The result was that the transport system was overworked and turn-rounds were cut down to the barest minimum.

Military officers of wide experience held the view that if longer turn-rounds were not given, transport in Jammu and Kashmir would be affected adversely. While our vehicles, whose mechanism could withstand this strain, deserve special mention, the motor transport drivers merit whole-hearted praise. Grimly did they carry on with their onerous duties.

driving over tortuous terrain, negotiating narrow, winding, uneven and slimy roads and steep gradients with hazardous drops into deep ravines. Some of the newly constructed mountain tracks were negotiable only by jeeps.

The need for maintaining adequate stocks increased the transport requirements and it was with much relief that the RIASC officers and men heard the first air-brake hisses of our ten-tonners at Pathankot and saw the first cylindrical-bodied petrol tanker moving up to Srinagar. The jeeps also arrived in due course.

A convoy carrying supplies being checked at the depot at Pathankot before proceeding to Jammu.



But the arrival of various types of transport—jeeps, trucks and carriers—added to the complexity of the problems confronting the Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers of the Army. Many of these vehicles could not negotiate the winding and perilous roads of Kashmir without frequent breakdowns and the IEME had to maintain repair units at far-flung points.

Out of 3,000 vehicles employed to keep the lines of communications open, nearly 1,100 were at one time off the roads. Such mishaps which severely taxed the energy and ingenuity of the IEME were not rare.

Reassembling guns which had been pulled into pieces before being flown to forward positions was another job assigned to the IEME. All dismantled guns flown to Punch and reassembled by them went into action within 36 hours of their landing.

Some of the areas demanded use of a special type of transport. The problem was not only to divert suitable transport to certain areas but also to maintain special repair workshops for them. At the foot of the Zoji La hills, for instance, the IEME set up a special repair workshop for vehicles which had been moved to Baltal, and were being used in the Zoji La area.

To effect speedy recovery of vehicles and equipment, the IEME divided the State into four regions—Madhopur to Jammu, Jammu to Srinagar, Srinagar to Uri and Jammu to Naushera. The recovery units reclaimed valuable material, the loss of which might have blunted the edge of our offensives.

As the enemy fell back into the hills, the need for animal transport increased. The animal transport drivers, besides moving supplies, had to face bullets alongside the forward troops. In wet weather many hazardous journeys up to and down the piquets had to be made; an incautious step or a slip on the mossy or loose rock meant certain death.

The animal transport personnel and loaded animals were sometimes required to jump from one ledge to another in order to get to the heights. During the monsoon in one sector where not even jeeps could operate, the animal transport drivers came to the rescue and waded in knee-deep mud to carry supplies and ammunition forward.

We sustained many animal casualties. Mules slipped and

fell down several hundred feet into the rocky depths of deep ravines or mountain streams, but the regular chain of supplies moving forward did not break. Around Zoji La, where conditions are nearly arctic all the year round, our soldiers wearing thick sheep-skin caps and jackets and heavy boots, and looking like Eskimos, were able to fight because the mules had not let them down.

Perhaps the most spectacular RIASC story of the campaign is the maintenance of Leh. The RIAF, which made history by landing supplies and refreshments at Leh, could meet the barest requirements of our armed forces. It was the RIASC which had to carry supplies for a distance of 203 miles on thousands of hired ponies and porters over the bleak Himalayan ranges and along the tricky tracks. Anything from a week to a month and a half was needed for this perilous journey.

Leh, 11,500 feet above sea level, is a deficit area and produces very little food. Supplies were needed not only for our troops but also for the civil population. The mules and their drivers did magnificent work in bringing supplies to Leh. Similarly the Punch link-up operations with a 45-mile roadless stretch between Rajauri and Punch would have been unthinkable without mules.

These animals, reared in the plains of India, at times reacted very poorly to the extreme climatic conditions, but on the whole, they stood the test well. To render aid to the injured animals and to advise on their welfare, veterinary units were stationed at various points. A chain of mules was also maintained to replace casualties on the roads and in forward areas.

Another branch of the Indian Armed Forces which played a vital role in Jammu and Kashmir was the Army Ordnance Corps. The Ordnance Corps had to supply the forces with almost anything from a bullet to a tank and from a tooth brush to a battle dress. On the supply list of the Ordnance Corps there are 4,00,000 items. Its mobile units checked ammunition at farthestmost piquets. Minor defects were repaired on the spot while major repairs were carried out at a small centrally located factory.

The story of the Ordnance Corps, as of the other services, is the story of a fight against heavy odds. It had limited staff at



Mountain-gun in action.

its disposal and the transport system was inadequate to cope with the work.

Building stocks for the winter was a problem for the Ordnance Corps. Some 10,000 tons of stores and munitions, over and above the normal maintenance supply were to be moved forward and positioned before scheduled dates. The bottleneck was, of course, transport. Almost without an exception the Ordnance railhead had to hold an accumulation of Ordnance stores till the stores were moved forward on our supply lines. The Ordnance Corps arranged a phased programme of issue from depots and organised a special civilian transport convoy consisting of 300 three-ton vehicles to carry the stores forward from Pathankot.

The operation of mobile laundry units was also arranged by the Ordnance Corps at Jammu. Here worn clothes were disinfected and dry-cleaned with up-to-date equipment and despatched to forward areas.

Two other "gifts" of the Ordnance Corps which were most popular with our troops in Kashmir were baths and cinema

shows. A hot bath in Kashmir is a rare luxury and the mobile bath units were welcomed everywhere. The mobile cinema section equipped with 16 mm projectors was divided into two sub-sections in order to serve the troops both in Jammu and Kashmir.

The telephone system in the State was as undeveloped as the lines of communications. Out of the two telegraph and telephone lines, the one between Srinagar and Kohala had been cut by the invaders and the other, the Srinagar-Jammu-Pathankot line, which had hitherto remained neglected, was not well equipped to bear the load.

One of the first tasks of our forces was to improvise a wireless link connecting Delhi with Jammu and Srinagar. Then, the Signal Corps began work on service lines, for without signals the efficient conduct of any operation is impossible. The signal equipment had to be installed almost everywhere, from the headquarters to the forwardmost piquets at Uri, Zoji La and Punch. Transport of wireless and telephonic equipment to forward areas, sometimes to heights 17,000 feet above sea level,

Rations being brought to the forward piquets.



presented a serious problem to the Signal Corps. Where roads were not motorable, wireless equipment had to be carried by porters or on mules. Yet, there was not a single height on the entire Jammu and Kashmir front where signalmen did not accompany our troops.

Although the right type of equipment was not always available, signalmen of all classes did their job well. The Skardu garrison, for instance, maintained contact with Srinagar, about 300 miles away, with the help of a set with an open aerial belonging to the State forces and intended to serve over a radius of only 20 miles. The Indian and Kashmir Posts and Telegraphs Departments rendered yeoman service to our forces in establishing good lines of communication.

The maintenance rather than the installation of the inter-communication set-up was the real problem. Operators had to work continuously day and night passing operational traffic; linemen had to patrol lines in rain and snow to repair breaks as they occurred; despatch-riders had to carry important despatches at all times over dangerous roads and in foul weather. Wearing wireless headphones for two or three hours in bad atmospheric conditions is not too pleasant an experience, but signalmen, conscious of their vital role in the operations, never grumbled. Though signalmen are technicians first, they often had to fight as infantrymen in Kashmir, as they did in lengthened, making the supply of equipment from India to the front line a slow process. Signals equipment is heavy and bulky Naushera on February 6, 1948.

As Indian troops advanced, our lines of communication and its correct provisioning and positioning has to be thought out well in advance. Provision had also to be made for unforeseen operational contingencies. On several occasions vital signal equipment had to be flown at very short notice from bases in India to the front-line in Kashmir.

The gunners were among the first to land in Srinagar. After a couple of days' battle, the need for the artillery in support of the infantry was keenly felt.

At three hours' notice on October 29, a senior officer was sent to Kashmir from the Artillery Directorate to put the artillery plan into operation. Four 3.7 howitzers from the Patiala State force were flown to the front in one day and the

artillery went into action before 5 o'clock next morning.

Landing artillery by aircraft on the Punch airstrip and transporting it over many bridges which had never before borne such heavy loads was an exciting adventure. The accuracy, timely support and tactics used by artillery units did much to neutralise the enemy on various fronts. The artillery pieces were found in action at incredible places and in almost inaccessible ground formations.

The deployment of artillery along the entire front from Jammu to Jhangar and from Rajauri to Punch was, indeed, a military feat.

The artillery was in action on many fronts and gave excellent support. A battery of the 36 Anti-Tank Regiment was employed to safeguard against any armoured threat towards Jammu. The break-through up to Chakothi from Uri was achieved owing to accurate concentrated artillery support. By taking up positions on the steepest hills, in the snow-covered Zoji La or in Tithwal, the artillery set up new records in its history.

The tanks performed quite a feat when they successfully operated on the Jammu-Beri Pattan-Naushera-Jhangar roads. The armoured cars ventured up to Ban bridge near Kotli. Intersected at several points by deep ravines and running through wooded hills affording protection to hostile bands and snipers, the roads were often mined and blocked with felled trees, massive boulders, destroyed culverts and broken bridges, and it was a miracle that the tanks and armoured cars could negotiate them.

The performance of the tanks in the break-through operations at the Zoji La and in the initial stages of the Punch link-up is almost a legend. The movements of tanks were of necessity confined to roads and tracks, whether in the Kashmir valley or on the mountain roads leading to Punch.

In January 1948, an armoured column, including tanks, penetrated 24 miles into enemy territory towards Bhimber and jabbed at strongly held enemy positions in the Assar-Kadala area, catching the hostiles napping.

The armoured column started early in the morning, and observing wireless silence during the earlier stages of its moves, it advanced quickly and struck at the startled enemy. The casualties inflicted by the two forward troops and tanks on the



A 25-pounder, ready for action, waiting for fire-order in the Zoji La sector.

enemy in the short period of half an hour was approximately 200 killed.

The part played by armoured fighting vehicles on several fronts was an important contribution to the successes in the Kashmir operations.

During the battle of Shelatang on November 7, 1947, although the main attack was launched by our troops along the Srinagar-Baramula road, an armoured column consisting of one troop of armoured cars and one rifle troop was sent along the route Ganderbal-Shadipur-Shelatang, manoeuvring their way to the flank of the enemy. The tactical move was a success, for a confident and numerically superior enemy was surprised from the flank and utterly routed with heavy casualties.

Armoured fighting vehicles were used to "soften" enemy positions in fairly open country along the Jammu-Pakistan border and the Jasmirgarh-Samba-Suchetgarh-Akhnur-Chamb Assar area.

In the army's "sinews" can be included the Provost Units, the first of which arrived at Jammu as late as December 14, 1947.

One of its immediate tasks was to control convoys of transport on the Pathankot-Jammu road. With the arrival of another Provost Unit on January 23, it was possible to enforce traffic control on the two roads connecting Jammu with Srinagar and with Akhnur. In most cases block-timing system had to be adopted for upward and downward traffic on the hazardous roads of the State.

Then there were enemy interruptions and road-blocks. It was found that sign-boards and directional arrows guiding traffic to staging-posts away from enemy pockets were unreliable, and an expert guide of the Provost Unit escorting a convoy became a general rule.

The movement of a large number of refugees from Kashmir to India further hindered safe traffic control. The Provost Units had to segregate refugees and plan their movements as meticulously as those of the Indian Army. Looking after stragglers from Pakistan Army who roamed in the disturbed areas searching for their family members was yet another headache. Many of these stragglers being in an unbalanced mental

Cleaning a 25-pounder after action.



state were hardly co-operative and the utmost tact of the Provost personnel sometimes failed to assuage their ruffled temper.

By February 12, 1948, however, movement of traffic was well under control and by April 5, 1948, an elaborate system of traffic control on Srinagar-Baramula, Srinagar-Tithwal and Srinagar-Dras roads, which had been evolved by the Provost Units, was in practice. Under the management of the Provost Units came a POW cage also, which was established soon after the beginning of Kashmir operations.

Some other activities of the Provost Units were in relation to the State Administration, such as enforcement of customs and excise laws and apprehending criminals and suspects. The areas in which Indian troops were stationed were cleansed by the Provost Units and proper discipline was maintained in the Indian Army.

A casualty being carried from the forward area to the Advanced Dressing Station by "daring and hardy stretcher-bearer."



CHAPTER XIII

THE "SECOND FRONT"

THE war against disease and epidemics in Jammu and Kashmir was the Indian Army's "Second Front."

The Indian Army Medical Corps did not confine their activities to extracting bullets from war casualties and healing the wounded and sick among the Indian troops. Wherever they went, they also took on the task of looking after the health of the local civilian population.

Ensuring prompt medical aid to the wounded and sick soldiers on the roadless hills of Jammu and Kashmir was an achievement in itself; patients had to be carried across enemy-dominated hills by daring and hardy stretcher-bearers who were the unsung heroes of many a battle.

The IAMC surgeons worked in forward areas in improvised surgical hospitals under impossible conditions and within reach of hostile gun-fire. The field surgical teams worked at places which were inaccessible to ambulance cars.

The teams were equipped with instruments to give blood transfusion, and minor surgical cases were treated on the spot. This method was adopted to reduce pressure on base hospitals and to cut down the time-lag between the battlefield and surgical attention, which saved many lives. Young and experienced surgeons attached to these teams did marvels at great personal risk and sacrifice of rest and leisure.

Besides routine medical work, advanced methods of diagnosis of diseases and prevention of malaria, dysentery, diarrhoea and diseases due to exposure to cold were treated at the front-line hospitals.

When a battle was in progress or an attack was being mounted, each fighting unit was accompanied by a medical officer with two orderlies and an adequate number of stretcher-bearers. The medical officer took with him such medical stores and equipment as he could conveniently carry.

After receiving immediate treatment by the front-line team, the casualty was sent on to one of the relay posts of the Field



The underground hospital at Uri named after Gen. K. M. Cariappa—a casualty being brought in.

Ambulance. After further treatment there, he was taken to the headquarters of the Field Ambulance Company established near the Advanced Headquarters of the attacking column. If the condition of the wounded or sick soldier continued to be serious, he was immediately transported to the base hospital.

Supplies of sulpha drugs and penicillin enabled army medical officers to provide modern treatment in the field. Blood transfusion stores were well supplied. Operation theatre equipment was made available at the front-line surgical hospitals. Even X-ray facilities were provided at some of the front-line hospitals.

The general hospitals received serious and long-term cases from the battle area. Any person requiring more than a fortnight's treatment was taken to these hospitals, generally by air. Jeep posts fitted with stretcher and ambulance car posts kept in constant telephonic communication with the piquets.

If a man got wounded or fell sick on a hill-top piquet, he was immediately brought down by stretcher-bearers to a jeep post or ambulance post from where he was sent to a hospital behind the forward area. Here, specialists equipped with X-ray and

modern equipment performed the most delicate surgical operation.

The RIAF co-operated in transporting patients from distant and remote places to the base hospitals. A soldier wounded in the Uri or Jhangar sector, for instance, would be found comfortably lying in a base hospital far away from the fighting line within a brief period of 24 hours.

Hygiene sections and anti-malaria units of the front-line teams prevented diseases by maintaining a high standard of sanitation and checking the spread of diseases from local inhabitants to the members of the fighting forces. The issue of malaria and dysentery panniers to the units of some of the front-line teams helped in the diagnosis of fever and digestive ailments.

Laboratories for carrying out pathological examinations were, however, available at the base hospitals. Various preventive measures such as the use of DDT and insect repellents kept down incidence of vector-producing diseases. Water sterilising

A unit doctor dressing the wound of a Muslim at a battalion headquarters in a Kashmir village.



chemicals carried even by individuals ensured the supply of pure drinking water to our troops everywhere.

Lymph vaccine was regularly flown to protect the troops against small-pox and enteric fever. Prophylactic cholera inoculation was carried out whenever any outbreak occurred in a village in the neighbourhood. Typhus vaccine was used in areas where the disease was endemic.

Equally important was the problem of making up diet deficiencies in the front-line, where officers and men had often to live for days on end on a few *chappaties* and *dal*, without fresh vegetables or meat to supplement their meagre diet. For the winter, troops serving in Srinagar and the snow-bound regions like Gurais and Zoji La were prescribed an addition of 200 calories to their diet. Multi-Vitamin tablets were also issued to the troops.

A vital unit operating in Kashmir was the Field Research team which helped a great deal in keeping down the incidence of diseases like typhus, relapsing fever and infective hepatitis. The research teams carried out a malarial survey in the forward areas and investigated into the origin and cause of the epidemics often prevalent in the villages. The habitat of various vectors was examined carefully and the data collected after these investigations formed useful basic material for medical research in the diseases peculiar to Jammu and Kashmir.

On the report that some typhus cases had occurred in some villages near Uri and Baramula, the Field Typhus Research team visited several villages and carried out a thorough investigation with a view to conducting research in that disease. Another important survey conducted in the Kashmir valley was about the incidence of malaria which was carried out during the summer of 1948 and yielded valuable results. A type of disease which resembled relapsing fever presented a challenge to the Indian Army Medical Officers.

Successful research was carried out to fight those diseases and it was ultimately found that the cause of relapsing fever was the bite of a kind of tick. The disease was brought under control after this discovery.

There were also varieties of typhus not found in the rest of India and some diseases like snow-blindness, trench-foot, frost-bite and a peculiar headache at certain altitudes. Scientific

observations and research enabled medical officers to find speedy remedy for these.

Long after peace returns to Jammu and Kashmir, the people of the State will remember with gratitude the Indian Army's sterling work in banishing disease and epidemics in their villages.

One of the problems that the Indian Army was confronted with in Jammu and Kashmir was a complete breakdown of civil administration in the liberated areas. Whatever sanitary arrangements there existed earlier had collapsed. There were piles of refuse and stink and squalor everywhere. This was a paradise for microbes of disease and epidemics. Malaria and other diseases arising from malnutrition and epidemics like cholera and small-pox were the main enemies that the Indian Army medical units had to contend with.

To prevent outbreak of epidemics it was essential not only to supplement but to overhaul and reorganise the available medical aid in the State. The Indian Army established dispensaries for civilians at Uri, Baramula, Gantharpal, Gurais, Tangdhar and Kargil in Kashmir. A large dispensary exclusively devoted to refugees was also opened in Srinagar. The attendance at these dispensaries averaged a thousand patients a day. In addition, medical units wherever stationed were instructed to treat civilian workers employed by the army and other Kashmiris who sought medical aid.

The Army doctors took prompt measure to prevent and isolate cases of epidemics. Soon after the liberation of Kargil, the Army doctors discovered prevalence of small-pox amongst civilians in an epidemic form. Within a few days 8,000 doses of vaccine were transported to Kargil by air for the vaccination of civilians. Small-pox was also prevalent in the Tangdhar area and 5,000 doses of vaccine were despatched to that place.

Cholera was one of the diseases against which the Indian Army doctors had to put up the stiffest fight. It had broken out in epidemic form in Akhnur, Naushera, Rajauri and Darhal valley. The mortality at Naushera, in July-August 1947 was nine out of 27; in Rajauri 67 out of 114; and in Darhal 105 out of 330 cases in September-October 1947. Indian Army Medical Corps officers took prompt and energetic measures to cure, prevent and isolate cases of cholera in these areas.



Army surgeons operating on a wounded soldier in a forward area in the Rajauri sector.

Other diseases which were common among the people of the State were diarrhoea, eye diseases, fevers and diseases of the skin. Above all, every second civilian suffered from malnutrition which expressed itself in various kinds of bodily ailments.

The unsatisfactory conditions that prevailed in the liberated areas and the continuous movement of population from Jammu and Naushera hampered work of Indian Army Medical officers. The check-posts fixed to detect cases of cholera did not ensure complete freedom from infiltration of cholera cases.

The Army medical officers grappled with the task realistically. Anti-cholera precautions were vigorously enforced and house-to-house inspection was carried out in the cholera-infected areas. All the troops of the local units were put on to clean up the streets and disinfect houses by spraying DDT and other disinfectants. Civilian water-points were chlorinated. Saline bottles were supplied by the army and wherever it was not possible to do so, rain water or spring water was collected, purified, distilled and saline was made from it.

An Army doctor examining a liberated patient in Rajauri.



Isolation wards were established in several areas and victims of cholera were treated systematically by the medical officers. The town of Naushera, for example, was divided into six sectors for purpose of cleaning it thoroughly. Prizes were awarded for the best centre or the cleanest house to encourage civilians in sanitary habits. The prizes consisted of soap and sweets.

Medical stores including expensive drugs like penicillin and sulpha drugs were made available to civilians. In Akhnur about 2,400 persons were inoculated in the course of a few days and a hospital was established to accommodate 60 patients. These timely measures localised diseases and ultimately wiped them out. To prevent recurrence of epidemics and infective diseases, educative propaganda lectures were given to the civilians in many areas of Kashmir.

The besieged town of Punch threw up its own peculiar problems of health. The burden of caring for 40,000 refugees fell to the Indian Army Medical Corps. That no epidemic of any severity occurred in their town despite privations and hardships testifies to the efficiency with which Army doctors looked after the health of the refugees.

Refugee camps in Srinagar were visited regularly by Army Medical officers to make sure that sanitary conditions were maintained. During the summer, these camps were sprayed with DDT. Villages in Gurais in the north, which were reeking with filth when the Indian troops first liberated the area, soon put on a different and healthy appearance thanks to the Indian Army's insistence on sanitation.

In Jammu, medical aid in the form of supply of vaccines and sera and other medicines not easily obtainable in the province was given to the public at a nominal price. Although army dispensaries were not established in Jammu Province, medical units were instructed to give aid, both outdoor and indoor, to the civilian population.

In Chhamb and Platan, the Indian Army established an "M. I. Room" where during the period May to November 1948, more than a thousand cases were treated as outpatients and about 150 cases were entertained in an improvised hospital organised outside the camp area. The local people were so grateful that they collected a fund among themselves for

buying medicines and men volunteered to work as nursing orderlies.

The Indian Army's war against ill-health and disease in Jammu and Kashmir included health and baby shows held in villages in the vicinity of the military camp at which the best baby was awarded a prize. At these shows, whatever rations were available with the units were pooled, cooked and distributed to the civilians.

In this chapter it is appropriate to review and acknowledge the services rendered by the Armed Forces Welfare Women's Organisation to the troops in Jammu and Kashmir. This non-official organisation run by Armed Forces officers' wives supplied large quantities of woollen, made-up and knitted, warm clothing, gift parcels and sweets, rendered voluntary nursing aid, collected magazines and books and ran canteens for the troops.

The organisation, established in 1947, which had as its President Lady Bucher, wife of the then Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, has six sub-committees and 30 affiliated branches spread out all over India, and is primarily concerned with welfare of troops.

During the Kashmir operations, this organisation did much useful work. From March 1948 onwards, the Amenities Sub-Committee at a cost of Rs. 2,500 each month purchased goods such as biscuits, cigarettes, *beedies*, toilet articles, gramophone records, harmoniums, *tablas*, pickles, *papads* and sweets, and sent them periodically to Kashmir. The number of hand-knitted garments prepared by the members of this organisation and supplied to our troops ran into five figures. Gift parcels sent to Kashmir numbered 489 till the end of April and contained pull-overs, mittens and socks.

On the occasion of Diwali in October, 1948, 14 women, members of this organisation, proceeded to Jammu and Srinagar to distribute sweets costing Rs. 12,521 to the *jawans* and to wish them a happy Diwali. Sweets distributed on this occasion exceeded over 72,000 packets in one division alone, and efforts were made to send sweets even to the most forward piquets.

The Nursing Sub-Committee and Hospitals Sub-Committee undertook the task of looking after and helping wounded and diseased persons in collaboration with the Red Cross Society on



Jawans being entertained at a canteen in Srinagar by officers' wives.

a voluntary basis in Kashmir and at Delhi. Six or seven women attended the Military Hospital at Srinagar to nurse the sick and wounded every afternoon at a time when the Hospital was trying to cope with a heavy influx of casualties. Batches of four or more women visited the Military Hospital at Delhi, and 16 women visited the Indian General Hospital three times every week helping the Red Cross workers with the library, letter-writing, diversional therapy and also looking into complaints the patients might have.

Eight parties every month, besides free cinemas and circus shows, were organised for convalescent soldiers. A free canteen for troops coming from or going to Kashmir was opened at Delhi in October, 1948. An average of 290 *jawans* were served every day. Up to the date of cease-fire, over 25,600 persons at an expense of about Rs. 17,000 had been served at the canteen which was managed and run entirely by members of this organisation.

The Snowball and Knitting Committee, affiliated to this organisation in January, 1948, knitted about 5,000 garments for

troops in Kashmir. Over 2,000 pounds of wool had been bought for this purpose; the number of women who knitted these garments must have run into several thousands.

A Welfare Week to raise funds was also organised in February this year. About Rs. 5,000 which was collected during this week was spent in providing further amenities to the troops in Kashmir. The work of this organisation was voluntary and the expenses which it incurred were met with from funds, donations and contributions from private individuals.

First-aid being rendered to a casualty in a forward area.



Mrs. Parry, wife of the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Indian Navy, and the present President of this organisation, and Mrs. Shrinagesh, Mrs. Kalwant Singh and Mrs. Maneckshaw, assisted by innumerable women who are members of this organisation, worked hard and set up an impressive record of contribution to war against disease in Jammu and Kashmir.

Mrs. Shrinagesh, wife of Lt.-Gen. S. M. Shrinagesh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, chatting with jawans in a forward area.



APPENDIX

REVIEWS

APPENDIX I

BORDER INCIDENTS BEFORE OCTOBER 27, 1947

The economic "squeeze" applied to the State and the border harassments in the form of raids from Pakistan, both intensified almost simultaneously, served as a prelude to a full-scale invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan.

Between September 3, when the first border incident occurred south-east of Jammu, and October 20, when the full-scale invasion of Kashmir was launched along the Domel Road, the border was pierced on several points every day. The following border incidents were reported to the Government of India by the Jammu and Kashmir State and briefly refer to the occurrences before October 27, 1947.

September 3, 1947—At Kotha, 17 miles south-east of Jammu, armed raiders chased refugees and indulged in loot and murder. The raiders retreated into Pakistan territory when the Kashmir State garrison reached the scene. Another band of 300 raiders waylaid and murdered a Hindu refugee and his wife and abducted their two daughters near the village of Rajpura, ten miles south of Samba, and later attacked the village. A group of Pakistan nationals attacked Dohali on Jammu-Pakistan border and indulged in cattle-lifting. Yet another group, numbering about 500, armed with service rifles chased refugees and attacked State petrol reservoir at Chak Haria, 6 miles south of Samba.

September 4, 1947—Armed gangs of 200 to 300 raiders from tehsils Kahuta and Murree, crossing the Jhelum river in Panjar area, seven miles north and south of Owen ferry, raided State territory and looted and murdered the people.

September 5, 1947—Armed band of raiders roamed about defying law in the area west of Punch.

September 6, 1947—Increased activity of Pakistan troops on the main roads. A Pakistan patrol visited Alibeg, twelve miles west of Bhimber.

September 7, 1947—A Pakistani mob collected on the border, south of Manawar and Shri, and staged demonstrations but did not cross the border.

September 9, 1947—A convoy of Kashmir State subjects escorted by Pakistani troops and coming from Rawalpindi was expected at Kohala. It failed to arrive. Later on, information was available to show that the convoy had been massacred *en route* to Kohala.

September 12, 1947—The post office at Mirpur refused to accept registered and insured covers and money orders. Villagers across the border at Alibeg were given firearms.

September 13-14, 1947—Pakistan Army patrols pierced the State territory and visited Alibeg and Jatli, 14 miles west of Bhimber.

September 16, 1947—Pakistan Military personnel escorting postal treasury from Jhelum to Mirpur returned shouting inciting slogans.

September 17, 1947—A small State Garrison Company Patrol came in contact with a fully armed band of 400 raiders from Pakistan, about 12 miles south-east of Ranbirshinghpura, inside the State. The raiders were driven away.

September 19, 1947—The Sialkot Sub-Area Headquarters approached the railway authorities in Pakistan to send under escort five railway wagons—three of petrol, one of diesel oil and one of kerosene oil—stranded at Sialkot to Jammu and Suchetgarh respectively. It was suggested that the State Forces may be permitted to send a troops escort. There was no reply.

The Special Magistrate at Palandri informed the State Government that people from Pakistan were trying to cross the State border at various points.

September 22, 1947—Several raids in the Mawa area, six miles south-east of Samba.

Eight Pakistanis entered the State, opposite Chak Sada, a village ten miles south-east of Samba at 7.30 in the evening to steal livestock and cattle. The Pakistanis were beaten back.

Another mob of 400 Pakistanis, collected together by beat of drum at about 11 in the night, moved towards Jhohar, 11 miles south-east of Samba shouting anti-State slogans. The village of Jhohar was set afire by the raiders.

September 28, 1947—A band of about 500 armed raiders, equipped with service rifles, automatics, and spears, attacked a State patrol near Chak Harka, six miles south-east of Samba. Another band of 500 raiders was sighted near Rajpura, 8 miles south-east of Samba.

September 29, 1947—About 40 Pakistani raiders wearing uniforms and accompanied by two police constables entered the State at 10 in the morning at a point five miles south-west of Akhnur.

October 3, 1947—One hundred armed Pathans entered the Dhikote *thana*, 8 miles south-east of Kohala and, after taking possession of arms and ammunition, set fire to the police station. Three hundred armed raiders crossed the river Jhelum opposite Salian 2½ miles south-west of Dhikote at 11.30 in the morning, and raided Dhikote again.

Raiders were also seen crossing the river Jhelum at Baseen, 4 miles south of Kohala.

October 4, 1947—An aeroplane flew over the river Jhelum from Kohala to Palandari and back. The object of the flight was probably reconnaissance.

Increased activity of the raiders in Chirala area. About 400 raiders armed with automatic weapons and bombs surrounded Chirala. Twenty lorries, with headlights on, were seen coming from the direction of Murree on the Kohala-Murree road opposite Kappadar, 3 miles west of Chirala. A large number of raiders crossed the river Jhelum and approached Sesar at dawn. The State received private information from reliable sources that Ibrahim Khan of Punch who had gone to Peshawar and had returned to Murree, staying there at the Karachi Muslim Hotel, was trying to send arms and ammunition to Punch.

October 6, 1947—Raiders with all kinds of modern weapons surrounded Thorar on all sides. A number of lorries carrying Afridis arrived at Abbottabad. An aeroplane was reported to be making regular flights over Bagh area.

The State Forces Chirala Column encountered stiff opposition at Salian. A patrol of Kathua Garrison contacted an armed gang of about 100 dacoits who, facing the Garrison fire, broke up and fled. The piquet noticed 25 hostiles wearing olive-green uniforms and hiding in dugouts.

October 9, 1947—It was found that Pakistan Army and police were posted all along the border on Jhelum side. Lorries were seen running to and fro, opposite Chechian all night. A point near Manawar was raided by about 17 armed men from Pakistan, wearing police and military uniforms, to lift cattle. When the State troops opened fire they fled leaving behind the body of Tora Khan, Sub-Inspector of Police, Tanda (Pakistan) and one revolver with six rounds.

October 10, 1947—A mob of 5 armed raiders headed by two sections of Pakistan Army attacked Pansar, a village 6 miles south-east of Hiranagar (Jammu). Another armed mob of Pakistanis entered Nikkowl, 12 miles south-west of Akhnur and fired on the villagers ploughing fields. When the State patrol contacted them, the mob fired 30 rounds.

October 11, 1947—Pakistanis fired nine rounds from a point south of Nikkowl, 12 miles south-west of Akhnur.

October 11-12, 1947—Five hundred raiders from Hazara crossed the river Jhelum near Salian and entered Punch Jagir on the night of October 11-12.

October 13, 1947—Pakistani troops attacked Babiya Platoon Post, 12 miles south-east of Samba, opposite Sukho Chak, at 7.15 in the evening. Pakistanis attacked Rajpura, a village ten miles south-west of Samba, Nanga, Barro Chak and Samdho Chak, all along the border, about three miles south of Ramgarh.

October 14, 1947—Pakistanis, estimated at four to five thousand, wearing olive-green uniforms, occupied vantage positions along Tarala, 20 miles north-west of Kotli.

October 18, 1947—An organised band of Pakistanis, numbering about 5,000 and supported by troops armed with light automatics and machine-guns, infiltrated into the State territory and raided a group of villages—Alla, Pindi Charkan Kathar, Karial, Kothi—all about 12 miles south-east of Ranbirsinghpura. They killed children and old men, abducted women and set fire to the villages.

A Pakistani band fired on a State patrol at Khrobal Mathirian, 12 miles south-west of Samba.

Pakistanis supported by troops raided Rajpura and the surrounding area.

October 20, 1947—Pakistani raiders set fire to the villages of Bilaspur, Parhala, Chanor, Dhangote, Nikkawal on the night of October 20-21.

October 22, 1947—The Commander of State Forces at Domel reported that they were under heavy attack and that about 500 armed men were firing on them from the hills.

State Garrison patrols at Ramkot, Dub and Lohargalli failed to contact the State Army Headquarters and no news was available from Kohala-Barsala.

A later report, clocked at 11 in the morning, said that 60 lorries had crossed Lohargalli into the State. Another report, clocked at 2 in the evening, reported that 300 more lorries entered Muzaffarabad and looted the town, murdered its inhabitants and pillaged houses. Lorries were seen returning to Pakistan loaded with looted property.

A further report, clocked at 4 in the evening, said that raiders were firing from across the Muzaffarabad bridge. The Commander of State Forces requesting for immediate reinforcement, reported that enemy pressure had increased still further. At about 5.30 in the evening the wireless link with Muzaffarabad broke down.

October 24, 1947—A full-fledged raid from Muzaffarabad into Srinagar valley began and raiders touched Uri.

October 27, 1947—Indian Army contacted raiders near Baramulla. The RIAF noticed several bands of raiders marching into the Srinagar valley.

APPENDIX II

UNITED NATIONS AND THE KASHMIR CASE

TEXT OF THE LETTER ADDRESSED BY HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR ON OCTOBER 26, 1947, TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA, ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE HELP FROM INDIA TO STOP INFILTRATION OF "AFRIDI SOLDIERS IN PLAIN CLOTHES AND DESPERADOES ARMED WITH MODERN WEAPONS."

I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government.

As Your Excellency is aware, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. Geographically my State is contiguous to both the Dominions. It has vital economic and cultural links with both of them. Besides my State has a common boundary with the Soviet Republic and China. In their external relations the Dominions of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact.

I wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede, whether it is not in the best interest of both the Dominions and my State to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with both.

I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into a Standstill Agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the developments indicated below. In fact the Pakistan Government under the Standstill Agreement are operating Post and Telegraph system inside the State.

Though we have got a Standstill Agreement with the Pakistan Government, that Government permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.

Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes, with modern weapons, have been allowed to infiltrate into the State at first in Punch area, then in Sialkot and finally *en masse* in the area adjoining Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points simultaneously and it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mahoora Power House which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on

the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to overrunning the whole State.

The mass infiltration of tribesmen drawn from the distant areas of the NWF Province coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra-Muzzafarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial Government of the NWF Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. In fact both the Pakistan Radio and Press have reported these occurrences. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provisional Government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both the Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.

With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally, they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters. On this basis no civilised Government can exist or be maintained. This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.

I may also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an Interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.

If my State has to be saved immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. . . .

REPLY FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF INDIA ON OCTOBER 27, 1947.

Your Highness's letter, dated the 26th October, has been delivered to me In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people. Meanwhile, in response to your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the

Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.

My Government and I note with satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdulla to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.

MEMORANDUM ON KASHMIR SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT LAKE SUCCESS ON DECEMBER 30, 1947.

1. Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north-west, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. The circumstances of the accession, the activities of the invaders which led the Government of India to take military action against them, and the assistance which the attackers have received and are still receiving from Pakistan are explained later in this memorandum. The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to giving of such assistance which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self-defence, to enter Pakistan territory, in order to take military action against the invaders. The matter is therefore one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace.

2. From the middle of September, 1947, the Government of India had received reports of infiltration of armed raiders into the western parts of the Jammu Province of the Jammu and Kashmir State; Jammu adjoins West Punjab which is a part of the Dominion of Pakistan. These raiders had done a great deal of damage in that area and taken possession of part of the territory of the State. On the 24th of October, the Government of India heard of a major raid from the Frontier Province of the Dominion of Pakistan into the Valley of Kashmir. Some 2,000 or more fully armed and equipped men came in motor transport, crossed over to the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, sacked the town of Muzaffarabad, killing many people, and proceeded along the Jhelum Valley Road towards Srinagar, the summer capital of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Intermediate towns and villages were sacked and burnt, and many people killed. These raiders were stopped by Kashmir State troops near Uri, a town some 50 miles

from Srinagar, for some time, but the invaders got round them and burnt the powerhouse at Mahura, which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir.

3. The position, on the morning of the 26th of October, was that these raiders had been held by Kashmir State troops and part of the civil population who had been armed, at a town called Baramula. Beyond Baramula there was no major obstruction up to Srinagar. There was immediate danger of these raiders reaching Srinagar, destroying and sacking the capital and massacring large numbers of people, both Hindus and Muslims. The State troops were spread out all over the State and most of them were deployed along the western border of Jammu Province. They had been split up into small isolated groups and were incapable of offering effective resistance to the raiders. Most of the State officials had left the threatened area and civil administration had ceased to function. All that stood between Srinagar and the fate which had overtaken places on the route followed by the raiders was the determination of the inhabitants of Srinagar, of all communities, practically without arms, to defend themselves. At this time, Srinagar had also a large population of Hindu and Sikh refugees who had fled there from West Punjab, owing to communal disturbances in that area. There was little doubt that the refugees would be massacred if the raiders reached Srinagar.

4. Immediately after the raids into Jammu and Kashmir State commenced, approaches were informally made to the Government of India for the acceptance of the accession of the State to the Indian Dominion. (It might be explained, in parenthesis, that Jammu and Kashmir form a State whose Ruler, prior to the transfer of power by Britain to the Dominions of India and Pakistan, had been in treaty relations with the British Crown which controlled its foreign relations and was responsible for its defence. The treaty relations ceased with the transfer of power on August 15th last, and Jammu and Kashmir, like other States, acquired the right to accede to either Dominion.)

5. Events moved with great rapidity and the threat to the Valley of Kashmir became grave. On the 26th of October, the Ruler of the State, His Highness Maharaja Sir Hari Singh, appealed urgently to the Government of India for military help. He also requested that the Jammu and Kashmir State should be allowed to accede to the Indian Dominion. An appeal for help was also simultaneously received by the Government of India from the largest popular organisation in Kashmir, the National Conference, headed by Sheikh Abdullah. The Conference further strongly supported the request for the State's accession to the Indian Dominion. The Government of India were, thus, approached not only officially by the State authorities, but also on behalf of the people of Kashmir, both for military aid and for the accession of the State of India.

6. The grave threat to the life and property of innocent people in the Kashmir Valley and the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir that had developed as a result of the invasion of the Valley demanded immediate decisions by the Government of India on both requests. It was imperative, on account of the emergency, that the responsibility for the defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State should be taken over by a government capable of discharging it. But, in order to avoid any possible suggestion that India had taken advantage of the State's immediate peril for her own political advantage, the Dominion Government made it clear that, once the soil of the State had been cleared of the invader and normal conditions restored, its people would be free to decide their future by the recognised democratic method of a plebiscite or referendum which, in order to ensure complete impartiality, might be held under international auspices.

7. The Government of India felt it their duty to respond to the appeal for armed resistance because

- (1) they could not allow a neighbouring and friendly State to be compelled by force to determine either its internal affairs or its external relations;
- (2) the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the Dominion of India made India legally responsible for the defence of the State.

8. The intervention of the Government of India resulted in saving Srinagar. The raiders were driven back from Baramulla to Uri and are held there by Indian troops. Nearly 19,000 raiders face the Dominion Forces in this area. Since the operations in the Valley of Kashmir started, pressure by the raiders against the western and south-western border of the Jammu and Kashmir State has been intensified. Exact figures are not available. It is understood, however, that nearly 15,000 raiders are operating against this part of the State. State troops are besieged in certain areas. Incursions by the raiders into the State territory involving murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women continues. The booty is collected and carried over to the tribal areas to serve as an inducement to the further recruitment of tribesmen to the ranks of the raiders. In addition to those actively participating in the raids, a large number of tribesmen and others, estimated at 100,000, have been collected in different places in the districts of West Punjab bordering the Jammu and Kashmir State and many of them are receiving military training under Pakistan nationals, including officers of the Pakistan Army. They are looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped, and transported to the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistan officials, both military and civil.

9. As already stated, raiders who entered the Kashmir Valley in October came mainly from the tribal areas to the north-west

of Pakistan, and, in order to reach Kashmir, passed through Pakistan territory. The raids along the south-west border of the State, which had preceded the invasion of the Valley proper, had actually been conducted from Pakistan territory and Pakistan nationals had taken part in them. This process of transit across Pakistan territory and the utilisation of that territory as a base of operations against Jammu and Kashmir State continue. Recently, military operations against the western and south-western borders of the State have been intensified and the attackers consist of nationals of Pakistan as well as tribesmen. These invaders are armed with modern weapons, including mortars and medium machine-guns, wear the battledress of regular soldiers and, in recent engagements, have fought in regular battle-formation and are using the tactics of modern warfare. Man-pack wireless sets are in regular use and even Mark V mines have been employed. For their transport the invaders have all along used motor vehicles. They are undoubtedly being trained and, to some extent, led by regular officers of the Pakistan Army. Their rations and other supplies are obtained from Pakistan territory.

10. These facts point indisputably to the conclusions
- (a) that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory ;
 - (b) that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations ;
 - (c) that they include Pakistan nationals ;
 - (d) that they draw much of their military equipment, transport and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan ; and
 - (e) that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise actively helping them.

There is no source other than Pakistan from which they could get such quantities of modern military equipment, training and guidance. More than once, the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny to the invaders facilities which constitute an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any response. The last occasion on which this request was made was on the 22nd December, when the Prime Minister of India handed over personally to the Prime Minister of Pakistan a letter in which the various forms of aid given by Pakistan to the invaders were briefly recounted and the Government of Pakistan were asked to put an end to such aid promptly and without reserve. No reply to this letter has yet been received, in spite of a telegraphic reminder sent on the 26th.

11. It should be clear from the foregoing recital that the Government of Pakistan are unwilling to stop the assistance in material and men which the invaders are receiving from their territory and from their nationals including Pakistan Government personnel, both military and civil. This attitude is not only unneutral but

constitutes active aggression against India, of which the State of Jammu and Kashmir forms a part.

12. The Government of India have exerted persuasion and exercised patience to bring about a change in the attitude of Pakistan. But they have failed, and are, in consequence, confronted with a situation in which their defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State is hampered and their measures to drive the invaders from the territory of the State are gravely impeded by the support which the raiders derive from Pakistan. The invaders are still on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir, and the inhabitants of the State are exposed to all the atrocities of which a barbarous foe is capable. The presence, in large numbers, of the invaders in those portions of Pakistan territory which adjoin parts of Indian territory other than the Jammu and Kashmir State is a menace to the rest of India. The Government of India have no option, therefore, but to take more effective military action in order to rid Jammu and Kashmir State of the invader. Indefinite continuance of the present operations prolongs the agony of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, is a drain on India's resources and constant threat to the maintenance of peace between India and Pakistan.

13. In order that the objective of expelling the invader from Indian territory and preventing him from launching fresh attacks should be quickly achieved, Indian troops would have to enter Pakistan territory; only thus could the invaders be denied the use of bases and cut off from their sources of supplies and reinforcements, in Pakistan. Since the aid which the invaders are receiving from Pakistan is an act of aggression against India, the Government of India are entitled, in international law, to send their armed forces across Pakistan territory for dealing effectively with the invaders. However, as such action might involve armed conflict with Pakistan, the Government of India, ever anxious to proceed according to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, desire to report the situation to the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of Article 35 of the Charter. They, therefore, feel justified in requesting the Council to ask the Government of Pakistan

- (1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, participating in or assisting the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (3) to deny to the invaders
 - (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir;
 - (b) military and other supplies;
 - (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

14. The Government of India would stress the special urgency of the Security Council taking immediate action on their request. They desire to add that the military operations in the invaded area have, in the past few days, been developing so rapidly that they must, in self-defence, reserve to themselves the freedom to take, at any time when it may become necessary, such military action as, they may consider, the situation requires.

15. The Government of India deeply regret that a serious crisis should have been reached in their relations with Pakistan. Not only is Pakistan a neighbour but, in spite of the recent separation, India and Pakistan have many common ties and many common interests. India desires nothing more earnestly than to live with her neighbour State on terms of close and lasting friendship. Peace is to the interest of both States; indeed to the interests of the world. The Government of India's approach to the Security Council is inspired by the sincere hope that, through the prompt action of the Council, peace may be preserved.

A White Paper presenting factual information, backed by relevant documents, on the Jammu and Kashmir case was issued by the Government of India in February, 1948. In the White Paper it is re-emphasised that India's objective in launching operations in Kashmir is "to ensure that the vote of the people will not be subject to coercion by tribesmen and others from across the border who have no right to be in Kashmir."

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL

(1) *Text of the Resolution of January 17, 1948:*

The Security Council, having heard statements on the situation in Kashmir from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan; recognising the urgency of the situation; taking note of the telegram addressed on January 6 by its President to each of the parties and of their replies thereto; and in which they affirmed their intention to conform to the Charter; calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation; and further requests each of those Governments to inform the Council immediately of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under consideration by the Council, and consult with the Council thereon.

(2) *Text of the Resolution of January 20, 1948:*

The Security Council, considering that it may investigate any dispute or any situation which might by its continuance endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and that, in the existing state of affairs between India and Pakistan, such an investigation is a matter of urgency, adopts the following resolutions:

(A) A Commission of the Security Council is hereby established, composed of representatives of three members of the United Nations, one to be selected by India, one to be selected by Pakistan, and the third to be designated by two so selected.

Each representative of the Commission shall be entitled to select his alternatives and assistants.

(B) The Commission shall proceed to the spot as quickly as possible. It shall act under authority of the Security Council, and in accordance with directions it may receive from it. It shall keep the Security Council currently informed of its activities and of the development of the situation.

It shall report to the Security Council regularly, submitting its conclusions and proposals.

(C) The Commission is invested with a dual function, firstly, to investigate the facts pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter; secondly, to exercise, without interrupting the work of the Security Council, any mediatory influence likely to smooth away the difficulties, to carry out directions given to it by the Security Council, and to report how far advice and directions, if any, of the Security Council have been carried out.

(D) The Commission shall perform the functions described in Clause C, firstly, in regard to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir State set out in a letter of the representative of India, addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated January 1, 1948, and in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, addressed to the Secretary-General, dated January 15, 1948, and, secondly, in regard to other situations set out in the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, addressed to the Secretary-General, dated January 15, 1948, when the Security Council so directs.

(E) The Commission shall take its decision by a majority vote. It shall determine its own procedure. It may allocate among its members, alternate members, their assistants and its personnel, such duties as may have to be fulfilled for the realization of its mission and the reaching of its conclusions.

(F) The Commission, its members, alternate members, their assistants and its personnel, shall be entitled to journey separately or together wherever necessities of their tasks may require, and in particular, within those territories which are the theatre of events of which the Security Council is seized.

(G) The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall furnish the Commission with such personnel and assistance as it may consider necessary.

(3) *Text of the Resolution of April 21, 1948:*

The Security Council, having considered the complaint of the Indian Government concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, having heard the representative of India in support of that complaint and the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan, being strongly of opinion that early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about cessation of all fighting, noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, considering that continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security, reaffirms the Council's resolution of January 17, resolves that Membership of the Commission established by resolution of the Council of January 20, 1948, shall be increased to five and shall include, in addition to the Membership mentioned in that resolution, representatives of.....and..... (names to be chosen later) and that if the membership of the Commission has not been completed within 10 days from the date of adoption of this resolution, the President of the Council may designate such other members of the United Nations as are required to complete the Membership of five;

Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian sub-continent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of necessary measures both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite by the two Governments acting in co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of action taken under the resolution and to this end,

Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which, in the opinion of the Council, are appropriate to bring about cessation of fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.

(A) Restoration of peace and order: Firstly, the Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours

(a) to secure withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the pur-

poses of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State ;

- (b) to make known to all concerned that measures indicated in this and following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.

Secondly, the Government of India should (A) when it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of January 20 that tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for cessation of fighting have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for support of the civil power in maintenance of law and order ;

(B) make known that withdrawal is taking place in stages and announce the completion of each stage ;

(C) when the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum strength mentioned in (A) above, arrange in consultation with the Commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in accordance with the following principles :

- (1) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State.
- (2) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas.
- (3) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength should be located within their present base area.

Thirdly, the Government of India should agree that until such time as the plebiscite administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise powers of direction and supervision over State forces and police provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon with the plebiscite administrator.

Fourthly, after the plan referred to in paragraph 2(A) above has been put into operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as possible be utilised for re-establishment and maintenance of law and order with due regard to the protection of minorities subject to such additional recruitments as may be specified by the plebiscite administration referred to in paragraph 7.

Fifthly, if these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it seems effective for the purpose of pacification.

Sixthly, the Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of the State invite major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equally and fully in the conduct of the administration at Ministerial level while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out.

Seventhly, the Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a plebiscite administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan.

Eighthly, the Government of India should undertake that there will be delegated by the State to the plebiscite administration such powers as the latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite including for that purpose only direction and supervision of State forces and police.

Ninthly, the Government of India should at the request of the plebiscite administration make available from Indian forces such assistance as the plebiscite administration may require for the performance of its functions.

Tenthly, (A) the Government of India should agree that a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be Plebiscite Administrator.

(B) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other subordinates to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(C) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State judicial system to hear cases which, in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator, have serious bearing on the preparation for and conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite.

(D) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of separate negotiations between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix terms of service for his assistants and subordinates.

(E) The Administrator should have the right to communicate direct with the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security Council and through the Commission with the

Security Council and with the Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the Commission.

It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the foregoing (as he, in his discretion, may decide) any circumstances arising which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the plebiscite.

Eleventhly, the Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion, or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir.

Twelfthly, the Government of India should themselves and through the Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly, and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit.

Thirteenthly, the Government of India should use and should ensure that the Government of the State also use their best endeavours to effect the withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are normally resident therein or who, on or since August 15, 1947, have entered it for a lawful purpose.

Fourteenthly, the Government of India should ensure that the Government of the State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps to the effect that

- (a) all citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are invited and are free to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens ;
- (b) there is no victimisation and minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.

Fifteenthly, the Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial.

Sixteenthly, the Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.

Seventeenthly, the Commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of measures indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.

Eighteenthly, the Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to it herein.

(4) *Text of the resolution of June 3, 1948 :*

The Security Council reaffirms its resolutions of January 17, January 20 and April 21 and directs the Commission to proceed without delay to the areas of dispute with a view to accomplishing by priority the tasks assigned to it by the resolution of April 21.

And the Security Council directs the Commission further to study and report to the Council.

MESSAGE COMMUNICATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL ON MAY 7, 1948.

The Government of India regret that it is not possible for them to implement those parts of the Resolution (of April 21) against which their objections were clearly stated by their Delegation, objections which, after consultation with the Delegation, the Government of India fully endorse.

If the Council should still decide to send out the Commission referred to in the preamble to the Resolution, the Government of India would be glad to confer with it.

APPENDIX III

U. N. COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 13, 1948

Press Communiqué issued by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on September 6, 1948

The Commission first met in Geneva on June 15, 1948, and since then has held 55 plenary and many informal meetings. In Switzerland the Commission drew up its Rules of Procedure, and exchanged communications with the Governments of India and Pakistan regarding its arrival on the Indian sub-continent and the scope of the task of the Commission.

On July 7, 1948, the Commission arrived in Karachi, where it paid official courtesy visits to the Prime Minister and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a background exposé of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Arriving in New Delhi on July 10, the Commission was received by the Governor General and the Prime Minister of the Government of India. The Commission acquainted itself with the point of view of the Indian Government and started a study of the different approaches to the existing problem.

The Commission returned to Karachi on July 31, where, after hearing the views of the Government of Pakistan it drew up and adopted its Resolution of August 13, 1948.

On August 14, 1948, the United Nations Commission presented simultaneously to the two Governments its proposal for a cease-fire, and truce agreement as embodied in its Resolution of August 13, 1948.

The Commission subsequently gave elucidations and explanations of its proposal in response to requests by both Governments.

The Indian Government and the Pakistan Government have submitted their respective replies to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948.

While the Commission is assiduously studying the replies of the two Governments and expects—should it find it desirable—to continue negotiations with the two Governments, it finds that immediate effectuation of its proposal of August 13, 1948, is not to be envisaged.

The Commission is now making public the text of the August 13 Resolution, along with the correspondence with both Governments relative to the Resolution.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON AUGUST 13, 1948

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Having given careful consideration to the points of view expressed by the Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and

Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security are essential to implementation of its endeavours to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a final settlement of the situation,

RESOLVES to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following proposal:

PART I

Cease-fire order

A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.

B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (For the purpose of these proposals "forces under their control" shall be considered to include all forces, organised and unorganised, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective sides.)

C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.

D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who under the authority of the Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.

E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

PART II

Truce Agreement

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their Representatives and the Commission.

- A. 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.
- B. 1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its Army which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within their power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be safeguarded.
- C. 1. Upon signature, the full text of the Truce Agreement or a communiqué containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two Governments and the Commission will be made public.

PART III

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the

people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Letter dated 20.8.48 from the Prime Minister of India in reply to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948, accepting the Cease-fire Proposals.

2. During the several conferences that we had with the Commission when it first came to Delhi, we placed before it what we considered the basic fact of the situation which had led to the conflict in Kashmir. This fact was the unwarranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan Government on Indian Dominion territory in Kashmir. The Pakistan Government denied this although it was common knowledge. In recent months, very large forces of the Pakistan regular army have further entered Indian Union territory in Kashmir and opposed the Indian Army which was sent there for the defence of the State. This, we understand now, is admitted by the Pakistan Government, and yet there has been at no time any intimation to the Government of India by the Pakistan Government of this invasion. Indeed, there has been a continual denial and the Pakistan Government have evaded answering repeated inquiries from the Government of India.

In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations adopted on the 17th January, 1948, the Pakistan Government should have informed the Council immediately of any material change in the situation while the matter continued to be under the consideration of the Council. The invasion of the State by large forces of the regular Pakistan Army was a very material change in the situation, and yet no information of this was given, so far as we know, to the Security Council.

The Commission will appreciate that this conduct of the Pakistan Government is not only opposed to all moral codes as well as international law and usage, but has also created a very grave situation. It is only the earnest desire of my Government to avoid any extension of the field of conflict and to restore peace, that has led us to refrain from taking any action to meet the new situation that was created by this further intrusion of Pakistan armies into Jammu and Kashmir State. The presence of the Commission in India has naturally led us to hope that any arrangement sponsored by it would deal effectively with the present situation and prevent any recurrence of aggression.

3. Since our meeting of the 18th August, we have given the Commission's resolution our most earnest thought. There are

many parts of it, which we should have preferred to be otherwise and more in keeping with the fundamental facts of the situation, especially the flagrant aggression of the Pakistan Government on Indian Union territory. We recognise, however, that if a successful effort is to be made to create satisfactory conditions for a solution of the Kashmir problem without further bloodshed, we should concentrate on certain essentials only at present and seek safeguards in regard to them. It was in this spirit that I placed the following considerations before Your Excellency:

(1) That paragraph A.3 of Part II of the resolution should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as

- (a) to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops,
- (b) to afford any recognition of the so-called "Azad Kashmir Government," or
- (c) to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State.

(2) That from our point of view the effective insurance of the security of the State against external aggression, from which Kashmir has suffered so much during the last ten months, was of the most vital significance and no less important than the observance of internal law and order, and that, therefore, the withdrawal of Indian troops and the strength of Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be conditioned by this overriding factor. Thus at any time the strength of the Indian forces maintained in Kashmir should be sufficient to ensure security against any form of external aggression as well as internal disorder.

(3) That as regards Part II, should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the State by means of a plebiscite, Pakistan should have no part in the organisation and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter of internal administration in the State.

4. If I understood you correctly, A.3 of Part II of the resolution does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions to which we have objected in paragraph 3(1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that the Commission was not competent to recognise the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.

As regards paragraph 3(2), the paramount need for security is recognised by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.

Finally, you agreed that Part II, as formulated, does not in any way recognise the right of Pakistan to have any part in a plebiscite.

5. In view of this clarification, my Government, animated by a sincere desire to promote the cause of peace and thus to uphold the principles and prestige of the United Nations, have decided to accept the resolution.

Reply dated August 25, 1948, from the Chairman of the Commission.

The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation, it being understood that as regards point (1) (c) the local people of the evacuated territory will have freedom of legitimate political activity. In this connection, the term "evacuated territory" refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command.

The Commission wishes me to express to Your Excellency its sincere satisfaction that the Government of India has accepted the Resolution and appreciates the spirit in which this decision has been taken.

Letter dated August 20, 1948, from the Prime Minister of India to the Chairman of the Commission.

You will recall that in our interview with the Commission on August 17, I dealt at some length with the position of the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the Jammu and Kashmir State in the north. The authority of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir over this region as a whole has not been challenged or disturbed, except by roving bands of hostiles, or in some places like Skardu which have been occupied by irregulars of Pakistan troops. The Commission's resolution, as you agreed in the course of our interview on the 18th, does not deal with the problem of administration or defence in this large area. We desire that, after Pakistan troops and irregulars have withdrawn from the territory, the responsibility for the administration of the evacuated areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and that for defence to us. (The only exception that we should be prepared to accept would be Gilgit.) We must be free to maintain garrisons at selected points in this area for the dual purpose of preventing the incursion of tribesmen, who obey no authority, and to guard the main trade routes from the State into Central Asia.

Letter from the Chairman of the Commission to the Prime Minister of India dated August 25, 1948.

... your letter of 20 August 1948 relating to the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the North.

The Commission wishes me to confirm that, due to the peculiar conditions of this area, it did not specifically deal with the military aspect of the problem in its Resolution of August 13, 1948. It believes, however, that the question raised in your letter could be considered in the implementation of the Resolution.

Letter dated August 19, 1948, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of Pakistan to the Chairman of the Commission, rejecting the Cease-Fire Proposals.

2. The Government of Pakistan have given their most serious consideration to the proposals made by the Commission, but regret that they are not in a position to indicate their views with regard to them without obtaining clarification of a number of important points. The matters with regard to which further elucidation is required are set out in the attached memorandum. It would be greatly appreciated if the Commission could provide the elucidation requested.

3. While reserving their views with regard to the proposals formulated by the Commission, the Government of Pakistan would like to submit certain observations with regard to the Commission's approach to the question of cease-fire. As the Commission is aware, the Pakistan representatives, in their discussions with the Commission during its stay in Karachi from July 31st to August 13th, put forward the view that the proposals regarding cease-fire should be completely divorced from all other proposals. In the view of the Pakistan Government, the truce proposals contained in Part II of the Commission's Resolution are so closely inter-linked with the final solution of the Kashmir question that it is impossible to separate the one from the other. This was fully recognised by the Members of the Security Council who sponsored the Resolution of 21st April. Senator Austin explained that the Resolution had a certain unity and all its parts were inter-related. For example, the proposal with regard to the withdrawal of tribesmen could only be implemented if there was satisfaction in respect of the reconstitution of the State Government and the creation of other conditions in which the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan could be determined by means of a free and impartial plebiscite.

4. It is the considered opinion of the Pakistan Government that there are only two practical ways of dealing with the Jammu and Kashmir situation, namely:

- (1) to bring about a cease-fire, pure and simple, such as in Part I of the Commission's Resolution; or
- (2) to attempt at the very start a complete and final solution of the entire Jammu and Kashmir question.

The Pakistan Government regret to note that the Commission has not adopted the first alternative, which would have put a stop to the fighting immediately, and, in the calmer atmosphere thereby created, would have greatly improved the chances of a final settlement being reached. The result of extending the scope of the Resolution beyond Part I must inevitably be to bring the whole field of the dispute under immediate discussion and thereby to delay the attainment of cease-fire until a final solution of the whole problem can be agreed upon.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1948

THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Having decided to leave for Europe to prepare an interim report to the Security Council on the present situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, hereby

RESOLVES to appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to use their best endeavours during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as further to prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement, which both Governments have declared to be their most sincere and ardent desire.

DOCUMENTS CONNECTED WITH THE CEASE-FIRE ON JANUARY 1, 1949
Text of the communiqué issued on Friday, January 7

The Governments of India and of Pakistan have informed the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan that they have accepted the principles proposed by the Commission for the holding of a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of determining the State's future status. These principles are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948, which provided for a cease-fire and truce. Following the agreement of the two Governments to the Commission's last proposals, both Governments ordered the forces under their control in the State to cease fire effective at 11.59 P.M., January 1, 1949.

The Governments of India and Pakistan are commended for their endeavour to reach friendly and peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem. Worthy of especial note is the prompt proclamation of the cease-fire by both Governments.

RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 5

Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan in communications dated December 23 and December 25, 1948, respectively their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948:

- (1) The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.
- (2) A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948, have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed.
- (3) (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will in agreement with the Commission nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff or assistants and observers as he may require.
- (4) (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine in consultation with the Government of India the final disposal of Indian and State Armed Forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.
(b) As regards the territory referred to in A(2) of Part II of the Resolution of August 13, 1948, final disposal of the Armed Forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities.
- (5) And civil and military authorities within the State and the principal political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for and the holding of the plebiscite.

- (6) (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the disturbances will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commissions shall operate under the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of India and Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into effect.
- (b) All persons (other than citizens of the State) who on or since August 15, 1947, have entered it for other than lawful purpose shall be required to leave the State.
- (7) All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to ensure in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator that
- (a) there is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in the plebiscite;
 - (b) no restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the State. All subjects of the State regardless of creed, caste or party shall be safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the Press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of lawful entry and exit;
 - (c) all political prisoners are released;
 - (d) minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection; and
 - (e) there is no victimisation.
- (8) The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance and the Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been entrusted.
- (9) At the conclusion of the plebiscite the Plebiscite Administrator shall report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial.
- (10) Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part III of the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will be fully associated in these consultations.

Commends the Government of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight of January 1, 1949, pursuant to the agreement

arrived at as provided for by the Commission's Resolution of August 13, 1948, and

Resolves to return in the immediate future to the sub-continent to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Resolution of August 13, 1948, and by the foregoing principles.

AIDE MEMOIRE NO. I

His Excellency Dr. Lozano, accompanied by his Alternate, Mr. Samper, and His Excellency Mr. Colban, Personal Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, met the Prime Minister yesterday. The Hon'ble Shri Gopaldaswami Ayyangar and Sir G. S. Bajpai were also present. The discussions of the Commission's plebiscite proposals fell into two parts: (1) General, (2) Particular in reference to individual clauses.

2. The Prime Minister drew attention to Pakistan's repeated acts of aggression against India. In spite of the presence of Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir, which is Indian territory now, and the offensive action of Pakistan troops, the Government of India had accepted the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August. Pakistan had not accepted that Resolution. In paragraph 143 of its report, the Commission has referred to its conference with the Prime Minister on the conditions attached by the Government of Pakistan to its acceptance of the Resolution of the 13th August. As stated in paragraph 144 of the report, the Prime Minister had informed the Commission that he stood on his original premises that the Pakistan forces must be withdrawn from the State before the Government of India could consider any further steps. This had specific reference to an amplification of Part III of the Resolution of the 13th August. Nevertheless, the Government of India had agreed to informal conversations in Paris which had resulted in the formulation of the proposals now put forward by the Commission. The Government of India naturally wondered how far this process of rejection of proposals put forward by the Commission by Pakistan and the adoption of a responsive attitude on the part of the Government of India towards the Commission's proposals could continue. The Commission must realise that there were limits to the forbearance and spirit of conciliation of the Government of India. The Prime Minister emphasised (1) that, if the Government of India were to accept the Commission's plebiscite proposals, no action could be taken in regard to them until Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August had been fully implemented; (2) that in the event of Pakistan not accepting these proposals, or having accepted them, not implementing Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August, the Government of India's acceptance of them should not be regarded as in any way binding upon them; (3) Part III of the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August provided

"that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured." The present proposals appeared to limit the method of ascertaining the will of the people regarding the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to a plebiscite. While the Government of India adhered to their position in regard to a plebiscite, they had pointed out that, in view of the difficulties of holding a plebiscite in present conditions in Kashmir, other methods of ascertaining the wish of the people should also be explored. The Commission had itself recognised the difficulties of carrying out a plebiscite in Kashmir. The Government of India feel that the exploration of other methods should not be ruled out.

3. As regards (1), Dr. Lozano enquired whether there would be objection to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator until Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August had been implemented. Both he and Mr. Colban thought that the Plebiscite Administrator could do useful exploratory work even before arrangements for holding a plebiscite could be taken in hand. The Prime Minister pointed out that it was always open to the Commission to employ advisers or experts for work within its terms of reference. The Government of India, however, would regard the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator, as such, premature until Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August had been implemented. Dr. Lozano accepted (2). As regards (3), he said that the Commission wished the possibility of a plebiscite to be explored first. Should the Plebiscite Administrator, however, find a plebiscite to be impracticable, the way would be open to consider other methods for ensuring a free expression by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of their wish regarding the future status of the State.

4. *B.1. Preamble.* The phrase "The Governments of India and Pakistan simultaneously accept" is incorrect in that either Government may not accept the principles supplementary to the Resolution of the 13th August. Even if both Governments accept them, the acceptance cannot be simultaneous. The wording should be changed accordingly.

B.3(b). The question was raised whether the form of words employed was intended to give to the Plebiscite Administrator powers of interference in the administration of the State, e.g., by "direction and supervision of the State Forces and Police," mentioned in paragraph B.8 of the Security Council's Resolution of the 21st April, 1948. Dr. Lozano said that this was not the intention of the Commission and that the words quoted above had been deliberately omitted. The Prime Minister pointed out that all that the Plebiscite Administrator could in reason expect

was that, for the purpose of organising and conducting the plebiscite and ensuring its freedom and impartiality, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir should give him such assistance as he might require. Dr. Lozano said that a Plebiscite Administrator of international standing and commanding general confidence, who would be appointed after consultation with the Government of India, could be expected to act reasonably and that the Commission did not intend that he should usurp the functions of the State Government in the field of normal administration and law and order. His functions and powers would be limited to ensuring that the plebiscite was free and impartial.

B.4(b). The Prime Minister drew attention to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces which had been armed and equipped by Pakistan and were under the operational command of the Pakistan Army ran into tens of thousands. Their presence in the territories referred to in A.3 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August, even after demobilisation, would be a constant threat to the territory under the control of Indian and State forces, a deterrent to the return of many refugees, and an obstacle to the free expression of opinion regarding the future status of the State by those who might be opposed to the accession of the State to Pakistan. Dr. Lozano pointed out that it was the Commission's intention that there should be large-scale disarming of these forces, though it would not be possible to require withdrawal from these territories of genuine inhabitants of these areas.

B.6(a). Dr. Lozano agreed that it was not the Commission's intention that the Pakistan Commission should operate outside Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistan Commission would *not* operate in the territory referred to in A.3 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August. The Prime Minister then raised the question of the "free return" to the State of all citizens who had left it on account of the disturbances. He said that the tendency of Pakistan would be to push as many people as possible into Jammu and Kashmir. If the plebiscite was to be limited, as it should be, to genuine citizens of the State, the entry of persons claiming to be citizens into the State will have to be most carefully checked. How was this to be achieved? Dr. Lozano said that the Commission fully realised the necessity of an accurate and effective check but had not gone into details. Possibly those returning to the State could be stopped and examined at the frontier. The Prime Minister pointed out that, considering the length of the frontier and the ease with which people could slip across the border over mountain tracks, a check on the frontier would be neither easy nor effective, except by the employment of large forces.

Apart from the problem of entry, there is the even more important problem of the rehabilitation and protection of those who have left the State on account of recent disturbances. Homes have been destroyed; property has been lost; there has been wholesale

dispossession of persons from the land that they used to cultivate. It is not enough to "invite" these persons to return to the State. They have to be given full security and to be housed, fed and put in a position to maintain themselves. It may be necessary to lodge these returning citizens of the State temporarily in camps for distribution to their homes. They could not, however, be expected to remain in relief camps for long or to take part in a plebiscite from such camps. The administrative and economic implications of this task were at once significant and onerous. They must receive full attention.

B.6(b). It is assumed that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir will decide whether or not a person entered the State for a lawful purpose.

B.7(b). India is a secular State; the United Nations also are a secular organisation. Pakistan aims at being a theocratic State. An appeal to religious fanaticism could not be regarded as legitimate political activity. Dr. Lozano agreed that any political activity which might tend to disturb law and order could not be regarded as legitimate. The same test would apply to freedom of press and of speech.

As regards the freedom of lawful entry and exit, this must obviously be governed by B.6 of the proposals. It is assumed that in the territory under their control, entry and exit will be regulated by rules framed for the purpose by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, with due regard to the security of the State and the maintenance of law and order. Dr. Lozano said that a system of permits would probably be necessary.

B.7(c). Persons guilty of ordinary offences against law and order will not be regarded as political prisoners.

5. In all their negotiations the Government of India have emphasised the paramount need of ensuring the security of the State. The Commission recognised this in their Resolution of the 13th August; they have also provided in 4(a) of the proposals that measures with regard to the final disposal of Indian and State forces will be taken with due regard to the security of the State. The Government of India wish to emphasise the supreme importance which they attach to adequate provision for the security of the State in all contingencies.

AIDE MEMOIRE No. II

His Excellency Dr. Lozano and His Excellency Mr. Colban met the Prime Minister. The Hon'ble Shri N. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai and Mr. Pai were also present.

2. Dr. Lozano said that the *aide memoire* of the conference which took place on Monday, the 20th December, was a correct account of the proceedings. He suggested, however, that the phrase "large-scale disarming" of the Azad Kashmir forces used

in the portion of the *aide memoire* dealing with B.4(b) of the Commission's plebiscite proposals did not, perhaps, represent the Commission's intention. What the Commission had in mind was the disbanding of these forces: disarming, it was assumed, would follow. The Prime Minister pointed out that disbandment was not the same thing as disarming. Pakistan had raised something like 35 battalions of 28,000 to 30,000 men who now formed part of the Azad Kashmir forces. The presence of such a large number of armed people, even if the regular formations were disbanded, would not be conducive either to ensure the security of that part of Jammu and Kashmir which is under the control of Indian and State forces, or the security of those inhabitants of the territories referred to in A.3 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August who did not fully subscribe to or share the political views of pro-Pakistan elements. Moreover, the question of the re-entry into these territories of State citizens who had left it on account of the present conflict had to be kept in mind. With such a large number of members of the Azad Kashmir forces under arms, former inhabitants of these territories who held different political views would not dare to re-enter and, therefore, would be debarred from participation in a "free and impartial" plebiscite. In view of this explanation, Dr. Lozano agreed that phrase "large-scale disarming" should be regarded as correctly interpreting the Commission's intention.

3. Discussion then turned on B.10 of the proposals. Dr. Lozano, answering an enquiry of the Prime Minister, said that the Commission did not contemplate that the Plebiscite Administrator should undertake any administrative functions in regard to the plebiscite until Parts I and II of the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August 1948 had been implemented. Until such implementation, the conditions for the discharge of such functions would not exist. What the Commission had in mind was that discussions on details connected with the plebiscite might begin as soon as possible as this would create a good impression all around. Monsieur Colban supported this view on the ground that the announcement of a plebiscite administrator of high standing would have an excellent psychological effect. Monsieur Colban added that, of course, if difficulties arose in the implementation of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August, the preliminary consultations regarding the functions of the Plebiscite Administrator and other detailed arrangements for the plebiscite would have to be deferred.

The Prime Minister replied that, under the Commission's proposals, the Governments of India and Jammu and Kashmir assumed a great many responsibilities while Pakistan had to do practically nothing. The Governments of India and Jammu and Kashmir could not, in fairness, be expected to discharge any of their responsibilities regarding the plebiscite until there was satisfactory evidence that Pakistan was carrying out its obligations under Part

II of the Resolution of the 13th August. Moreover, once the present proposals had been accepted, the things left over for discussion with the Plebiscite Administrator would be (1) his functions and (2) detailed arrangements for carrying out a plebiscite. A consideration of (2) would clearly be impracticable until Parts I and II of the Resolution of the 13th August had been implemented. Unless cease-fire was carried out and Pakistan forces, hostile tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for purposes of fighting had withdrawn, there could not be, in the territories referred to in A.3 of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August, any local authorities with whom plebiscite arrangements could be discussed. B.9, as at present worded, could be interpreted to mean that consultations with the Plebiscite Administrator should start immediately on the signature of the truce. This clearly was not feasible. Dr. Lozano and Monsieur Colban pointed out that, when the paragraph in question was drafted, all these considerations were not present to the mind of the Commission. The Commission, according to Dr. Lozano, had assumed that since the Prime Minister of India had informed the Commission, two days after it had placed before him the conditions attached by the Government of Pakistan to their acceptance of the Resolution of the 13th August, that he stood on his original premises that the Pakistan forces must be withdrawn from the State before the Government of India could consider any further steps, action in relation to B.9 would be feasible only after satisfactory progress had been made with the implementation of Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August. He and Monsieur Colban agreed that the consultations envisaged in B.9 could take place only after the Commission was satisfied that satisfactory progress had been made with the implementation of Part II of the Resolution, that is, after hostile tribesmen, Pakistan forces and Pakistan nationals who had entered Jammu and Kashmir for the purpose of fighting had withdrawn from State territory. Dr. Lozano said that this was the interpretation of B.9 which they could present to the Pakistan Government in Karachi.

4. Dr. Lozano stressed the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator as soon as possible. In view of the preliminaries that had to be gone through, he thought that it might take some time before the Plebiscite Administrator was finally appointed. The Prime Minister pointed out that, if Pakistan accepted the present proposals and carried out its obligations under Part II of the Resolution of the 13th August promptly, he saw no reason why the appointment should take such time. What he wished to emphasise was that there would be nothing which the Plebiscite Administrator could usefully do in India until progress had been made with the implementation of Part II of the Resolution as now explained by Dr. Lozano and Mr. Colban.

5. As regards alternative methods of ascertaining the wish of the people regarding the future status of Jammu and Kashmir.

Dr. Lozano said that the statement in paragraph 3 of the *aide memoire* dated the 21st December, 1948, was substantially similar to his own record which reads "Dr. Lozano said that it would be up to the Plebiscite Administrator to report to the Security Council (through the Commission) if he found the plebiscite procedure to be impossible for technical or practical reasons. The Plebiscite Administrator and/or the Commission could then recommend alternative solutions."

6. Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister once again emphasised the need for security for displaced State nationals returning to the territory referred to in Part II A.3 of the Commission's Resolution of the 13th August. Equally important would be the task of rehabilitation of refugees returning to this area as well as to the part of the State under the control of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds of thousands of persons were involved. Not only organisation and machinery but time and money would be needed to accomplish the formidable task of restoring these unhappy persons to what once was their home. Until this task was completed, the conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite would not exist. Dr. Lozano recognised the importance of this matter and pointed out that it would have to be carefully gone into when the consultations on the details of the present proposals took place.

